




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**Title:** **Dejihadization Through Hadīth Reinterpretation and the Experience of Former Radical-Terrorism Prisoners**

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# ***Dejihadization Through Hadīth Reinterpretation and the Experience of Former Radical-Terrorism Prisoners***

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## **Abstract**

The study of *dejihadization* has received increasing attention due to the emergence of acts of violence in the name of jihad, which are essentially a distortion of the correct understanding. Acts of terrorism that are often based on erroneous interpretations of the Prophet's Hadīth about jihad against infidels have raised concerns about the spread of radical ideologies and threats to social stability and national security. This study aims to explore the roots of these misunderstandings and offer an understanding of jihad that is more in line with Muhammad's prophetic mission, which emphasises peace and non-violence. Using a descriptive-exploratory phenomenological approach and desk study method, this research analyses muktabar Hadīths as well as media reports to reveal how radical groups interpret jihad. The results show that acts of violence and terrorism by certain groups cannot be categorised as jihad, as they contradict the principles of the Prophet's teachings.

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Jihad in its authentic meaning is in line with the prophetic mission of mercy and compassion, rejecting violence as a means to an end. This study emphasises the importance of the concept of *dejihadization* to trace the origins, networks and movements that spread the false interpretation of jihad. As such, this study contributes to the discourse of de-radicalisation and counter-terrorism in Hadīth studies and helps to dispel the negative stigma of jihad that is often misused in radical ideologies.

**Keywords:** *Dejihadization*, Hadīth interpretation, radicalism-terrorism

## Introduction

The term jihad<sup>1</sup> has generated controversy and contradictions. Originally broad in meaning, jihad has often been misinterpreted as solely referring to physical warfare, bloodshed, and killing. As a result, jihad is frequently associated with violence, military aggression, and armed conflict, which risks portraying Islam as a religion of war and violence. For Muslims, jihad is a fundamental teaching, including the form of war that is considered holy,<sup>2</sup> in fact, dying in jihad is seen as a martyr's death, guaranteeing entry into heaven without reckoning. This belief encourages some groups to sacrifice their lives for jihad, particularly in wars against infidels or polytheists. Martyrs who die on the battlefield are buried without being washed, only shrouded in the clothes they wore at the time of their death. Several Hadīths of the Prophet (*SAW*) describe the virtues of martyrdom, often serving as motivation for *jihad fi sabilillah* (struggle in the way of Allah). However, the misinterpretation of jihad verses and Hadīths by radical groups has led to acts of terror, distorting the broader and essential meaning of jihad in Islam.<sup>3</sup>

Jihad has become a transnational issue that is frequently debated, especially after the emergence of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) which is considered an extremist militant group and jihadi terrorist organization. This issue is discussed in various forums, seminars, mass media, and academic literature in the West and the East.<sup>4</sup> As a concept in Islamic teachings, jihad is often misunderstood, both by some Muslims themselves and by Western observers. The extreme and destructive jihad movements have drawn global attention, leading to various negative labels from the Western world, including the United States, such as hardliners, extremists, militants, right-wing Islam, fundamentalism, and terrorism. In fact, after the collapse of communist ideology, Islam in some Western countries has been perceived as a frightening civilisation.<sup>5</sup> This perception arises

<sup>1</sup>Etymologically, jihad is a struggle by exerting all abilities, either in the form of fighting the enemy on the battlefield, or in the form of a struggle without entering the battlefield. Meanwhile, in terms of terminology, jihad has various meanings. According to the Arabic Language Research Institute of the Arab Republic of Egypt in al-Mu'jam al-Wasīth, jihad means fighting infidels with whom there is no peace treaty. Nowadays, jihad is often misunderstood. This condition is triggered by several reasons, one of which is the wrong interpretation of the meaning of jihad, both by some Muslims and non-Muslim.

