Comparing Service Delivery Arrangements in Urban South Asia: Process Tracing Case Studies

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Abstract

Viewed as the backbone of the 'informal city', migrant labourers and low-income communities represent the largest populations of South Asia's mega cities. The unabated densification of large urban settings is indicative of the overwhelming demands facing service delivery providers, particularly in mega cities. Calls of civil society actors for coordination between local state and non-state actors in extending services to low-income communities remain unheard due to constraints rooted in administrative complexity and politics. This paper compares arrangements between state and non-state actors where municipal services are extended to informal settlements in Dhaka, Karachi, and Mumbai. A comparative case study approach is coupled with the 'process tracing' methodology to contrast positive and negative service delivery experiences across the three mega cities. Evidence from the water, sanitation, and solid waste collection settings points to the role of community leaders in sustaining solutions alongside sufficiently resourced local government service providers. Specificities from the 'process tracing' exercise point to the importance of leveraging relationships between lower tier state and non-state actors to offset interests from upper tier actors. The study underlines the need for clearly defined roles between state and non-state actors in protecting public goods. A final case study in organic waste recycling from Mardaan, Pakistan is provided as a link to markets. The usefulness of the 'process tracing' method in specifying accountability to key actors is a contribution which researchers in urban policy research, informality, and governance might consider.

Keywords: *local government, service delivery, process tracing, water and sanitation, mega cities.*

Introduction

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Service delivery to the informal sector in South Asia's mega cities is grossly under researched across the interdisciplinary policy literature. This should be alarming for the region's urban researchers and practitioners, given the inverse relationship between an overwhelming pace of urbanization and the diminishing capacity of local service delivery infrastructure and providers (Siddiqui et al., 2004). While a comparative urban research agenda has introduced the role of non-state actors (Rukmana, 2020; Satterthwaite, 2001; Stren, 1993), neoliberal thinking has promoted privatization and market led models, effectively silencing discussions around alternative service delivery arrangements and/or public sector reform (Hasan, 2007). The reasons for this are many and deserve some elaboration before we turn to comparative analysis and the study's purpose.

It is well established that urban growth is surging across South Asia and is outpacing the ability of the public sector to service all segments of society. South Asia's mega cities are among the densest, most complex, diverse and institutionally weak in the developing world. According to UN Habitat forecasts, South Asia will be home to the most mega cities and medium sized cities by 2025 (Un-Habitat, 2007). While neoliberal thinkers celebrate and promote the cosmopolitan aspirations of modernization, affluence and 'trickle down' economic growth, South Asia's urban centers are characterized by polarization. A small minority of South Asia's wealthy, globally mobile urbanites benefit from modern amenities from the comfort of gated communities while the majority struggle with precarious employment and existence in low income, unplanned settlements with no access to secure employment or basic services (Davis, 2006; Siddiqui et al., 2004). Furthermore, the poor pay illegal service providers (many with ties to elites) up to 10 to 15 times more (WaterAid, 2013) for services such as housing, water, sanitation, and other utilities (Devas, 2005). Over time, public service delivery machinery is overwhelmed and as systems of waste management collapse, spreading disease across these marginalized communities. If organized crime continues to monopolise scarce resources for profits, state infrastructure and public goods will continue to collapse (Baqir, 2009; Hasan, 2007). Eventually, these forces will threaten the urban health of wealthier communities and urban society as a whole. It is critical that we unpack the constraints to policy design, through the comparison of alternative service delivery models and urban settings. Two main challenges to our understanding of administrative capacities have constrained a

2

regional approach to service delivery research, which we will engage in this paper.

The first challenge has been that critical approaches do not unpack the intergovernmental dynamics between local and national/provincial levels of government. In post-colonial administrative contexts, centre facing bureaucracies have captured the policy agendas of South Asian governments while service delivery machinery across under resourced, under-developed and overwhelmed municipal governments has become politicized. For instance, the operations and maintenance needs of the latter, particularly the larger mega cities, have been marginalised to the point where they cater to upper tier projects and shifting mandates (for support) rather than develop self-sufficiency through autonomous means, such as taxation and revenue collection (Siddiqui et al., 2004; Shaheen, 2021). Evidence from the development studies literature has broadened the range of models and service delivery solutions that are independent of the state. However, while these contributions are valuable, they are limited in their scope, often duplicate efforts and are donor dependent (Banuri et al., 2002; Baqir, 2009). Most of all, they are isolated and lack a coordinating function that by organizational design, resides within municipal institutions and arrangements. The resulting policy gap demands the exploration of service delivery capacity and extension via mega cities.

The second related challenge is rooted in South Asia's colonial history, where the impression left by British rule has neglected investment and capacity building in service delivery infrastructure and distribution of services within and across mega cities. The colonial imprint remains within many of the SAARC nations as policies cater to an upward facing cadre of elite civil servants creating a 'tiered', centre facing bureaucracy (Ahmad, 1992). This network of bureaucrats has been charged with establishing a series of self-sustaining institutions that preserve power within a tightly knit group of policy actors (Subramaniam, 1990) without much concern for street level bureaucrats, social entrepreneurs, or front-line service delivery. The result is that resource transfers to program levels are time bound, inconsistent, and often discontinuous. Politicised institutions operate without due process or support from upper tiers. Rather than establish a framework of checks and balances to control spending and program activity, upper tier actors often dictate program outcomes at the local government level with no knowledge at all of ground realities (Shaheen,

3

2009, 2021; Subramaniam, 1990). This not only disempowers lower tier actors, but also removes the 'audit' function or 'regulatory' role of the state's upper tier. Subsequent swings in local elections and administrations further weaken municipal institutions as their mandates continue to be dismissed by upper tier policies/decisions. Furthermore, the duplication of 'legacy' departments, through politicised functionaries is a common feature of these municipal departments. Within this challenging context, it becomes difficult to assess where program improvements and points of intervention can be made to extend support and services to the urban poor (Baqir, 2009). It is therefore difficult to establish causality not only across different levels of government but with non-state actors as well. This, we argue, can be addressed by the case study approach coupled with the process tracing methodology.

