| Review | Open Access |
|---|
Qur’ānic Persuasive Logic as a Structural Framework: Exploring Syllogism and Presupposition in Divine Argumentation |
|---|
Sujiat Zubaidi1,
Nindhya Ayomi Delahara1* ,
Yusuf Rahman2 ,
Dhita Ayomi Purwaningtyas3
1Universitas Darussalam Gontor, Indonesia
2UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Indonesia
3Universitas Negeri Padang, Indonesia
This study examines Qur’ānic persuasive logic as a structural framework, emphasizing how the text employs syllogistic and presuppositional reasoning in divine argumentation. Although the Qur’ān does not use formal Aristotelian logic, its rhetorical discourse reveals implicit logical patterns that invite rational reflection. Drawing on classical Islamic thought, particularly that of al-Ghazālī, this research employs thematic analysis to examine selected narratives. It identifies three core syllogistic structures with their corresponding epistemic presuppositions: equilibrium (taʿādul), equivalence (talāzum), and contradiction (taʿāruḍ). These elements are integral to theological persuasion, guiding readers from accepted premises toward coherent and compelling religious conclusions. The findings confirm that the Qur’ān systematically employs both syllogism and presupposition—not merely as stylistic devices but as core logical instruments in its persuasive strategy. These elements work in tandem to shape a coherent argumentative structure that affirms divine truth while appealing to human reason. Particularly in the narratives of Ibrāhīm and Mūsā, the presence of deductive and analogical reasoning grounded in presupposed truths is both evident and methodologically consistent. This research thus contributes to Qur’ānic studies by foregrounding a model of divine persuasion rooted in logical architecture, where syllogism and presupposition function as integral components of the Qur’ān’s epistemic and rhetorical authority.
*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Nindhya Ayomi Delahara, Department of Al-Qur’an and Tafsir Studies, Universitas Darussalam Gontor, Indonesia [email protected]
As a divinely inspired guide for humanity (hudan li al-nās), the Qur’ān offers a comprehensive framework for all aspects of life, grounded in rational and persuasive argumentation. Upon closer examination, it contains key elements for developing science that benefit humankind. Although the Qur’ān does not explicitly elaborate on formal logic, it implicitly sets standards for intellectual reasoning. Nevertheless, some groups have challenged the Qur’ān’s logical coherence.
Classical Islamic scholars have long acknowledged the rational dimension of the Qur’ān. Al-Ghazālī (d.1111), in his al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm, developed a framework of Qur’ānic logic based on principles such as equilibrium (taʿādul), equivalence (talāzum), and contradiction (taʿāruḍ) aimed at countering theological errors and establishing evidentiary standards grounded in both reason and revelation.1 For instance, in his analysis of Prophet Ibrāhīm’s debate with Namrūd, al-Ghazālī identifies a structure akin to contradiction as a logical refutation of false claims of divinity. Similarly, Mūsā's confrontation with Fir’aun illustrates the use of partial explanation (al-juzʾiyyah) to affirm divine lordship without resorting to ontological definition.
The Qur’ānic text exhibits identifiable patterns of logical organization, frequently embedded in foundational concepts resembling mathematical balance and symmetry. 2 These elements are conveyed through analogical patterns encouraging reflective thought and epistemic engagement. For example, in responding to Pharaoh’s interrogation concerning the nature of God, Prophet Mūsā refrained from offering an ontological or metaphysical definition. He provided a partial (juzʾiyyah) explanation that highlighted the core divine attribute of rubūbiyyah (lordship) to distinguish God from created beings, thereby avoiding speculative kullīyyah assertions.3 Analyzing the stories of the Prophet in the verses of the Qur’ān reveals the decisive role of persuasive logic in establishing rational proofs for the existence of the divine. Furthermore, the Qur’ānic model of persuasive logic, exemplified through analogical reasoning, offers a framework for constructing compelling arguments across diverse domains, including economics and politics, using inductive and deductive methods.
Persuasion is frequently viewed with suspicion, commonly associated with manipulation, propaganda, or indoctrination. In contrast, logic has traditionally been regarded as a tool for ensuring argumentative rigor and preventing fallacious conclusions. This perceived dichotomy between logic and persuasion has shaped modern conceptions of rational discourse. However, within Islamic intellectual tradition, the epistemological status of logic itself has not been immune to critique. Scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah challenged the adoption of Aristotelian syllogism, arguing that syllogistic reasoning is misaligned with the foundation of Islamic epistemology, and may obscure rather than illuminate divine truths.4 He argued that knowledge cannot be confined to formal syllogistic structures, especially in matters of religion. This critical stance has sparked broader debates about the relationship between revelation and reason, and whether logic should be regarded as a neutral tool or a culturally contingent epistemological system.5
Several studies have examined the role of logic in Islamic philosophy and theology. However, few have explored the Qur’ān’s use of persuasive logic, particularly its application of syllogistic structures and presuppositions within narrative contexts. Shoxobiddonov found that presupposition is a cognitive and pragmatic feature of language. It encompasses how implicit assumptions are triggered, projected, and accommodated in everyday discourse to manage contextual relevance and shared understanding.6 Qusthan et al. justify faith by using logical fallacies to counter those who doubt the Qur’ān.7 At the same time, Parvin and Mohsen analyze verses that address attitudes of doubt and various forms of doubt in the Qur’ān, as well as how the Qur’ān refutes these arguments.8 Moqbel, in his article, integrates the science of manṭiq (logic) with Qur’ānic interpretation, discussing how logic is used as an explanatory tool by systematically analyzing revealed texts.9 Habibolahi focuses on the role of presupposition in identifying implicit concepts in the Qur’ān and how implied meanings are revealed through background assumptions and semantic inference.10
This study aims to fill that scholarly gap by investigating how the Qur’ānic narrative employs analogical reasoning and presuppositional logic to construct arguments concerning the existence and authority of the Divine.