<sup>2</sup>Bouzerzour Zoubir, "Jihad As A Source of Terrorism a Reality or Propaganda," *Politics And Religion Journal* 8, No. 1 (2014): 93–114, <https://doi.org/10.54561/Prj0801093z>.

<sup>3</sup>Muhammad Raqib Assidiqi, "Critical Analysis Hadith of War: Between Historical Context and Contemporary Relevance," *An-Nur International Journal of The Qur'an & Hadīth* 1, no. 1 (November 21, 2023): 35–43, <https://doi.org/10.62032/aijqh.v1i1.13>.

<sup>4</sup>Kirsten E. Schulze, and Joseph Chinyong Liow, "Making Jihadis, Waging Jihad: Transnational and Local Dimensions of the ISIS Phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia," *Asian Security* 15, no. 2 (May 4, 2019): 122–39, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1424710.ā>

<sup>5</sup>The Cold War that occurred between the United States and Western countries with the communist Soviet Union showed two great powers between the Western and Eastern camps. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union which meant the destruction of the communist ideology, Islam emerged as a great power that was considered dangerous by the West. Therefore,

because the term jihad, which represents a holy and profound Islamic teaching, has been misused by certain Muslim individual.<sup>6</sup> They are *considering* jihad as a pretext for committing acts of violence—killing innocent people, including civilians, children, women, and the weak and elderly. Such actions are entirely contrary to the universal Islamic principles of promoting peace, tolerance, and non-violence. Terrorism emerges to spread fear under the pretext of upholding Islam and fighting infidels. However, jihad in Islam, when interpreted as warfare, follows ethical guidelines that differ from terrorism, which disregards moral considerations and the psychological impact on children, women, and the elderly. Historically, terrorism has been driven more by religious ideology than political and economic factors, though in practice, it is influenced by complex social and geopolitical dynamics. The 2000 Pattern of Global Terrorism report identified 43 international terrorist groups, predominantly religiously motivated, though geopolitical also play a role.<sup>7</sup> Based on these findings, it is evident that Islam has been disproportionately scrutinized, especially following the WTC (World Trade Center) bombing incident on September 11, 2001 in the United States.

Islam has no connection to radicalism and terrorism because it contradicts historical facts. Terrorism deviates from the true concept of jihad, bringing destruction to the earth and civilisation. From the perspective of common sense, legal reasoning, and the objectives of *sharia*, using terror, including suicide bombings as a form of jihad, reflects desperation, a loss of rationality, and a distortion of Islam as a religion of peace.<sup>8</sup> Terrorism is terrorism, a crime against humanity, regardless of who commits it or what religion they follow. An inclusive understanding of jihad fosters a broad, egalitarian, and open religious awareness that can help realize Islam as *rahmatan lil-'alamin* (a mercy to all creation). This perspective encourages cooperation with other religious communities to uphold fundamental human rights and fulfill the essential goals of religious teachings.<sup>9</sup> Conversely, the exclusive interpretation of jihad promoted by radical groups obstructs interfaith understanding, which is crucial for national harmony. It also undermines the cultural aspirations of societies seeking unity and disregards the reality of Indonesia's diverse social fabric.<sup>10</sup>

The aim of this research is to explore the process of dejihadization through Hadīth reinterpretation and the experiences of former radicalism-terrorism. It aims to answer three main questions: how Hadīths often used to justify violence can be reinterpreted in alignment with the Prophet Muhammad's peaceful mission; how the experiences of ex-convicts influence their changing views on jihad; and to what extent this process can serve as an effective deradicalisation

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claims of terrorism are often addressed to Islam. Nurcholish Madjid, *The Doors to God* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994), 270.

<sup>6</sup>Seyyed Hossein Nasr explains that jihad is often misunderstood as “*holy war*” and *Islam as “the religion of the sword,”* so its spiritual meaning is reduced. In fact, life demands movement, and balance is only achieved through inner jihad at every stage of life to approach the divine reality. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1990), 19–26.