Opportunities for Establishing Causality in the 'Interests' of Urban South Asia

Establishing causality through a more rigorous examination of institutions, processes, coalitions, and actors has long been emphasized across the policy studies literature As we have discussed, weak and politicized institutions across South Asia leave gaps between policy making (and budgeting), formulation, implementation, and evaluation. As many non-state actors also engage in ad hoc service delivery arrangements to communities, the service delivery landscape becomes that much more complex. Variances between state and non-state actors and their resources leads to a series of mixed outcomes which are difficult to assess empirically. As such, our examination responds to weak institutional frameworks by profiling the roles and interactions of specific interests, operating through coalitions at different levels of state and society (Siddiqui et al., 2004). We are specifically interested in how these civil society actors impact the service delivery context in South Asia's largest cities. This method has emerged from the sustainable development literature, a body of case studies, which profile interactions between non-state and state actors in various sectors such as forestry (Khan et al., 2006; Shaheen & Khan, 2017), fisheries (Khan et al., 2005; Khan & Kazmi, 2008; Khan & Khan, 2021), rural support (Baqir, 2009; Khan, 2008), rural support (Baqir, 2009; Siddiqui, 2006) and urban services (Shaheen, 2021; Khan & Khan, 2021: Rukmana, 2020; Drew & Grant, 2017). These examinations from South Asia (and East Asia) have focussed to a significant extent on the journeys and experiences of

4

community led movements and their replication across the region. In methodological terms, the inclusion of non-state actors and recipient communities through planning workshops, focus groups, social mapping, and stakeholder advocacy; cannot be understated. Let us briefly distill the roles of upper and lower tier state and non-state actors engaged to some degree, in serve delivery.

Among the more prominent state actors who were observed in service delivery interactions are those who operate at the upper tiers of the state, namely the central and/or provincial governments. There are also a number of non-state actors[†] (donors, international non-government organisations and aid agencies) who regularly engage with upper tier policy makers on various development initiatives and projects. This level of policy activity, in terms of the policy stages heuristic, is concerned largely with agenda setting, policy development and formulation. At the lower tiers of the state are those municipal and local government departments charged with overseeing or at least implementing and sustaining to some extent, neighborhood, and community level services and programs. At this level, community-based organisations as well as non-government organisations advocate for, support, and extend services to the poorest of the poor. The lower tier also sees the technically focussed, sector specific non-state actors and donors facilitate state projects by intervening and injecting funds tied to community engagement. This program level of service delivery is concerned mainly with policy implementation and to a lesser extent, evaluation, and monitoring.

Given the different stages of the policy development cycle, measures of project management, stakeholder activities and modes of alternative service delivery models; it is difficult to trace policy outcomes from the initial sources of any intervention to the outcomes at the community level. Moreover, it is challenging to assess which measures have contributed to

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[†] Use of non-state actors refers to those domestic, indigenous NGOs (and their partners) who are active at the community level in South Asia's mega cities. In each of the low-income communities, non-state actors transfer knowledge and lessons learned from across similar contexts and slowly develop the capacity and access to state services of the informal sector.

positive outcomes or not[‡]. In governance terms, the roles of upper and lower tier actors (state, donors, civil society, technical experts and communities) in contributing to positive service delivery outcomes is difficult to establish. For instance, the prioritisation of policies at different stages of development is always changing in volatile political environments. Corruption, nepotism, and a lack of capacity result in mixed outcomes from even the most specific of projects. Contingency theorists and community researchers will point to the 'Service Delivery Events' or 'Community Milestones' at the lower tiers of the state, but they are rarely appreciated by upper tier decision makers. As a result, there is an opportunity for a more 'Systems based approaches' to policy examination that address complexity by involving and tracing multiple actors and outcomes across comparable settings and case studies. The insights and observations which emerge from interactions and governance is the topic we now turn to, which will be framed by the process tracing method. In light of this, let us now turn to an overview of the methodology which discusses the merits of the process tracing approach.

Methodology: Case Study Approach and Process Tracing

Recent developments in policy research have recommended that case study methods be strengthened through the utilization of comparative studies between similar jurisdictions. In so far as efforts across the Global South are concerned, urban researchers and practitioners have emphasized the value of comparing the service delivery efforts of state and especially non-state actors and their arrangements across settings (Satterthwaite et al., 2011; Siddiqui et al., 2004; Shaheen, 2018). This study responds to the call for comparison by asking how the post-colonial WATSAN and SWM[§] service delivery contexts in Dhaka, Karachi and Mumbai compare in terms of engagement and service to the informal sector[**]. We supplement this

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[‡] Many policy researchers resort to utilizing the 'garbage can' approach to policy analysis, pointing to the overly complex convergence of forces which leads to outcomes. Our effort in this article is to inform analysis through a more accurate overview of policy and program processes which might lead to better cases of replication.

[§] Water and sanitation and Solid Waste Management.

[**] The comparison of South Asia's post-colonial municipal contexts is a natural research outcome from the imprint left by British rule. The legacy of elitist institutions, segregated pools of

comparison with a more recent social entrepreneurship model from Mardaan, where non-state actors actively engage market actors. A combination of primary and secondary sources informs a comparison of service delivery outcomes between each pair of case studies in each mega city of analysis. Research was conducted from December 2012 to December 2014 with data from Mardaan gathered in 2018. Let us now turn to the case study approach and the specific tool of 'process tracing'.

Each case study detailed the specific experiences of informal settlements in obtaining service delivery in cooperation with non-state actors. I used the experiences of successful and unsuccessful outcomes to contrast the roles of different state and non-state actors in extending services to informal settlements. Field case study research expands on the direct engagement of dynamic actors in a non-predictable environment (Singleton & Straits, 1993). I used this approach to explain interactions between state and non-state actors in two informal settlements within each of the three mega cities (Ragin & Becker, 1992; Palys & Atchison, 2008). This approach has helped to establish a level of conceptual validity by illustrating the influence of specific variables being analyzed (Yin, 1981; George & Bennett, 2005). Specifically, groups of 'comparator variables' described service delivery capacities between various actors in each of the case studies. These variables served as building blocks for assessment in the small number of cases (Ragin & Becker, 1992; George & Bennett, 2005).