To achieve the objectives of the study, the research adopts a qualitative approach, employing an analytical-descriptive method with thematic tafsīr (tafsīr mawḍūʿī) as its primary interpretive framework. This approach is used to categorize and synthesize Qur’ānic verses about the affirmation of God’s existence and the prophetic mission of Muhammad, with particular emphasis on the persuasive reasoning embedded within the Qur’ānic narrative discourse.
The selection of verses was guided by three primary criteria: (1) the presence of narrative elements involving key prophetic figures, particularly Ibrāhīm and Musa, (2) verses that incorporate logical dialogues rather than mere affirmations, (3) the use of presuppositions aligned with the sociocultural context of the intended audience. These verses were identified through thematic and lexical analysis utilizing both classical and contemporary tafsīr works, including al-Kashshāf by al-Zamakhsharī and Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb by al-Rāzī.
The analytical method employed in this study progresses from structural to rhetorical and finally to logical interpretation. This method reflects an integrative hermeneutical framework that combines textual and contextual readings. First, structural linguistic analysis was utilized to uncover syntactic patterns and semantic coherence to frame the logical flow of the verses. Second, rhetorical analysis explored the use of persuasive devices that enhance the discourse’s cognitive appeal. Third, rational analysis, drawing upon al-Ghazālī’s al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm, was applied to trace syllogistic reasoning and presuppositional logic embedded within the narratives, thereby illustrating how the Qur’ān constructs rational arguments to engage its audience intellectually.
Logic in Islamic intellectual history represents a dynamic synthesis of classical Greek philosophy and Islamic epistemological frameworks. Logic in Islamic tradition is rendered as the term manṭiq, which is rooted in naṭaqa (to speak), and conveys the idea of articulated, structured reasoning. It mirrors the Greek logos, which signifies rational discourse, order, and meaning. This alignment between language and reason connects language and thought. This philosophical framework asserts the inherent rationality of the universe, a principle that can be understood through intellectual thought and conveyed through language. 11 The integration of logic into the Islamic intellectual tradition was significantly advanced through the transmission of logical theories during the translation movements.”12
Building upon this foundation, early Muslim philosophers, notably al-Kindī (d. 892), al-Fārābī (d. 951), and Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), played a foundational role in adapting Aristotelian syllogistic logic to the context of Islamic metaphysics and theology. Al-Kindī (d. 892) initiated this project by translating and commenting on Aristotle’s Organon, arguing that logic is indispensable for scientific investigation and interpreting divine revelation.13 Al-Fārābī (d. 951) developed a systematic definition, classification, and demonstration theory. At the same time, Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037) introduced innovations such as modal logic and hypothetical syllogisms, expanding Aristotelian logic to address complex metaphysical and theological questions.14 Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) later emerged as a staunch defender of Aristotelian rationalism, arguing that logic and revelation are not contradictory but mutually reinforcing. He emphasized that interpreting divine texts requires a rigorous logical method, not devotional reading.15
Logic (manṭiq) represents a distinct strand within the broader landscape of Islamic intellectual tradition, rather than encompassing the entirety of Islamic logical thought. It is plausible that the foundational currents of Islamic thinking independently developed alternative reasoning frameworks, including Arabic grammar, rhetoric, the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), and Islamic theology (kalam).
Al-Ghazālī (d.1111) acknowledged the instrumental value of logic but redefined its scope within an Islamic theological framework. In Miʿyār al-ʿIlm and al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm, he derived logical principles directly from the Qur’ān. Central to his framework is the concept of taʿādul (equilibrium), which he articulated through three levels of inference, akbar (major), awsaṭ (middle), and aṣghar (minor), mirroring the components of a categorical syllogism. Drawing from metaphors of balance, he proposed that logical reasoning, like a scale, operates by discerning coherence between opposing claims via a mediating term.16 Al-Ghazālī further identified talāzum (logical equivalence) as a compound syllogism comprising a conditional and a categorical premise. Conversely, taʿāruḍ (contradiction) functioned as a model of reasoning based on mutually exclusive propositions. These analytical constructs reflect his effort to show that divine revelation embodies an intrinsic logical order, even if it transcends the bounds of human syllogistic reasoning.17
The ta'addul (equalizer) is analogous to ordinary balance scales, with two pans attached to a column. The column is shared between the two palms because each is connected to it. Each palm represents the major and minor terms of a logical measurement. The column is the middle term that connects the two terms to the result. The third form of a categorical syllogism is called the ‘smaller-scale’ syllogism. The limit of this scale is that when a concept is restricted to two parts, the affirmation of one of them necessitates the negation of the other. The negation of one of them requires the affirmation of the other, but only if the division is exhaustive and mutually exclusive. If the division is overly broad or ambiguous, its epistemic weight becomes unreliable or symbolically likened to the weight of the devil.18 The talazum (equivalence) is a type of mixed syllogism, consisting of a connected conditional premise (necessary), a categorical premise, and a definite conclusion.19 The balance of contradiction (ta'arud) is a type of complex syllogism consisting of a separate premise, a categorical premise, and a categorical conclusion. The argument's validity here depends on the nature of the separate conditional proposition.20
In the Islamic philosophical tradition, Aristotle’s logical system peaked in discussions of the theory of syllogism, as explained in his books “Prior Analytics” and “Posterior Analytics”. The primary focus of this study was to attain specific knowledge. The theory of syllogism usually focuses on the form of presuppositions used in it.
Presuppositions are implicit assumptions underlying an utterance.21 Distinct from explicit assertions, they are backgrounded pieces of information that the speaker takes for granted. Presuppositions maintain validity across various linguistic contexts, including negation, modality, and conditionals.22 These characteristics differentiate presuppositions from assertions, conversational implicatures, and other types of inferential meaning.23 The notion of presupposition encompasses the specification of logical forms and the concepts of falsity and truth.24 Presuppositions are also considered propositions taken for granted by the speaker and deemed uncontroversial. Their primary function is to act as a prerequisite for properly using sentences.