<sup>7</sup>Imam Mustofa, “Terrorism: Between Action And Reaction,” *Religia* 15, no. 1 (2012): 66–67. <http://portalgaruda.fti.unissula.ac.id/?ref=browse&mod=viewarticle&article=251222>

<sup>8</sup>Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, Reprint edition (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2004), 4; Karen Armstrong, *Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World*, 2nd edition (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2001), 93.

<sup>9</sup>Abdurrahman Wahid, *Islamic Universalism and the Cosmopolitanism of Islamic Civilization* (Jakarta: Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina, 1988), 546; and M. Quraish Shihab, “Grounding” the *Quran: The Function and Role of Revelation in Public Life* (Bandung: Mizan Pustaka, 2007), 368.

<sup>10</sup>Budhy Munawar Rachman, *Pluralist Islam: the Discourse of Equality of the Faithful* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2004), xiii.

model. The study's implications include contributing to faith-based deradicalisation strategies, reinforcing an authentic understanding of jihad as a moral and spiritual struggle, and developing a framework for rehabilitating and reintegrating former extremists into society. Additionally, the research supports efforts to counter negative stigma surrounding jihad.

## 2. Research Methodology

This research employs a qualitative approach with a descriptive-exploratory phenomenological method to understand how radical groups interpret *jihad*. This approach aims to uncover the subjective experiences of the individuals involved in the phenomenon and analyse the meaning of jihad within a broader context. The study utilizes a desk research method, enabling an in-depth exploration of *muktabar* Hadīth texts and related media reports. The data sources consist of both primary and secondary data. Primary data are derived from *muktabar* Hadīth collection, which served as the main references for understanding the concept of jihad as taught by the Prophet Muhammad. Secondary data include scientific articles, research reports, and media accounts that illustrate how radical groups interpret jihad. Content analysis is used as the primary analytical technique, allowing for the identification of interpretative patterns across various sources. By dissecting the narratives of radical groups and comparing them with authentic Islamic teachings, this research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the urgency of *dejihadization* in deradicalisation and counter-terrorism efforts.

## 3. Result and Discussion

### 3.1. Definition of Jihad

Jihad is defined as a sincere effort to expand Islam, educate others about *sharia*, protect citizens, promote goodness, and foster peace.<sup>11</sup> Jihad differs from a mujahid, who dedicated all of his abilities, including his life, energy, thoughts, and emotions to this struggle.<sup>12</sup> Ibn Taimiyah describes jihad as devoting all one's abilities to achieving what Allah SWT desires while rejecting what He forbids.<sup>13</sup> In the Sufi tradition, jihad is defined as *mujahadah* or the struggle against the impurities of the heart.<sup>14</sup> Imam al-Qusyairi categorized jihad into three forms: the struggle of the soul, the heart, and wealth. Enduring hardships, combating negative thoughts, and giving charity. Sufis emphasize the spiritual dimension of jihad while accepting physical warfare as a means of preserving Allah's religion when necessary.<sup>15</sup>

### 3.2. Semantic Term With Jihad

*First, al-qitāl*<sup>16</sup> (القتال). In the Qur'ān, *al-qitāl* refers to warfare as a form of jihad against enemies in the path of Allah. These revelations occurred in the context of Medina-era battles,

<sup>11</sup> Abdul Karim Munthe, *Setting the Jihadists' Understanding of Hadīth Straight* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pengkajian Hadis el-Bukhari, 2017), 26.

<sup>12</sup> M. Quraish Shihab, *Insights From the Qur'ān: Thematic Interpretation of Various Issues of the Ummah* (Bandung: Mizan Pustaka, 1996), 501.

<sup>13</sup> Ibnu Taimiyah, *Majmu' al-Fatawa* (Collection of Fatwas), (Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1980), 192.

<sup>14</sup> David Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, 1st edition (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2005), 33.

<sup>15</sup> Abd al-Karim bin Hawazin bin Abdul Malik, *Lataif Al-Isyarat* (Subtlety of Signs ), (Mesir: Al-Hidayah Al-Mishriyah Al-Ammah Li Al-Kitab, 1981), 546.