The case study approach allows for the examination of 'causal mechanisms' across each of the mega-city service delivery contexts (George & Bennett, 2005). Causal mechanisms can be defined as the pathway that a process follows by which a particular effect is produced (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Employing causal mechanisms is indispensable when explaining third world development dynamics and the role of interests over institutions (Bradshaw & Wallace, 1991). In this study, each case study demonstrates how comparator variables influence non-state efforts at extending service delivery to informal settlements (Palys & Atchison, 2008). This method is referenced in the literature regarding qualitative and quantitative options to case study selection (Seawright &

professionals, class-based politics have left a centre facing bureaucracy mimicking imported models of institutional development.

Gerring, 2008; Bennett & Elmann, 2007; Yin, 1981). The collection of data at the local level about varying levels of success in service delivery and support to informal settlements, has allowed for 'within case' comparisons of constraints and enablers in small-n analysis (Mahoney, 2000). Such 'within case' comparisons have generated policy analysis with respect to the ability of actors to extend service delivery (Ragin & Becker, 1992). The case study approach enables the modeling of complex causal relationships between multiple state and non-state actors (Mahoney, 2000). I have employed 'process tracing' to outline the relationships between state and non-state actors in arriving at a means of extending service delivery. This approach has been employed across the literature to conceptualize the relationship between various actors (Palys & Atchison, 2008; Collier, 2011).

It goes without saying, that the case study approach has been the subject of criticisms across the research methods literature. The case study approach has been criticized for its vulnerability to selection bias as well as representativeness (George & Bennett, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2006). Selection bias in my study is addressed as each pair of mega city case studies were selected based on completely different outcomes. In other words, non-state actors selected case studies where service delivery experienced different outcomes. The influence of each comparator variable on each instance of service delivery outcomes was then assessed. The representativeness of the case is addressed as non-state actors directed the selection of a 'typical case' where service delivery is extended or denied to a community. The bias of the researcher is thus removed from the selection process as non-state actors are selecting the cases. The assumption is that across contexts and mega cities, there will be some similarity and parsimony nested within the explanatory richness of service delivery extension. This will provide insight into key variables that driven service delivery extension (Yin & Heald, 1976).

The 'dual approach' to case study selection is logical for this study, given that it enriches the data that has been categorized by comparator variables and compared across settings (Bennett & Elmann, 2007). By contrasting service delivery experiences between informal settlements, I assessed the capability of state and non-state actors within and across cities for service delivery effectiveness. This use of 'within case' analysis is commonly used within the policy research literature (Palys & Atchison,

2008). In each mega-city, I defined the 'class' of events for case study examination based on the experiences of non-state actors who frequently facilitate service delivery extension to informal settlements. This method of selecting 'crucial cases' maintains case study objectivity (George & Bennett, 2005). Each NGO provided two examples of service delivery extension to informal settlements. In one case, the effort to extend service delivery was successful. In other words, the informal settlement and its supporters in civil society were able to obtain service delivery from the state. In the other case, the effort was either unsuccessful or has experienced delays. In this unsuccessful case, a number of constraining factors has prevented the informal settlements' CBO and its civil society supporters from obtaining recognition or service delivery from the state. In our two cases, I am engaging the facilitating non-state actors for their experiences in engaging informal settlements and obtaining service delivery. By doing this, I am isolating comparator variable (civil society and donors) for analysis in successful and unsuccessful outcomes. It should also be noted that in the case of Mumbai, I drew on a larger set of information (the broader experiences of toilet block implementation in Dharavi) for the unsuccessful case study to make up for my inability to visit the mega city. Although the scale which I apply to Mumbai is larger than the other case studies, it allows me to make claims on the roles of specific comparator variables.

As such, process tracing with causal-process observations has been integrated with semi-structured interviews and nested within the case study and non-state actor experience. This brings out the causal sequence in which process-tracing observations are then situated. The key features of the process tracing framework as appears in each of the case study tables is as follows:

1. Each case study is divided into five-year increments.
2. Within each five-year period, key service delivery extension events are described.
3. In addition to the service delivery event, the policy stage that best defines the relationship between state and non-state actor is summarised.
4. A matrix of enabling and disabling factors is then charted, against the two groupings of actors (in this case upper and lower tier state and non-sate actors) which have been the subject of research and observation.

5. Finally, the tensions between enabling and disabling forces is summarized, for further elaboration during the discussion and concluding sections.

For this particular paper, we examine arrangements and outcomes from the water and sanitation sector and the roles played by state and non-state actor at the lowest tiers of the state in extending service delivery to the informal sector. In Dhaka, the relationship between the NGO Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) and the Dhaka Water and Supply Authority (DWASA); in Karachi the relationship between the NGO The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) and the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB); in Mumbai the relationship between Sulabh International (SI) and the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. In addition to the mega city case studies, an innovative process of organics recycling is also mapped out from the Integrated Resource Recovery Center in Mardaan. This final case study illustrates how a relationship between the Akhtar Hameed Khan Memorial Trust (AHKMT) and UN Habitat, UN Escape and the foreign based 'The Knowledge Executive' (TKE) network has engaged social entrepreneurs and market actors. Mapping for this particular site has been conducted as of 2018. For each setting, the level of engagement between state and non-state actors with reference to administrative typologies is then summarised (Sansom, 2006) via process tracing. An overview of the various state and non-state actors which were surveyed for this study are listed in Table 1.