Presupposition can be divided into two distinct components: the proposition (al-khabar) and the referent (al-mukhbir bih). Conventionally, the proposition is typically identified as the predicate (mahmul) and the referent as the subject (mawḍūʿ).25 Based on their structural composition, Presuppositions are generally classified into three types: the categorial (or attributive) proposition (al-qadiyyah al-hamliyyah), the conjunctive conditional proposition (al-qadhiyyah asy-syartiyyah al-muttasilah), and the disjunctive conditional proposition (al-qadiyyah asy-syartiyyah al-munfashalah).
The categorial proposition (al-qadiyyah al-hamliyyah) involves affirming or denying a predicate about a subject. For instance, the statements “The world is an accident,” and “The world is not an accident” illustrate this form. In these examples, “the world” is the subject, while “an accident” is the predicate. This case requires either affirming or negating the predicate about the subject.
The conjunctive conditional proposition (al-qadhiyyah asy-syartiyyah al-muttasilah) corresponds to a hypothetical statement. The paradigm example, “If the world is an event, then it has a cause,” is defined by the dependence on a condition for the occurrence of its consequent. The terms “if” and its equivalents are considered conditional indicators. In such propositions, the initial clause, “If the world were an accident,” is termed the antecedent, while the subsequent clause, “there is a cause,” is referred to as the consequent. The consequent is inherently linked to the antecedent, establishing a conditional relationship between the two.
While the disjunctive conditional proposition (al-qadiyyah asy-syartiyyah al-munfashalah) aligns with the concept of exclusive disjunction, a prime example is the statement, “either the world is an accident or it is old.” This proposition involves two mutually exclusive alternatives, where the truth of one necessitates the falsity of the other. Unlike the conditional proposition, where the consequent depends on the antecedent, both alternatives are presented as possibilities, with only one being true.
Despite their overlooked treatment in scholarly discourse, presuppositions and syllogisms constitute fundamental and interconnected concepts within logic. From its type, Syllogisms can generally be classified into two primary types: categorical and conditional. Categorical syllogisms are composed exclusively of categorical propositions, with their two premises joined to produce a unified conclusion—functioning as if they were fused. Because of this conjunctive structure of its premises, it is often termed a conjunctive syllogism. Conversely, conditional syllogisms incorporate either wholly or partially conditional propositions. Integrating categorical and conditional elements within a syllogistic framework gives rise to the term “conditional analogy.” Given the binary nature of conditional propositions—connected or disjunctive—their interplay with categorical propositions in inferential reasoning becomes a critical subject of logical analysis.
Presuppositions are integral to the structure of a syllogism, as they form the foundation of its premises. A clear understanding of these two concepts holds significant implications in various academic fields, particularly in the philosophy of language, where presuppositions serve as analytical tools for examining the meaning and impact of a statement. In particular, the validity of a syllogistic conclusion depends heavily on the truth of the underlying presuppositions since the falsity of any presupposition can invalidate the resulting conclusion.
The authority of the Qur’ānic text carries methodological implications for interpretation, particularly in tracing the connection between the signified (al-ma'na) and the signifier (al-lafẓ). Analogical reasoning emerges as one of the essential epistemic tools in this process, mainly when employed through structured forms such as syllogisms. This perspective aligns with Ilyas Supena’s idea, which emphasizes the importance of an integrative approach among tafsir, ta’wil, and hermeneutics in understanding sacred texts. Tafsir provides a linguistic foundation for dissecting the structure of the signifier, ta’wil opens up rational and intuitive dimensions to uncover the depth of the signified, while hermeneutics connects both with the context of the modern reader.26
Analogies and parables are rhetorical devices frequently employed in the Qur’ān to communicate divine messages to humankind. Abstract concepts that may be difficult for the average person to grasp are often conveyed more effectively through analogical expressions. One of the uses of analogy is to facilitate understanding, improve memory, and attract attention. Analogical reasoning is also employed as a problem-solving strategy by identifying similarities between two seemingly unrelated entities. Although analogies are often used to convey messages intuitively and emotionally, the use of analogies in the Qur’ān also has a close relationship with logic. One of them is used in qiyas tamtsil as a presupposition of a syllogism to clarify aspects of God's nature in the Qur’ān. One of the advantages of syllogistic presuppositions in the Qur’ān is that their informative character grants presuppositions in the Qur’ān a special persuasive power. This is reinforced by Marina Sbisa's statement that informative presuppositions seem to serve a compelling communicative function.27
Measuring the effectiveness of persuasion in analogical reasoning through syllogistic presuppositions in the Qur’ān requires a comprehensive textual analysis. This includes identifying rhetorical style, evaluating the logical coherence of the propositions used and supported by relevant evidence, and analyzing historical aspects. Several stories in the Qur’ān illustrate the persuasive power of analogical reasoning, as exemplified by syllogisms, as follows:
5.1. Largest-Scale Syllogism: Argument from Divine PowerIn Surah al-Baqara (2:258), Prophet Ibrāhīm confronts Namrud’s false claim to divine power: “Allah causes the sun to rise from the east. So, make it rise from the west.” And so, the disbeliever was dumbstruck.”
Namrud’s presupposition that granting life and causing death qualify one as divine is logically dismantled by Ibrāhīm through a structured analogical syllogism. The logic is as follows:
P1: Whoever can reverse the sun’s course is divine. (rational premise)
P2: Allah causes the sun to rise from the east. (empirical premise)
C: Therefore, Allah is the true God. (conclusion)
This form of measurement is employed in response to the manipulative presupposition advanced by Namrud when he mentioned that “he could give life and cause death,” referring to the divine attribute mentioned by Prophet Ibrāhīm. This presupposition can potentially mislead the interlocutor into openly accepting a claim they would reject upon careful reflection. Critically, Namrud's claim is flawed because the attribute of "bringing someone back to life (al-muhyi) and making him die (al-mumit)" that Prophet Ibrāhīm meant, did not refer to simply killing someone and letting the other live.28
To criticize this manipulative presupposition, Prophet Ibrāhīm used an equalizer syllogism like the first example by using a proposition that contains empirical and logical assumptions by stating that the true God can raise the sun because one of Allah's powers mentioned in the Qur’ān is that He can raise the sun from the east and set it in the west.29 And if Namrud is God, then Namrud must be able to raise the sun. The result of the syllogism proposition above contains persuasive reasoning that can silence Namrud with the answer that Allah is the true God, because He can make the sun rise.