<sup>16</sup> The word "*al-Qital*" literally means "fighting" or "combat." In the context of Islamic studies, this term refers to "warfare" as a form of physical struggle regulated in sharia, especially in the context of defensive jihad or resistance to aggression. M. Kholisurrohman Fanani, "Jihad in the Qur'ān (Toshihika Izutsu's Semantic Perspective)" (Undergraduate, Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2019), 75.

indicating that jihad in the form of combat was first conducted at that time, when Muslims began facing significant threats from disbelievers.<sup>17</sup> *Second, al-harb*<sup>18</sup> (الحرب). Raghīb al-Asfahani defines *al-harb* as any act of plunder committed during war time. *Third, al-Ghazw*<sup>19</sup> (الغزو) in the Qur'ān refers to physical warfare against enemies in the way of Allah, this word only mentioned once in Sūrah Āli 'Imrān 3:156.<sup>20</sup> It specifically denotes military expeditions led directly by the Messenger of Allah, distinguishing it from *sariyah*, which refers to expeditions commanded by others. Muslims are instructed to engage in battle without adopting the attitudes of disbelievers or hypocrites. *Fourth, al-Nafr*<sup>21</sup> (النفر) in the Qur'ān, as found in QS. Al-Taubah/9:41 refers to the command to set out for battle in the way of Allah. *Fifth, irhāb*<sup>22</sup> (إرهاب). However, in the Qur'ān, it is not associated with terrorism or illegitimate acts of violence.<sup>23</sup>

### 3.3.Radicalism

In Arabic, violence and radicalism are expressed through several terms, including *al-'unf*, *at-tatarruf*, *al-guluw*, and *irhāb*. *Al-'unf* means violence and is the antonym of *ar-rifq* which means gentleness. Abdullah al-Najjar defines *al-'unf* as the unlawful use of force to impose one's will.<sup>24</sup> Although the term does not appear in the Qur'ān, various Hadīths reference *al-'unf* and *ar-rifq*, emphasizing that Islam upholds gentleness and nonviolence toward all people, including non-Muslims. *At-tatarruf*, derived from *at-tarf* (edge), refers to extreme religious attitudes, whether leaning to the far right. Its opposite is *al-wasath*, meaning moderation, which is considered a virtuous quality in Islamic teachings. *Al-guluw*, refers to exceeding limits or being excessive, often associated with extreme religious behaviors.<sup>25</sup> Some Muslims exhibit *al-guluw* by accusing fellow Muslims of being disbelief over minor differences in jurisprudential matters (*furū'*) or by displaying excessive fanaticism. The Qur'ān and the Hadīth of the Prophet strongly condemn such extremism, particularly the Hadīth narrated by Abdullah ibn Abbās, which warns against excessive religious zeal.

<sup>17</sup>Ali bin Nafi' al-'Ulyani, *Ahamiyah Al-Jihad Fi Nasyri al-Da'wah al-Islamiyah Wa al-Radd 'ala al-Tawaif al-Dallah Fihi* (The Importance of Jihad in Spreading the Islamic Call and Refuting the Misguided Sects in It) (Arab Saudi: Dar al-Taiyibah Li al-Nasyar Wa al-Tawzic, 1995), 148.

<sup>18</sup>The word "*al-Harb*" in Arabic literally means "war" or "*battle*." In the context of Islamic studies, this term refers to armed conflicts or wars that occur between two or more parties.

<sup>19</sup>Etymologically, "*ghazwul*" which means war, attack, onslaught, and invasion.

<sup>20</sup>Departemen Agama RI (Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia), *Al-Qur'ān and its Translations* (Bandung: Jabal Raudlotul Jannnah, 2010), 70.