Table 1

Data Sources for Water and Sanitation Service Delivery

Actors/City	Dhaka	Karachi	Mumbai
Upper Tier State and Multilateral Organizations	Government of Bangladesh, Asian Development Bank	Ministry of Sindh, Asian Development Bank	State of Maharashtra
International NGOS	Concern International, Slum Dwellers International, WaterAid	Slum Dwellers International, WaterAid	Society for Protection of Areas Resources, Slum Dwellers International

10

Lower Tier State	Dhaka Water Sanitation Authority, Dhaka City Corporation	Karachi Municipal Corporation, Karachi Water and Sewerage Board, Ministry of Sindh	Municipal Corporation Greater Mumbai
Local NGOs and Community Based Organizations	Dustha Shashthrya Kendra, Centre for Policy Dialogue	Orangi Pilot Project RTI, SAIBAAN, AHK Foundation, Urban Resource Center	Sulabh International, WaterAid

Examining State and Non-State Actors

In order to assess and then compare the impacts of various state and non-state actors, a set of comparator variables found to be most prevalent in the municipal policy literature are employed (Umeh & Andranovich, 2005; Siddiqui et al., 2004; Devas, 2001). They are as follows: Political representation, Accountability and Transparency, Intergovernmental relations, Civil Society and Donor Activity, Citizen and Pro Poor Engagement. These categories are discussed in greater detail elsewhere and as such will not be examined or summarized here. Let us now turn to the findings from each of the mega city case studies, all of which cite field research across the various settings (Shaheen, 2021).

Findings

In the case of ***Dhaka-Bangladesh***, a focussed and well networked NGO, Dushtha Shasthya Kendra (DSK) was found to have leveraged its expertise to the benefit of service delivery to slum communities (WaterAid, 2013; Singha, 2008). After ten years of focussed service delivery and relationship building with local water and sanitation officials, community-based hand pumps were set up, paid for by DSK, through bill collection from the community-based organization. Over time, these 'water points' (community-based hand pumps, which are essentially utility service connections) were set up as accounts within slum communities. According to utility managers, bill collection was found to be more efficient with slum communities as compared to other higher income groups. The Water and Sanitation Utility, relatively free from the constraints of intergovernmental politics and interference, has been focussed on reforms that will expand service delivery and coverage across the mega city. Over time, while the

11

Utility's rationale has been to recover non-revenue water and strengthen the institution, engagement with non-state actors has increased. The Utility has also established a low-income slum wing, mandated specifically to engage and extend services to low-income communities. Upon realising the limitations of its own staff, a number of memoranda and arrangements have been proactively set up with civil society actors, to extend services to various slum communities. Policies and programs have also been proactively adjusted so as to streamline and 'decouple' service delivery efforts from bureaucratic malaise, such as land tenure, ownership disputes and other utility bylaws that are anti-poor.

The case studies from Dhaka (See Table 2 and 3) reveal success through community mobilisation [††] in the face of adverse state responses. For instance, Kalyanpur Pura Basti (village) was mobilised (provided with hygiene training, capacity to engage municipal officers) by DSK and furnished with a number of water points and sanitation facilities that elevated its human development indicators and image within the community of slum dwellers. Unfortunately, the slum was evicted and demolished three times. Repeatedly, the community's level of motivation was strengthened with the support of DSK to such an extent that they returned and re-established the slum in the same space as developer wrangling and permit processing stalled formal land development efforts. Similarly, in Karail Basti (village), the persistent coordination of water point establishment between DSK, the local community, DWASA officials and the police against the efforts of criminal water operators stealing public water and piping it through a contaminated water body surrounding the *basti* (village) and nearby middle-income neighborhoods resulted in the connection of an official water point in the middle of the *basti*. In all cases, there is proof that community mobilisation buttressed by a formal level of support from the water and sanitation authority has resulted in positive outcomes of service delivery for slum dwellers.

[††] Here community mobilisation refers to the long, gradual capacity building of the community through trust building, education, documentation, communication and partnered advocacy for services with municipal officials. The purpose here is not to define community mobilisation in depth, but to demonstrate how partnerships between indigenous, grass roots based NGOs can mobilise community-based organisations (CBOs) representing the most marginalised of the informal sector.

In the case of ***Karachi-Pakistan***, an established and pioneering NGO, Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), has been found to have replicated its model of component sharing and low cost sanitation across low income communities and villages along the urban fringes of Karachi, resulting in their land tenure recognition by the municipal authorities. After 30 years of community engagement and mobilisation for service delivery access through the local water utility, the majority of Karachi's households are now connected to a piped water supply. The NGO's policy and research capability has repeatedly drawn attention to the high rates of water pilferage and theft by organised criminal gangs and their linkages with 'ultimate beneficiaries'. Once thought to be based within the city's underworld, many of the 'ultimate beneficiaries'[‡‡] have been found to be prominent politicians, members of parliament, the senate and even high ranking officials within the military. The water and sewerage board, plagued by inefficiencies and institutional malaise and interference, has been unable to realise the potential of partnering with the NGO in formal terms in order to recover non-revenue water. Field operators and management staff who sympathise with the efforts of the NGO continue to reinforce and support its dissemination to other communities. However, a broad policy and programme of formal engagement through the water and sewage board is not forthcoming, despite the recommendations of consultant reports to explore alternatives for retail service delivery that address non-revenue water and theft.

The case studies from Karachi (See Table 4 and 5) reveal the strength of community mobilisation when service delivery and local commercial interests are combined. In other words, where resident communities are supported by the efforts of nearby markets and traders there is a faster response time from the service delivery providers to provide a connection. In Sabzi Mandi, the traders were involved in lobbying for a single water connection for the community. While the residents had long lobbied for a connection, it was only when the traders in the nearby market were involved

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[‡‡] Ultimate beneficiaries are those who are sponsoring and/or funding illegal hydrants through manpower, distribution, bribery of local officials (police and water utility operators) and revenue collection. Interviews with civil society and municipal actors reveal multiple allegations of upper tier state officials financially benefitting from the resale of pilfered public water supplies through illegal hydrants.

that services were connected.   Following the formal connection it was noticed that crime was reduced as local illegal water providers were being marginalised by the public utility. Political intervention, unfortunately, has stymied efforts by the water authorities to expand their reach.   Several illegal hydrants have been rigged for bulk water extraction across the city. There are reports that high ranking officials have requested that bulk water hydrants be set up in their jurisdiction, so that they may start up their own businesses at the expense of the public utility. Where hydrants are not involved, political intervention and jangling between municipal and provincial actors restricts recognition of low income settlements and service delivery to them.   For example, in Dhost Muhammad Jungar Goth, a village on the peri-urban fringe of Karachi, intergovernmental disagreement on the settlement's jurisdiction is a source of conflict.   The municipality as well as the province are unclear as to where the city limits and responsibilities for service delivery lie. As a result, upper tier political actors, leveraging 'votes for services' [§§] relationship, are threatening local community based organisation (CBO) leaders with death, should they try to establish a robust water line and sewage main that would sustain services from the city. Efforts by civil society actors continue, but there is still a lot of political resistance both internally and externally to service delivery to low income communities.