The complete picture of this scale is as follows:
P1: Every A B (rational premise)
P2: Every C A (empirical premise)
C: Every C B (conclusion)
This analogy is based on two premises: the first premise concerns what is known by reason, that is, the All-Powerful, and the second concerns what is known through observation. The logical argument given by Ibrāhīm is correct because it is derived from the Qur’ān. Its representation by analogy is accurate, and no one acknowledges it. This is because Allah, glory be to Him, is the One who brings forth the sun from the east after it sets in the west.30 It is the place of power, for God must be powerful, otherwise, He would be described as His opposite, powerlessness. It is a conditional issue that prevents emptiness, for power and powerlessness cannot come together in one place, and the place cannot be devoid of them. Therefore, whoever is powerful is a god, and whoever is powerless, his divinity is invalidated.31
5.2. Middle-Scale Syllogism: Argument from ImpermanenceIn Surah al-An’ām (6:76), Prophet Ibrāhīm critiques celestial worship: “I do not like those that set.” He reinforces this critique with further rational evidence in Surah Ash-Shu’arāʾ (26:28): “Then God brings forth the sun from the east, so bring it forth from the west”, and “Lord of the east and the west.”
This argument forms as part of a middle-scale syllogism that refutes the divinity of entities subject to change:
Premise 1 (Rational): God is not subject to decay.
Premise 2 (Empirical): The moon and the stars set and disappear.
Conclusion: Therefore, the moon and the stars are not divine.
To invalidate the presupposition of the divinity of the sun, moon and planets, Prophet Ibrāhīm employed a mid-level equilibrium analogy as mentioned in the previous example. Prophet Ibrāhīm derived the syllogistic proposition from a defining attribute of God, permanence, and structured the analogy around empirical evidence of appearance and disappearance. Since the planets, sun, and moon set, the conclusion follows that they are not divine but created entities, and a Creator who governs them must exist.32 In this case, the proposition of this syllogism contains an element of persuasion that can convince the listener, because the listener tends to believe more easily when hearing informative assumptions than when they are delivered as statements.
The complete picture of this scale is as follows:
P1: (no) A B (rational premise)
P2: (all) C B (empirical premise)
C: A is not C (conclusion)
This analogy is based on two premises: the first concerns what is known through reason, that is, that God is All-Powerful, and the second concerns what is known through observation. This syllogism aims to prove that the moon is not a God. This conclusion depends on understanding two foundational principles: God does not undergo decline, whereas the moon does. The origin must be that God is not dependent on the necessity of truthfulness. The Qur’ān represented decay instead of change because they are synonymous, so the original “God is not subject to change” is expressed as “God does not decay” or “God does not fade.” This is the result to be proven.
5.3. Smaller-Scale Syllogism: Argument for ProphethoodIn Surah al-An’ām (6:91), the Qur’ān rebuts the denial of Muhammad’s prophethood: “And they have not shown Allah His proper reverence when they said, 'Allah has revealed nothing to any human being.” So: “Who then revealed the Book by Mūsā as a light and guidance for people?”
The syllogism proceeds as follows:
P1: Mūsā was a human to whom Allah revealed a Book. (empirical premise)
P2: Muhammad is likewise a human messenger. (rational premise)
C: Therefore, Muhammad is capable of receiving revelation. (conclusion)
This presupposition entails the denial of the prophethood of the Prophet Muhammad SAW.33 According to Lombardi Vallauri,34 Presuppositions lower the recipient's epistemic vigilance, making detecting falsehoods more effortful and time-consuming when information is embedded as presuppositions. Thus, rather than the direct assertion "Prophet Muhammad is not a prophet", the presupposition "Allah did not give anything to Prophet Muhammad" is more likely to attract attention and manipulate the listener.
The complete picture of this scale is as follows:
P1: All A B (empirical premise)
P2: All A C (rational premise)
C: Some C is B (conclusion)
The Qur’ān constructs a syllogistic argument acceptable to the People of the Book to address this manipulative presupposition. Since Mūsā was a human and received the Tawrāt, divine revelation to humans is not without precedent. This reasoning relies on a partial analogy, based on the shared human nature of prophets, to counter presuppositions that attempt to deny Muhammad’s prophetic legitimacy or falsely assert that no revelation has ever been granted to a human being.35 As Vallauri argues, presuppositions often slip past critical reflection, enhancing their rhetorical force.36
5.4. Equivalence Syllogism: Argument for Divine UnityIn Surah al-Anbiyā’ (21:22), the Qur’ān affirms monotheism: “If there had been other Gods besides Allah in the heavens or the earth, both ˹realms˺ would have surely been corrupted.”
The logical structure follows a conditional syllogism:
P1: If A then B (conditional premise)
P2: but A (empirical observation)
C: Therefore, B (conclusion)
This argument can be structured as follows:
P1: If there were multiple gods, disorder would result. (conditional premise)
P2: But there is no disorder. (empirical observation)
C: Therefore, there is only one God. (conclusion)
This is a form of mixed syllogism, combining a conditional proposition with a categorical one to yield a necessary conclusion.37 It illustrates that the existence of multiple deities would logically lead to conflict and disorder. The observable order in the cosmos is thus presented as an āyah (sign) of divine unity. The underlying principle is that whatever necessarily follows from a condition must be denied if not fulfilled. This form of reasoning underscores the theological coherence and ontological harmony that affirms the doctrine of tawḥīd .
5.5. Contradiction Syllogism: Argument from Divine AttributesIn Surah Maryam (19:42), Prophet Ibrāhīm addresses his father: “Why do you worship what can neither hear nor see, nor benefit you?”