<sup>21</sup>Term *al-Nafr* and its derivatives can be interpreted as going on jihad or going to war. While every *al-nafr* is a form of jihad, not all jihad can qualify *al-nafr*, indicating that jihad can also be done through mobilization (*nafr*) or physical fighting. Fanani, "*Jihad in the Qur'ān* (Toshihika Izutsu's Semantic Perspective)," 78.

<sup>22</sup>Term *al-Irhāb* (إرهاب), is derived from "*arhaba*," meaning to create fear or intimidation. A. W. Munawwir, *Al-Munawwir Indonesian-Arabic Dictionary* (Surabaya: Pustaka Progressif 1, 2020), 539.

<sup>23</sup>Ibn Manzur, *Lisan al-'Arab* (The Tongue of the Arabs), vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar Sader, 1990), 436; Louis Ma'luf, *Al-Munjid Fi al-Lughah Wa al-a'lam* (The Munjid in Language and Names), (Beirut: Dar al Misriq, 2007), 282.

<sup>24</sup>Lajnah Pentashihan Mushaf al-Qur'ān Ministry of Religion RI, *Thematic Interpretation of Al-Qur'ān*, vol. 1 (Jakarta: Kamil Pustaka, 2014), 97.

<sup>25</sup>Muchlis M. Hanafi, "The Concept of Al-Wasathiyah in Islam," *Harmoni* 8, no. 32 (2016): 36–52.

يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ إِنَّا كُمْ وَالْغُلُو فِي الدِّينِ فَإِنَّهُ أَهْلَكَ مَنْ كَانَ قَبْلَكُمْ الْغُلُو فِي الدِّينِ<sup>26</sup>

“The Prophet warned against religious excess (ghuluw), noting that overzealousness destroyed past communities.”

Several other terms that have similar connotations to ghuluw include *tanattu'* (tough attitude) and *tasyaddud* (troublesome) or *takalluf* (forcing yourself).<sup>27</sup> These words are also mentioned in the Prophet SAW's Hadīth, such as the one from Ibn Mas'ud that follows: From 'Abdullah he said; Rasulullah SAW has said: 'Woe to those who like to exceed limits. (He said it three times).<sup>28</sup>

Extreme religious beliefs can foster extremism, including acts of terror against those who disagree. However, not all extreme radical attitudes leads to acts of terrorism.

### 3.4. Forms of Radicalism

Radicalism manifests at two levels: thought and action. Cognitively, it appears in language or concepts that incite violence. In a political context, Zuly Qadir identifies three radical movements: jihadists (who use violence in the name of jihad), reformists (who pressure the government without resorting to violence but seek to destabilize it), and rejectionists (who reject democracy). Each of these groups seeks to seize power.<sup>29</sup> According to Rubaidi, political radicalism emerges as a response to the wealth and arrogance of civilization, and this phenomenon is universal.<sup>30</sup> *Second*, Religious radicalism, claims to follow the "*manhaj al-salaf*" strictly according to the scripture without considering the modern context. Juergensmeyer argues that radical actions arise from religious beliefs and resistance to Western ideology. The National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) identifies five typologies of radicalism in Indonesia: Non-ideological Radicals (HTI, IM) with non-violent radical thinking; Non-Terrorist Radicals (FPI) who involved in vandalism; Militia Radicals (Laskar Jihad) who participate in communal conflicts; separatist radicals, including GAM and NII, who seek independence; and terrorist radicals, such as JI and ISIS, who use terror to impose Islamic law.<sup>31</sup>

Religious radicalism is frequently associated with fundamentalism, which adheres to specific ideological beliefs. Imadudin Rahmat, referring to Hrair Dekmejian, outlines the following principles: *First*, *Din wa al-Daulah*: which views a Islam comprehensive system encompassing all aspects of life, with the state obligated to execute *Sharia* law based on the Qur'ān and Hadīth, making no distinction between religion and governance. *Second*, a return to the Foundations of Early Islam: This group relies heavily on the Qur'ān and Hadīth, considering individuals or governments that do not adhere to the teachings of the Prophet and the *Khulafa' Rasyidin* as

<sup>26</sup>Muhammad bin Yazid Abu 'Abdillah al-Qazwaini, *Sunan Ibnu Majah*, Hadīth 2434, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, t.th)

<sup>27</sup>Abdurrahman bin Mu'alla Al Kathur Suhardi Luwaihqi, *Ghuluw Benalu dalam Ber-Islam* (Excessive Zeal and Parasites in Practicing Islam), (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 2003), 29.