In the case of **Mumbai-India**, a pioneering NGO in sanitation infrastructure, Sulabh International (SI), was engaged by the State to pilot local solutions. However, despite their success in tailored designs with local community actors, the State has continued to insist on scaling up solutions (See Table 6 and 7). Mumbai's highly concentrated core has left little space for sanitation solutions and service delivery facilities. One of the earliest experiments by SI, was at Dadar TT bus stand where sufficient space for a toilet block and a high rate of footfall (traffic) that would support 'pay as you go' toilet usage.   A local entrepreneur was engaged and a mixed use model was employed for the toilet block.   The facility paid for itself within a matter of months and continues to be operated as a community run toilet

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[§§] 'Votes for services' is rent seeking behaviour, where elected officials withhold the ability of local service providers to deliver until the elected official has a secured place in public office.   Such manipulative behaviour results in residents associating services with the elected official, rather than water or other utility bills which support service delivery infrastructure.

block today. Upon seeing the benefits of such pilots, upper tier actors within the State as well central government opted to promote scaled up and subsidised models of toilet block installation to expedite entrepreneurial involvement and achieving of the sanitation goals. However, the subsidisation of operations has reduced any competition for maintaining facilities and made operations unsustainable. The result has been the appropriation of each facility by private actors, local *mastaans* (slum lords) and shop keepers. The lesson from the dense locales of Mumbai and the innovative SI has been the need to engage community at the design stage so as to build operations and maintenance concerns into budget models. The delay of addressing such programme concerns has led to millions of rupees of waste, with no real increase in access to toilet blocks within the growing mega city.

In the case study of **Mardaan-Pakistan**, a social entrepreneurship based model of collection, composting and resale of organic waste was initiated with the support of the Akhtar Hameed Khan Memorial Trust (AHKMT) along with other supporting Community Development Network (CDN) partners. Solid waste collection and management is a complex and multilayered activity across an increasingly urbanizing Pakistan and for the most part, has experienced success where recycling of material has diverted materials away from the landfill stream and more importantly, discarding into the open drains which often surround urban centers. A significant proportion of the recyling and distribution activity is performed by informal sector actors with collection undertaken by the poorest of the poor. In dense urban settings, the concentration of recylable material and organics makes collection and sorting much more cost effective, with hierarchical relationships linking collectors to distributors. In smaller urban settings however, the greater geographical spread of homes and relatively smaller volumes of waste requires more active coordination to link collection with recylcing and distribution. The creation of Integrated Resource Recovery Centers in Mardaan illustrates how coordination and supply chain management can facilitate a sustainable business model.

Mardan's single IRRC compresses the diverse activities of urban solid waste collection and management into one segmented, process consisting of 'Boxes' which hold the maturing, organic waste. The end to end process consists of collecting/receiving, sorting, boxing, maturing, composting and bagging of the organic waste. Following this process, the organic waste is

15

sold to commercial and agricultural clients. The sequence of maturing and composting activities take place within a facility envelope, which is surrounded by a buffer zone of vegetation and tree cover. This allows the facility to blend into the community and contain the nuisance of site and smell, while remaining within the proximity of waste generating clients. A total of three staff are required at minimum, to manage the facility, processes and clients. At full capacity, the facility can manage the assembly and storage of 3 tons of organic waste per day. The piloting of the IRRC has been the product of funding from a third party sponsor in coordination with technical support from the AHKMT. In order to elevate the profile of the effort, external actors including the TKE among others have been engaged for sponsorship, resourcing and research support.

The IRRC approach has been in operation across small and medium sized communities since 2015. The most recent facility to be launched has been in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's district of *Mardan.* Established by the AHKMT in collaboration with UN-Habitat and UN-Escape, the decentralized model has illustrated the success of the social enterprise in recycling waste for agricultural and horticultural use. Other locations include the pilot project in Islamabad (Sector G-15 and H-9), Nawab Shah, Hyderabad, Thatta, and Hasilpur. Other cities include Muzaffarabad, Mingora, Mansehra, Sialkot, Gilgit and Rawalpindi. Now that these IRRC's have established a cumulative 5-year track record of efficient solid waste management across a number of urban settings, the replication of practices can be accelerated. The lead NGO, the AHKMT, with support from foreign partners (TKE among others) intend to replicate and support this model from the current 10 locations to over 100 additional locations across Pakistan. The critical input to these centers is the mobilization of unemployed graduates of local colleges and relationships with local market actors. The spill over benefits of the stand alone IRRC model to local social and economic settings makes it a candidate for deeper comparative study, research and recruitment in partnership with local educational institutions and communities. The intention being, that by increasing the scope of infrastructure support for such service delivery models, more policy attention to arrangements between non-state actors and community entrepreneurs can be generated. As with case studies from the water and sanitation sectors, the IRRC model mitigates endogenous risks as it is self sufficient in revenue recovery, focussed on recruiting young entrepreneurs.

Civil society actors are fully cognizant of the service delivery gaps which can be filled by arrangements between lower tier actors, research institutes and education centers.