This verse is in the context of compromise and doubt. The words of Prophet Ibrāhīm in this verse contain the presupposition that the True God has the attribute of All-Hearing, while the idols worshipped by his father did not have the attribute of hearing.38 This can be expressed using symbols as follows:
P1: Either God can hear and see, or idols cannot. (disjunctive premise)
P2: Idols cannot hear or see. (empirical observation)
C: Therefore, God is worthy of worship. (conclusion)
This is why believers are instructed to avoid worshipping anything other than Allah—such as trees, stones, or devils—especially in the polytheistic context that surrounded Prophet Ibrāhīm. Idols and natural objects lack the essential attributes that define divinity. The logical foundation of this reasoning lies in binary exclusivity: affirming one element necessarily entails denying the other. The use of “cannot” is intentional, since the Qur’anic verse39 explicitly negates the idols’ ability to hear or see, thereby forming the logical contrast with God’s perfect attributes. However, this logic is only valid within a closed set of mutually exclusive options. Reasoning based on non-exclusive dichotomies leads to fallacious conclusions, often called “the logic of the devil.”40
Table 1. Five Types of Syllogistic Logic and Their Qur’ānic Illustrations
|
No. |
Type of Syllogism |
Qur’ānic Reference |
Logical Structure |
Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
1 |
Largest-Scale Syllogism |
QS. Al-Baqara 2:258 (Ibrāhīm vs. Namrud) |
P1: Only God can reverse the sun’s course. P2: God causes the sun to rise from the east. C: Therefore, God is the true deity. |
Uses empirical observation to affirm divine power. Exposes the false claim of deity through impossibility. |
|
2 |
Middle-Scale Syllogism |
QS. Al-An’am 6:76; QS. Ash-Shuara 26:28 (Celestial worship) |
P1: God is not subject to change. P2: The stars and the moon rise and set. C: Therefore, they are not divine. |
Rejects the divinity of impermanent beings. Contrasts divine permanence with empirical transience. |
|
3 |
Smaller-Scale Syllogism |
QS. Al-An’am 6:91 (Revelation to humans) |
P1: Mūsā was a human who received revelation. P2: Muhammad is also a human. C: Therefore, Muhammad can receive revelation. |
Counters the denial of prophethood through precedent-based reasoning (partial analogy). |
|
4 |
Equivalence Syllogism |
QS. Al-Anbiya 21:22 (Tawḥīd affirmation) |
P1: If multiple gods existed, the universe would be corrupted. P2: The universe is orderly. C: Therefore, only one God exists. |
Employs conditional logic to affirm the unity of God via observable harmony. |
|
5 |
Contradiction Syllogism |
QS. Maryam 19:42 (Ibrāhīm vs. idols) |
P1: Either God has sensory attributes or idols do not. P2: Idols lack hearing and sight. C: Therefore, idols are not God. |
Uses exclusive disjunction to invalidate idolatry. Reveals a contradiction in idol worship. |
When these analogical arguments are applied in the Qur’ān narration, Al-Ghazālī makes revelation the primary source of truth and reason a tool to understand it. Therefore, in determining the proposition of the syllogism, he takes the central proposition from rational knowledge (al-ma'lum bil-'aqli) and the minor proposition from empirical knowledge (al-ma'lum bil-musyahadah). The result of the syllogism on the two propositions produces a persuasive logic that can convince the listener.
This interpretive foundation substantiates the methodological approach of this study, wherein thematic tafsīr and classical logic converge to identify how specific Qur’ānic narratives encode five distinct syllogistic forms, ranging from largest-scale to contradiction-based structures. The integration of linguistic triggers, analogical reasoning, and epistemic presuppositions within this framework demonstrates the Qur’ān’s rhetorical potency and the utility of structured methodological tools in uncovering its argumentative architecture.
To begin with, the preceding analysis has revealed that Qur’ānic discourse incorporates a rich tapestry of logical structures, including syllogism, presuppositional logic, and analogical reasoning, to engage its audience through rational coherence and moral resonance. The logical patterns of taʿādul (equilibrium), talāzum (necessary implication), and taʿāruḍ (contradiction) do not merely serve as abstract conceptual frameworks; they operate as persuasive mechanisms embedded within prophetic storytelling. These structures enable the Qur’ān to appeal simultaneously to the intellect and the conscience. Yet, Qur’ānic logic transcends rigid formalism—it constitutes a broader, ethically charged model of thought that is profoundly theological and dialogical.
Supporting this view, contemporary scholarship has identified explicit logical operators within Qur’ānic formulations, reinforcing the internal consistency of its reasoning. Alghar and Afandi, for instance, demonstrate how conjunction, implication, and negation are employed in verses such as Q.S. 4:86 and 14:7, indicating that the Qur’ān exhibits propositional clarity and coherence.41 In parallel, Al-Ghazaali emphasizes the Qur’ān’s use of ḥijāj. This rhetorical-logical strategy combines dialectical rebuttals, rhetorical questions, and audience engagement to appeal to logic and moral intuition.42 These scholarly observations underscore that the Qur’ān’s argumentative method is not neutral or purely informative—it is purposeful, oriented toward guidance, awakening, and ethical transformation.
Building on this, Qur’ānic logic emphasizes dialogical engagement and moral provocation. Through the use of rhetorical questions, repetition, and narrative structures, it invites the listener into a reflective process that engages both emotion and reason.43 Rather than relying solely on syllogistic precision, it integrates logical reasoning into parables, historical episodes, and moral exhortations, ensuring that arguments are intelligible and affectively resonant.44 This approach acknowledges human epistemological limitations and centers divine will, fostering humility in pursuing truth. As such, Qur’ānic logic bridges rational inquiry with spiritual receptivity, offering an intellectually grounded and spiritually elevating mode of persuasion.
Ultimately, Qur’ānic logic emerges as a comprehensive mode of reasoning rooted in revelation, synthesizing faith, intuition, and rationality within a unified epistemological vision. Its goal extends beyond proving theoretical propositions—it seeks to orient the human soul toward moral clarity and divine wisdom (ḥikmah). Logical forms such as analogy (qiyās), induction (istiqrāʾ), syllogism, and presupposition are consistently embedded within ethical and theological contexts. Syllogistic arguments in prophetic discourse derive conclusions from empirical premises to affirm tawḥīd and divine justice, while presuppositions embed theological truths subtly within everyday language. Rather than isolating truth from its moral and existential implications, Qur’ānic logic integrates reasoning into pursuing purpose, guiding the heart and the intellect toward spiritual fulfilment.