<sup>28</sup>Abu al-Husain Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj ibn Muslim al-Qusyairi al-Naisaburi, *Sahih Muslim* (The Book of Sahih Muslim), Juz 8, (Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turas al-'Arabi, t.th), 58. Hadīth No. 4823.

<sup>29</sup>Zuly Qodir, *Religious Radicalism in Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2014), 54.

<sup>30</sup>Rendy Adiwilaga and Agus Kurniawan, "Local Government Strategies To Prevent Religious Radicalism In Bandung Regency," *JISIPOL, Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik* 5, no. 1 (February 1, 2021): 9, <https://ejournal.unibba.ac.id/index.php/jisipol/article/view/364>.

<sup>31</sup>Eric Hiarije, "Action and Collective Identity of Radical Islamic Movements in Indonesia," *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik* 14, no. 2 (November 1, 2010): 131–68, <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.10934>.



unbelievers who must be opposed.<sup>32</sup> *Third*, Puritanism and Social Justice, which emphasize maintaining Islamic values, resisting foreign cultural influences, upholding socio-economic justice, rejecting usury, and reducing dependence on the West. *Fourth*, God's Sovereignty and Law, where the ultimate goal is to uphold God's sovereignty by implementing Islamic law as the highest authority.<sup>33</sup> *Fifth*, Jihad as the Main Pillar, which is regarded as the primary means to dismantle the order of ignorance and spread Islam globally, including through violent means if necessary.<sup>34</sup>

### 3.5.Terrorism

In Arabic, the term “terrorist” originated from the word *irhāb*, derived from lexeme *rahiba-yarhabu* which means “fear” or “threaten.” Its *masdar*, *rahbatan* and *ruhban*, evolved into *irhāb* which meaning “to frighten” or “to intimidate.” Additionally, *rahaba* can also mean “tired,” “monk,” “lion,” or “spearhead.”<sup>35</sup> In the Islamic era, the word *irhāb* has the meaning of *al-khauf* which signifies fear or submission as seen in Qur’ān<sup>36</sup> as follows: “O Children of Israel, remember My blessings that I have bestowed upon you, and fulfil your promise to Me, I will surely fulfil My promise to you; and only to Me should you fear (submit).”<sup>37</sup>

### 3.6.Terrorism in the Terminology of Law

In Law Number 15 of 2003 Concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, Chapter I (General Provisions), Article 1 paragraph 1, Criminal Acts of Terrorism are defined as any conduct that fulfills the element of a criminal act under the provisions of this Law. The rules of Chapter III (Criminal Acts of Terrorism), Articles 6, 7, specify that anyone might be penalised for committing Criminal Acts of Terrorism if they: (1) Intentionally use violence or threats of violence to create an atmosphere of terror or widespread fear among the public, or causes mass casualties by depriving individuals of the freedom, taking lives seizing property, or causing damage or destruction to vital strategic objects, the environment, public facilities, or international facilities.<sup>38</sup> (2) Intentionally use violence or threats of violence to create an atmosphere of terror or widespread fear among the public or cause mass casualties by seizing freedom, taking lives, seizing property, or causing damage or destruction to vital strategic objects, the environment, public facilities, or international facilities.<sup>39</sup>

### 3.7.The Narrative of Jihad Misused by Radical Jihadist and Terrorist Groups

Radical groups often misuse the concept of jihad to justify acts of violence and terrorism, even though true jihad fundamentally contradicts such actions, including attacks on non-Muslims outside of war situations. One of the Qur’ānic verses frequently cited to justify radicalism and terrorism is Sūrah Al-Anfal, 8:60. Quraish Shihab, a renowned Qur’ānic interpreter, notes that the phrase تُرْهِبُونَ in this verse is commonly misinterpreted by terrorist groups as justification for acts of terrorism.