Non-State Actors - Whither State Response

Each of the case studies demonstrate the efficient and effective role of civil society actors in both developing community capacity and bridging service delivery gaps with local state providers. As each arrangement has operated with minimal support and resources, the cost benefit of public sector engagement of civil society actors over market players is obvious. This is consistent with findings in the literature, the conversion of the allocations made by the state into outputs and outcomes depends upon the political context and system of governance (Leftwich, 1993, 2008). A system of governance based on exclusionist ideology and practices, reflected in high administrative costs (Hasan, 2007) and a narrow taxation base (Martinez et al., 2015), cannot address the poverty alleviation problem by introducing apolitical and ahistorical rules and norms of accountability. Second, the shortcoming of such a system of governance is also reflected in the functioning of the market. The market fails due to the lack of profit-making opportunities caused by diseconomies of scale for delivering services to low-income communities (Hussain et al., 1999; Khan, 1997). Finally, the resulting failures at both the state and market arenas creates 'anarchy' at the community level (Khan, 1997). It leaves the field open for both civil society and rent-seeking sections of the society to capture and entrench themselves in the delivery of services. Productive rent seekers can provide only part of the solution (Hasan, 2007; Rahman, 2008). The case studies show that civil society organizations can realize success if the necessary conditions for neutralizing unproductive rent-seeking by initiating the process of community-state engagement for the improvement of services is initiated (Hasan, 1997; Patel et al., 2001; Pervaiz et al., 2008). The DSK, OPP, SI and IRRC models address these endogenous risks by utilizing local actors and local inputs to ensure the benefits are captured within the communities of service. Future study may examine the local effects of crowding in economic activity around other enterprises. These models also demonstrate a realistic cost-benefit model due to low operating costs and the ample supply of labor. The establishment of service delivery which is fundamentally community based and depends on the engagement of local actors to ensure success, *may* insulate some of these models and

17

their relationships with municipal authorities from market failures, rent-seeking behavior, and forces of anarchy.

The results also provide a number of observations on the engagement between non-state actors (community and civil society) with their counterparts in the state (local government). Interactions which are bound by plans, memoranda of understanding, service level agreements, bill payment cycles and regular interactions are needed to build confidence among all stakeholders. These interactions also have significant policy implications. Most obviously, they illustrate that the state has simply not been able to meet its mandate and obligations in ensuring or enabling service delivery through non-state actors. By engaging in such documented meetings and agreements, the state has recognized this limitation, and delegated more authority to community-based organizations through their civil society partners. A few of the prominent examples of acknowledgement by state actors of the role played by civil society actors as documented in the case studies are as follows:

DSK: Having demonstrated exemplary service delivery within Mirpur, along with the opening of water supply to Karail slum, has now led to the expansion of service delivery extension to other parts of Dhaka. The *State utility has been pushed to realise its inability to service all stakeholders and engage more NGOs like DSK. DWASA has recognised this and* established *memorandum of understandings* (*MoUs*).

OPP RTI: While the NGO exposed water pilferage and water revenue losses as part of reporting efforts, relations with the KWSB are frayed at best. *In the absence of broad, formalised state facilitation and collaboration that would secure the relationship with this NGO, has left the organisation and staff vulnerable.*

SI: Details regarding the nuances of local entrepreneurial design and sustainability expose the limitations of the privatised 'one size fits all' model. *Absence of state appreciation of local nuances of design has led to unnecessary experimentation with subsidising private sector operations and millions of rupees in outlays through the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM).*

IRRC: The development of the social entrepreneurship model, alongside that of the OPP-RTI, has illustrated how the mobilization of local

talent can lead to several sustainable development benefits for the local community. The *absence of broad, formalised recognition with state actors and collaboration that would result in the replication of this effort across similar urban settings, has left the organisations potential for research and service delivery unrealized.*

Policy Implications for Tiers of the State

There are a number of service delivery settings which should be concerned with the implications of the study's findings. The urgency of institutional reform is but a summary of my research's broader findings on challenges facing municipal service delivery (Shaheen, 2017). Nevertheless, these recommendations speak to the post- colonial challenges of mega city management (in dealing with centre facing upper tiers of the state) and the difficulty of ensuring some level of service delivery sustainability. Taken further, 'process tracing' can also ensure that the participation of donors (technical and financial) can enable results tied to specific outcomes. Case study evidence points to the centrality of lower tier state service providers and frameworks of accountability and transparency across urban governance settings. Evidence from the case studies and process tracing exercises, points to the following specific policy and program reforms.

Firstly, there is a need to disentangle upper tier actors from lower tier frontline departments. While clear roles and responsibilities in service delivery need detailing, the role of monitoring and regulation needs to be re-established. Secondly, legacy departments need to be consolidated and aligned to reduce duplication. The process tracing of service delivery value can assist in this exercise. Thirdly, where the absence of municipal capacity exists, authorities must acknowledge, recognize, and legitimately engage in a relationship with non-state actors which elevates the profile of their efforts. Where contractual relationships emerge, fair market values for services and outputs should be studied to ensure that some level of engagement and recognition of inputs to alternative service delivery models occurs. Overall, resources and mandates need to address service delivery needs across all communities. Fourthly, the mobilization of local actors and indigenous social entrepreneurs' needs to take place, breaking the cycle of dependency on donor led development and solutions. Finally, there needs to be an official recognition and understanding with non-state actors which

19

is framed by formal contractual relations. This should increase the visibility and social handprint of street level bureaucrats on the communities they serve. This will require highly trained technocrats to be empowered within the communities they serve, with the potential of service delivery self-sufficiency made transparent for all stakeholders.

There is value in discussing specific steps which should be taken in light of the stages of engagement between state and non-state actors. Recommended next steps are outlined by case study in the following table.