This study has investigated the structure and function of persuasive logic in the Qur’ān, particularly concerning syllogistic presuppositions embedded within its narrative framework. Through an analytical exploration of Qur’ānic narratives—especially those involving Prophets Ibrāhīm and Mūsā—this research demonstrates how the Qur’ān integrates both epistemological depth and rhetorical force. Rather than merely reiterating doctrinal claims, the Qur’ān employs analogical reasoning aligned with discernible logical forms, including equilibrium (taʿādul), necessary implication (talāzum), and contradiction (taʿāruḍ). These forms reveal a multi-layered system of persuasion in which rational and experiential premises are mobilized to guide the reader toward theological conviction.
One of the key contributions of this research is to demonstrate that Qur’ānic argumentation is not opposed to formal logic but represents a unique model of persuasive reasoning rooted in divine revelation. Al-Ghazālī’s framework illustrates this compatibility, showing that the Qur’ān conveys divine truths through structured discourse that appeals both to the intellect and the heart. Rather than relying solely on abstract reasoning, it invites cognitive affirmation and emotional conviction, creating a holistic mode of communication that blends rational clarity with spiritual depth. This study has demonstrated that examining Qur’ānic narratives through the lens of syllogistic presupposition reveals a mode of reasoning that is at once normative, dialogical, and context-sensitive. It allows readers to see how persuasive Qur’ānic logic is woven into theological doctrines and the Qur’ān’s rhetorical structure. These insights have broader implications for Islamic hermeneutics, suggesting that logical reasoning was thoughtfully adapted within the Islamic tradition to deepen the clarity and resonance of scripture.
Sujiat Zubaidi: Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision, Validation, Writing – Review & Editing. Nindhya Ayomi Delahara: Writing – Original Draft, Formal Analysis, Data Curation, Visualization. Yusuf Rahman: Literature Review, Theoretical Framework, Writing – Review & Editing. Dhita Ayomi Purwaningtyas: Investigation, Reference Verification, Formatting and Proofreading.
The authors have no financial or non-financial conflict of interest regarding the subject matter or material discussed in this manuscript.
The corresponding author, upon request, will provide the data associated with this study.
This research received a grant from the Directorate of Research, Technology, and Community Service (DRTPM) of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research and Technology in 2024.
The authors did not used any type of generative AI software for this research.
Abidin, Zainal. Corak Pemikiran dan Metode Ijtihad Ibn Taimiyyah [The Thought Patterns and Ijtihad Methods of Ibn Taymiyyah].” Millah: Journal of Religious Studies, 10 (Special Issue), (2010): 31–53. https://doi.org/10.20885/millah.ed.khus.art2
Abu Zahrah, Muhammad bin Ahmad. Zahratu At-Tafasir [Flower of Interpretations]. Beirut: Daar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi, n.d.
Al-Alusi, Syihabuddin Sayyid Mahmud. Rūḥ al‑Maʿānī fī Tafsīr al‑Qurʾān al‑ʿAẓīm wa‑Sabʿ al‑Mathānī [The Spirit of the Meanings in the Exegesis of the Magnificent Qur’ān and the Seven Oft-Repeated]. Beirut: Dar Ihyāʾ al‑Turāth al‑Arabī, n.d.
Alghar, Muhammad Zia., and Muhammad Irfan Afandi. “Islamic Integrated Maths: Mathematical Logic in the Qur’ān.” Fahima 3, no. 1: (2024) 33–48. https://doi.org/10.54622/fahima.v3i1.144
Al-Andalusi, Abu Hayyan. Al-Bahru Al-Muhit Fi Tafsīr [The Ocean of Interpretation]. Beirut: Daar Al-Fikr, 1999.
Aravind, Athulya, Danny Fox, and Martin Hackl. “Principles of Presupposition in Development.” Linguistics and Philosophy 46 (2023): 291–332. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-022-09364-z.
Asnawi, Aqdi Rofiq, Ahmad Suharto, Muhammad Badrun Shahir, Deki Ridho Adi Anggara, and Hannah Hannah. “The Coherence of Surah Adz-Dzariyāt in Perspective of Semitic Rhetoric.” Jurnal Ilmiah Al-Muʿāshirah 20, no. 1, (2023): 71–84. https://doi.org/10.22373/jim.v20i1.16021
Asy-Sya’rawi, Muhammad Mutawali. Tafsir Asy-Syar’rawi [Al-Sya’rawi’s Qur’ānic Commentary]. vol. 15. Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1997.
Al-Baydawi, Nasir al-Din ‘Abd Allah ibn Umar. Anwār al‑Tanzīl wa‑Asrār al‑Ta’wīl [The Lights of Revelation and the Secrets of Interpretation]. Beirut: Dar Sader, 2008.
Firdaus, Qusthan A.H. “On Wirman’s Allegation of Fallacies of Harun Nasution Theological Logic.” Journal of Indonesian Islam, 17, no. 2, (2023): 352–375. https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2023.17.2.352-375
Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. Al-Qistas al-Mustaqim [The Straight Balance]. Beirut: Mansyurat Dar al-Masyriq, 1983.
—. Abu Hamid, Mi’yar al-Ilm Fii al-Mantiq [The Standard of Knowledge in Logic]. Beirut: Dar Al-Kitab Al-Alamiyah, 1971.
Goodman, Len E., Avicenna. London: Routledge, 2006.
Habibolahi, Mahdi. “The Role of Presupposition in Extracting Indirect Concepts from the verses of the Qur’ān.” Linguistic Research in the Qur’ān 10, no. 2, (2021): 229–46, https://doi.org/10.22108/nrgs.2021.129525.1671.