Table 2

Successful and Unsuccessful Service Delivery Outcomes

City	Successful	Unsuccessful
Dhaka	Kalyanpura Basti - **Accountability and Transparency**: Autonomous utility managers, formalize cooperation with NGOs and CBOs in order to share infrastructure and extend service to lower income users. - **Civil Society Activity**: Persistent NGO engagement of the public utility coupled with ongoing CBO capacity building led to rapid resettlement	Korail Basti - **Accountability and Transparency:** Utilities are unable to engage NGO and CBO infrastructure plans due to the lack of due process and delegated authority by upper tier state actors. - **Civil Society Activity**: NGO engagement of public utility was ad hoc while trying to mobilize a large, diverse group of community members
Karachi	Dost Muhammed Jungar Goth - **Accountability and Transparency** A weak utility utilizes the informal maps of a well mobilized CBO and technical NGO to extend infrastructure. - **Civil Society Activity**: Well-resourced CBO mobilizes its constituents with NGO facilitation and engages public utility	Ghazi Goth - **Accountability and Transparency**: Service delivery infrastructure to the settlement remains inactive due to lack of approval from upper tier actors. - **Civil Society Activity**: NGO provide technical support to a mobilized, resilient CBO despite threats from upper tier actors.
Mumbai	Dadar TT - **Accountability and Transparency**: A frustrated municipality contracts service provision and sustainment to the CBO. - **Civil Society Activity**: NGO mobilizes CBO to design, construct and operate a toilet block with sustainment and community considerations in mind. The block continues to be operational.	Dharavi - **Accountability and Transparency**: State actors ignore the advice of CBOs and NGOs to adopt site specific arrangements for sustainment. - **Civil Society Activity**: site specific NGO and CBO considerations are sidelined by upper tier actors (and pressure from organized criminals) and larger, unsustainable project scopes.

Conclusions

The process tracing methodology combined with the case study approach is a useful tool in disentangling the roles of multiple stakeholders in service delivery. The application of this approach across South Asia illustrates the value to dense and complex settings across the Global South (where interests are more in need of analysis and measurement than institutions). With further development, this tool may assist advocacy experts and policy analysts in pointing out specific gaps within the overall policy cycle. Of most importance is the mapping tool, which already has been employed across most civil society organizations. Taken in tandem with the process tracing approach within case studies, resulting analysis will have implications for community monitoring and data collection in general. While social mapping and diagnostic dialogues continue across the subcontinent, there is a risk of the approach being usurped by Systems and Contingency Theory which are more open to the process mapping and input/output language of policy measurement. The focus on technology over all other social and political considerations should be avoided. It is critical therefore, that the representation of recipient communities and needs analysis remain in the hands of civil society actors and researchers situated between them and local government actors. If the goals of service delivery improvement and inclusive engagement of recipients is maintained, a much more focussed policy discussion will emerge. Ultimately, such a discussion should be centered on at risk recipients, particular in the ever-densifying urban centers of the Global South. Case Studies

Table 2:

Kalyanpur Pura Basti, Dhaka

1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015

Slum established at Kalyanpur Pura Basti.	DSK engages slum through local NGOs in an effort to spread hygiene awareness	Basti residents evicted, assets destroyed, community resettles the slum after prolonged protests.	Basti evicted, assets destroyed, resettling follows, DSK MoU with DWASA.	DSK transfers WP and billing to Basti residents.	DSK sets up additional latrines.
	Recognition	Dialogue		Contractual	

	Enabling Factors	Disabling Factors
Upper Tier	Inability of developers to progress post slum eviction.	Upper tier networks of landowners marginalise slum dweller access to tenure and force evictions.
Lower Tier	NGO CBO mobilisation and resilience during each eviction and resettlement.	Inability to obtain clear recognition and relationship with lower tier department (DWASA).
Tension between Enabling and Disabling Factors	Education and awareness have led to mobilisation of illiterate slum dwellers and engagement of lower tier state actors. Per capita consumption in higher income areas leads to low pressure and neighbourhood pressure to evict slum dwellers. The community's resiliency in resettling demonstrates their resolve despite threats of eviction.	

Table 3

Karail Basti, Dhaka

1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Slum of Karail established by migrant workers on		Only 1 in 7 water connections are legal.		Number of illegal connections surpasses 20, most of	DSK launches targeted water and sanitation project in part	Population reaches 100,000; DSK WaSH	Construction finally starts on municipal line to Karail. Delays result due to	DWASA reforms and persistence by the CBO and DSK

90 acres of public land.		sanitation discharge returns to lake water supply.	of the slum with DFID***, Water Aid. Fire destroys part of slum, DSK provides assistance, first measure of trust building.	††† effort expanded to entire slum. Karail Master Plan developed. DSK and CBO engage DWASA with no success.	inter departmental dispute over land ownership.	result in opening of additional water lines to Karail.
	Recognition	Dialogue		Contractual		

	Enabling Factors	Disabling Factors
Upper Tier	Drafting of policies.	Opaque inter departmental land ownership, neglect of illegal water connections and permitting pilferage.
Lower Tier	Persistent pressure on utility for connections, internal reforms by utility management, formalised relationships between NGO/CBO and utility.	Time to engage, graft at lower tiers of utility.

*** DFID: Department for International Development, UK.

††† WaSH: Water Sanitation and Hygiene.

		A UNDP funded CBO draft of the Karail Master Plan has led to unity, lobbying, recognition and support from lower tier state actors. Persistent lobbying with DWASA has led to official water connections against the water profiting of criminal groups and the land development interests of upper tier actors. The connections have also been laid despite the disputes of current land ownership between multiple lower and upper tier state actors.
Tension between Enabling and Disabling Factors		

Table 4

Sabzi Mandi, Karachi

1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
		Sabzi Mandi grows as a market.	Sabzi Mandi emerges as a centre of trade and distribution.	Criminal activity noticed by authorities and residents, little access to services.	Traders get together to access services from city.	'Seamless' Site renewal facilitated by OPP in working with KWSB.	WATSAN Services provided to all of the community.	
			Recognition		Dialogue	Recognition		Dialogue?

	Enabling Factors	Disabling Factors
Upper Tier		PPP (Pakistan Peoples' Party) and MQM (Muttahida Quami Movement) competing interests stall CBO development efforts.
Lower Tier	NGO facilitation of documentation and CBO momentum between local business and local resident interests.	