Al-Khazaali, Musaab A. Raheem. “Argumentation in the Glorious Qur’ān: A Rhetorical Pragmatic Perspective.” Global Journal Al-Thaqafah 10, no. 2 (2020): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.7187/GJAT122020-2
Al-Kindi, Fī al-Falsafa al-Ūlā [In First Philosophy] ed. Rasheed al-Kayyali. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1994.
Moldovan, Andrei. “Persuasive Presuppositions.” Journal of Pragmatics 211 (2023): 96–104 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2023.04.004
Moqbel, Tareq. “Interpreting the Qur’ān through the Science of Logic: Ibn ‘Arafah al-Wargammi (d. 803/1401) on the Dynamics of Tafsir and Mantiq.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 35, no. 2 (2025): 273-308. https://doi.org/10.1017/S135618632400004X
Mustafa, OUALIF. “Presupposition: A Semantic or Pragmatic Phenomenon?” Arab World English Journal (AWEJ) 8, No. 3 (2017): 46-59. https://doi.org/10.24093/AWEJ/VOL8NO3.4
Nur, Muhammad. “The Qur’ānic Logic in Ghazali’s Book al-Qistaz al-Mustaqim.” Jurnal Kalam14, no. 1, (2020): 37–56. https://doi.org/10.24042/klm.v14i1.5677
Ar-Razi, Fakhruddin. Mafatih al-Ghaib [Keys to the Unseen]. Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turats al-‘Arabi, n.d.
El-Rouayheb, Khalde. Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900–1900. Leiden: Brill, 2010.
Salloum, Rahim. “Logical Scales Imam al-Ghazali and Some of Its Applications to Matters of Belief.” Islamic Sciences Journal 11, no. 2 (2020): 1–26. https://doi.org/10.25130/jis.20.11.2.1
Sbisà, Marina. “Ideology and the Persuasive Use of Presupposition.” In Essays on Speech Acts and Other Topics in Pragmatics, edited by Marina Sbisà, 492–509. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192844125.003.0004..
Shenasvand, Parvin., Mohsen Qasempour. “An Analysis of the Verses Regarding the Doubters and the Doubts in the Qur’ān.” A Research Journal on Qur’ānic Knowledge 14, no. 53 (2023): 237–266. https://doi.org/10.22054/rjqk.2023.71458.2734
Shoxobiddonov, Sirojiddin Isomiddin o’g’li. “Modern Understanding of Presupposition in the Framework of Cognitive Linguistics.” American Journal of Philological Science 5, no. 5 (2025): 132–135. https://doi.org/10.37547/ajps/Volume05Issue05-35
Simons, Mandy, Judith Tonhauser, David Beaver, and Craige Roberts. “What Project and Why.” Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory. Ithaca: CLC Publications, 2010.
Sugilar, H., U. Dedih, C. Anwar, T. Priatna, A. Lestari, and W. Darmalaksana. “The Correlation between Logic Ability, Mathematical Proof and the Qur’ān Recitations.” Proceedings Journal of Physics, Conference Series, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1467/1/012024
Supena, Ilyas. “Epistemology of Tafsir, Ta’wil, and Hermeneutics: Towards an Integrative Approach.” Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization (JITC) 14, No. 1, (2024): 121-136. https://doi.org/10.32350/jitc.141.08
Vallauri, Edoardo Lombardi. “Presupposition, Attention, and Cognitive Load.” Journal of Pragmatics 180, (2021): 15–28. https://doi.org/10/1016/j/pragma.2021.06.022.
Walbridge, John. God and Logic in Islam: The Caliphate of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Al-Zamakhshari, Abū al‑Qāsim Maḥmūd ibn ʿUmar. Al-Kashshaf ʿan Ḥaqāʾiq al‑Tanzīl wa‑ʿUyūn al‑Aqāwīl fī Wujūh al‑Taʾwīl [The Revealer of the Realities of Revelation and the Quintessence of Statements on the Aspects of Interpretation]. Cairo: al-Matba’a al-Kubra al-Amiriyya, 1870.
Zubaidi, Sujiat. “Late Antiquity Revisited: Angelika Neuwirth’s View on the Story of Prophet Abraham in the Qur’ān.” Journal of Al-Tamaddun 20, no. 1, (2025): 65-79, https://doi.org/10.22452/JAT.vol20no1.5
1Muhammad Nur, “The Quranic Logic in al-Ghazali’s Book al-Qistaz al-Mustaqim,” Jurnal Kalam 14, No.1 (2020): 37–56. https://doi.org/10.24042/klm.vl4il.5677
2H. Sugilar et al, “The Correlation between Logic Ability, Mathematical Proof and the Quran Recitations,” Proceedings Journal of Physics, Conference Series 1467, (2020), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1467/1/012024
3See Ash-Shuʿarāʾ 26:23–28 for the exchange between Mūsā and Pharaoh; and Al-Anʿām 6:74–79 for Ibrāhīm’s critique of idol worship. Al-Zamakhshari, Al-Kashshaf [The Revealer], vol 3, 355, Al-Baydawi, Anwar al-Tanzil, vol 4, 136, Al-Alusi, Ruh al-Ma'ani [The Spirit of the Meaning], c. 19, vol .11, 6551.
4Zainal Abidin, “Corak Pemikiran dan Metode Ijtihad Ibn Taimiyyah [The Thought Patterns and Ijtihad Methods of Ibn Taymiyyah],” Millah: Journal of Religious Studies, 10 (Special Issue), (2010): 31–53. https://doi.org/10.20885/millah.ed.khus.art2.
5Nur, “The Quranic Logic in Ghazali’s Book al-Qistaz al-Mustaqim.”.
6Shoxobiddonov Sirojiddin Isomiddin o’g’li, “Modern Understanding of Presupposition in The Framework of Cognitive Linguistics,” Oscar Publishing Service: American Journal of Philological Science 5 no. 5 (2025): 132–35. https://doi.org/10.37547/ajps/Volume05Issue05-35
7Qusthan A.H. Firdaus, “On Wirman’s Allegation of Fallacies of Harun Nasution's Theological Logic,” Journal of Indonesian Islam 17 no. 02 (2023): 352–75, https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2023.17.2.352-375.
8Parvin Shenasvand, and Mohsen Qasempour, “An Analysis of the Verses Regarding the Doubters and the Doubts in the Quran,” A Research Journal on Qur’ānic Knowledge 14, no. 53 (2023): 237–66, https://doi.org/10.22054/RJQK.2212.2734.
9Tareq Moqbel, “Interpreting the Qur’ān through the science of logic: Ibn ‘Arafah al-Warġammī (d. 803/1401) on the Dynamics of Tafsīr and Manṭiq,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 35, no. 2 (2025): 273–308. https://doi.org/10.1017/S135618632400004X
10Mahdi Habibolahi, “The Role of Presupposition in Extracting Indirect Concepts from the verses of the Qurān,” Linguistic Research in the Qur’an 10, no. 2 (2021): 229–46, https://doi.org/10.22108/nrgs.2021.129525.1671.
11John Walbridge, God and Logic in Islam: The Caliphate of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 19
12Khalde El-Rouayheb, Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900–1900 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 12–27.
13Al-Kindi, Fī al-Falsafa al-Ūlā [In First Philosophy] ed. Rasheed al-Kayyali (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnānī, 1994).
14Len E. Goodman, Avicenna (London: Routledge, 2006), 89–106.
15Walbridge, God and Logic in Islam, 124–38.
16Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm [straight balance] (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1983), 15–22.
17Nur, “The Quranic Logic in Ghazali’s Book al-Qistaz al-Mustaqim.”
18Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm [Straight Balance], 27–44.
19Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm, 45–47.
20Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm, 49–57.
21Athulya Aravind, Danny Fox, dan Martin Hackl, “Danny Fox, Martin Hackl, Principles of Presupposition in Development,” Journal of Linguistics and Philosophy 46 (2023): 291–332, https//doi.org/10.1007/s10988-022-09364-z.
22Simons et al., "What Project and Why," Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory, (Ithaca: CLC Publication, 2010), 20. https://doi.org/10.3765/salt.v20i0.2584
23Andrei Moldovan, “Persuasive Presuppositions,” Journal of Pragmatics 211 (2023): 96-104 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2023.04.004
24OUALIF Mustafa, “Presupposition, A Semantic or Pragmatic Phenomenon?” Arab World English Journal (AWEJ), 8, no. 3 (September 2017): 46–59, https//dx.doi.org/10.24093/awej/vol8no3.4.
25Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Mi’yar al-Ilm Fii al-Mantiq [The standard of knowledge in logic], (Beirut: Dar Al-Kitab Al-Alamiyah, 1971), 81–83.
26Ilyas Supena, “Epistemology of Tafsir, Ta’wīl, and Hermeneutics, Towards an Integrative Approach,” Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization 14, no. 1 (2024): 121–36, https://doi.org/10.32350/jitc.141.08.
27Marina Sbisà, “Ideology and the Persuasive Use of Presupposition,” in Essays on Speech Acts and Other Topics in Pragmatics, ed. Marina Sbisà (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 492–509. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192844125.003.0004
28Abu Hayyan Al-Andalusi, Al-Bahru Al-Muhīt Fi Tafsīr [The Ocean of Interpretation], (Beirut: Daar Al-Fikr, n.d), 2: 628.
29Muhammad bin Ahmad Abi Zahrah, Zahratu At-Tafasir [Flower of Interpretations] (Beirut: Daar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi, t.t.), 2: 959.
30Fakhruddin ar-Razi, Mafatih al-Ghaib [Keys of the Unseen] (Beirut: Dar Ihya at-Turats al-‘Arabi, n.d.), 26: 317.
31Rahim Salloum, “Logical Scales Imam al-Ghazali and Some of Its Applications to Matters of Belief,” Islamic Science Journal 11, no. 2, (2025): 1–26, https://doi.org/10.25130/jis.20.11.2.1.
32Ar-Razi, Mafatih al-Ghaib [Keys of the Unseen], 3:31.
33Ar-Razi, Mafatīh al-Ghaib [Keys of the Unseen], 13:58.
34Edoardo Lombardi Vallauri, “Presupposition, Attention, and Cognitive Load,” Journal of Pragmatics 180, (2021): 15–28, https://doi.org/10/1016/j/pragma.2021.06.022.
35Fakhruddin ar-Razi, Mafatīh al-Ghaib [Keys of the Unseen], 13:58.
36Vallauri, “Presupposition, Attention, and Cognitive Load,” 15–28.
37Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm [The Straight Balance], 45–47.
38Muhammad Mutawali Asy-Sya’rawi, Tafsir Asy-Syar’rawi (Beirut: Daar Al-Fikr, 1997), 15:9097.
39Maryam 19:42.
40Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, al-Qisṭās al-Mustaqīm [The Straight Balance], 51–57.
41Muhammad Zia Alghar dan Muhammad Irfan Afandi, “Islamic Integrated Maths: Mathematical Logic in the Qur’an,” Fahima 3, no. 1 (2024): 33–48, https://doi.org/10.54622/fahima.v3i1.144
42Musaab A. Raheem Al-Khazaali, “Argumentation in the Glorious Qur’an: A Rhetorical Pragmatic Perspective,” Global Journal Al-Thaqafa 10, no. 2 (2020): 1–12, https://doi.org/10.7187/GJAT122020-2
43Aqdi Rofiq Asnawi et al, "The Coherence of Surah Adz-Dzariyāt in Perspective of Semitic Rhetoric," Jurnal Ilmiah al-Mu'ashirah 20, no. 1 (2023): 71–84, https://doi.org/10.22373/jim.v20i1.16021
44Sujiat Zubaidi, et al, “Late Antiquity Revisited: Angelika Neuwirth’s View on the Story of Prophet Abraham in the Qur’an,” Journal of Tamaddun 20, no.1, (2025): 65–79, https://doi.org/10.22452/JAT.vol20no1.5.