	United advocacy by the residents and the market traders for access to services from KWSB led to the implementation of a component sharing arrangement. Subsidisation by market traders for the residents has, thus, sidelined a plethora of illegal service providers and organised criminal interests whose linkages with corrupt upper tier actors had led to encroachments, illegal occupation of land and marginalised services.
Tension between Enabling and Disabling Factors	

Table 5

Ghazi Goth, Karachi

1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Earliest records of Ghazi *Goth* ‡‡‡ as a village.		Unlike other *Goths* in Karachi, all ethnic groups are mixed within this community.		Population grows, but state services restricted to a small police department.	Density increases and soak pits as well as partial septics begin to pressure community health.	OPP RTI§§§ and CBO begin to place pressure on KWSB and KMC**** to provide sanitary and water lines.	Construction begins on water and sanitary lines. As PPP are running project, MQM interference and threats to contractor and residents' stalls work.	OPP RTI and CBO are still filing their request for laying the line.
				Recognition	Dialogue	Recognition		Dialogue?

‡‡‡ Goth: Town.

§§§ OPI RTI: Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute.

**** KMC: Karachi Municipal Corporation.

	Enabling Factors	Disabling Factors
Upper Tier	PPP construction and investment push.	MQM threats and interference.
Lower Tier	NGO and CBO persistence and patience.	
Tension between Enabling and Disabling Factors	CBO engagement with the OPP led to mapping and trenches being dug by the KWSB[††††] and DCC for water and sewerage. Unfortunately, MQM and PPP wrangling over jurisdiction (influenced in part by a nearby commercial development) has led to the stalling of progress and the backfilling of trenches without the lines. Local political actors have also threatened residents who are participating in the CBO and are willing to pay for the internal component portion of the water and sanitation network.	

Table 6

Dadar, Mumbai

1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
	Twin flush toilets established in India by Sulabh International (SI).		Dadar TT public toilet block established with success due in part to local planning and sustainability.		Bangalore blocks set up through private sector with subsidies. These blocks, along with others fail due to poor design and lack of market value.		Pune toilet blocks set up through state and private actors, State interference in design leads to SI withdrawing from contract.	
	Recognition and Dialogue		Contracting		Dialogue		Contracting	Dialogue?
	Enabling Factors				Disabling Factors			

[††††] KWSB: Karachi Water and Sewerage Board.

Upper Tier						Greed and desire to scale up without consulting community based actors.		
Lower Tier	Customised toilet block design and O&M [‡‡‡‡] sustainment.							
Tension between Enabling and Disabling Factors	MCGM[§§§§] funded work by SI led to the design, construction and operation of over 300 toilet blocks. As larger amounts of project funding were invested by the MMRDA[*****] and upper tier actors, local design considerations have been overlooked. A plethora of upper tier actors have increasingly intervened in project design and funding, leading to SI withdrawing from scaling up project work. In these cases, where NGOs among other contractors bid for the work, continuity is broken. In these instances, the money is in the hands of petty bureaucrats and funds are captured by middlemen. Where NGOs are given the funds up front to design and sustain the toilet block, local considerations are factored in and the likelihood of project success increases.							

Table 7

Dharavi, Mumbai

1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
	50% of the city's 5.9 million residents				Dharavi is targeted by redevelopment projects, with mixed results. SPARC [†††††] is part	SPARC bids for and operates a fraction of the toilet blocks in	MCGM, MMRDA and donors scale up toilet block projects with mixed results. Lack of communit	4,000 more toilet blocks are needed across Dharavi, concerns of scaled

[‡‡‡‡] O and M: Operations and Maintenance.

[§§§§] MCGM: Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai.

[*****] MMRDA: Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority.

[†††††] SPARC: Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres.

live in slums.		of an alliance protesting state development approaches.	Dharavi, through networks and contacts engaged at the MMRDA.	y engagement, corruption and insufficient O and M considerations.	up projects vs. CBO engagement abound.
Recognition and Dialogue	Contracting	Dialogue	Contracting	Dialogue

	Enabling Factors	Disabling Factors
Upper Tier	MMRDA and other actors recognise and work with SPARC.	Political economy of '*mastaan*[‡‡‡‡‡] networks'. Desire to scale up project wise, lack of planning and community engagement, lack of recognition and enabling of lower tier state actors.
Lower Tier	Ability to network with a range of actors across lower and upper tiers.	Lack of capacity.
Tension between Enabling and Disabling Factors	Large scale project results have been mixed due to intergovernmental disagreements on land ownership and red tape. CBO engagement in project delivery without the requisite education and advocacy has also led to poor uptake, usage and maintenance. The roles of lower tier NGOs has been challenged by pressures from upper and lower tier actors. The lack of transparency and clear lines of accountability have also made lower tier engagement and project implementation difficult across a very dense and politicised Dharavi.	

Table 8

Integrated Resource Recovery Center, Mardaan

[‡‡‡‡‡] Mastaan: Slum Lord.

1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020
		Research studies start in Mardaan	Research and studies on community development intensify in Mardaan	Research and community led women's groups continue to grow	Mardaan seen as an opportunity for social engagement and community mobilization.	Mardaan IRRC started with procurement of facility, hiring of staff and contracts for compost collection	Mardaan signs an MOU with the IRRC, with support from the AHKMT and UN partners.	Mardaan's IRRC now looks for replication across other urban settings. TKE establish to recruit partners in other settings
		Recognition and Dialogue			Contracting			Dialogue

	Enabling Factors	Disabling Factors
Upper Tier	No interference from provincial or municipal actors	Lack of recognition, political support or networking for scaling up project wise, against the backdrop of a lack of recognition and enabling of lower tier state actors.
Lower Tier	AHKMT actors and Community Development Network engage and support the IRRC, ample supply of labour also benefits collection.	Absence of start-up funding for staff recruitment, LG engagement and contracting services.

Tension between Enabling and Disabling Factors	Replication has been constrained due to a lack of recognition by upper tier state actors and support from local government. All is related to an overall lack of capacity. CBO engagement in project delivery without the requisite education and advocacy has also led to poor uptake, usage and maintenance.

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