<sup>32</sup>Umi Sumbulah, *Configuration of Islamic Fundamentalism* (Malang: UIN Malang Press, 2009), 40.

<sup>33</sup>M. Imaduddin Rahmat, *New Currents of Radical Islam: the Transmission of Middle Eastern Islamic revivalism to Indonesia* (Denpasar: Erlangga, 2005), 11.

<sup>34</sup>Sarbini, *Islam on the Edge of Revolution: Ideology, Thought and Movement* (Jakarta: Pilar Media, 2005), 23.

<sup>35</sup>Munawwir, *Al-Munawwir Indonesian-Arabic Dictionary*, 539.

<sup>36</sup>Al-Baqara 2:40.

<sup>37</sup>Department of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia, *Al-Qur’ān and its Translations* (Bandung: Jabal Raudlotul Jannnah, 2010), 84.

<sup>38</sup>Law Number 15 of 2003 Concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, Article 6.

<sup>39</sup>Law Number 15 of 2003 Concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, Article 7.



However, the verse actually emphasizes the importance of maintaining peace, with the use of force permitted solely as a deterrent.<sup>40</sup> A narrow and misguided interpretation of scripture, such as that employed by Imam Samudra in the Bali bombings, contradicts Islamic principles.<sup>41</sup> Similarly, One of the Hadīths used as a narrative for acts of terrorism is Ibn Umar's Hadīth, as narrated by al-Bukhari as follows:

عَنْ ابْنِ عُمَرَ أَنَّ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قَالَ أَمَرْتُ أَنْ أَقَاتِلَ النَّاسَ حَتَّى يَشْهَدُوا أَنْ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَأَنَّ مُحَمَّدًا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ وَيُقِيمُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَيُؤْتُوا الزَّكَاةَ فَإِذَا فَعَلُوا ذَلِكَ غَصْنُوا مِنِّي دِمَاءَهُمْ وَأَمْوَالَهُمْ إِلَّا بِحَقِّ الْإِسْلَامِ وَجَسَائِهِمْ عَلَى اللَّهِ<sup>42</sup>

Translation: According to Ibn Umar, the prophet of Allah said, "I was commanded to fight people until they testify that there is no deity except Allah and that Muhammad is Allah's Messenger, establish prayer, and pay zakat. If they do this, they have secured their blood and wealth from me (except by Islamic law), and their reckoning is with Allah.

The Hadīth on jihad is frequently misinterpreted misconstrued by jihadist groups as a justification for radicalism and terrorism, ignoring its specific context, which refers to polytheists who were actively fighting Muslims rather than all non-Muslims. They also disregard other Hadīths that condemn the killing of children, women, priests, and the destruction of religious sites.<sup>43</sup> Historically, the jihad of Prophet Muhammad (*SAW*) was primarily defensive, aimed at protecting Muslims from aggression.<sup>44</sup>

### 3.8.Hadīth Jihad: Textual And Contextual

Hadīth "أمرت أن أقاتل الناس" (*Umirtu an uqātila al-nās*) has been extensively analyzed by scholars regarding its textual, contextual, and intertextual meanings. Transmitted by Ibn Majah from Abu Hurairah, this Hadīth appears in 65 chains across the six major Hadīth collections. The word أمرت, meaning "to command," signifies an order from a superior aimed at achieving a beneficial outcome.<sup>45</sup> A key distinction lies in the use of The term "أقاتل" (to fight) rather than "أقتل" (to kill). The term "أقاتل" implies a reciprocal, defensive action in response to aggression, rather than unilateral violence. Muhammad Said Ramadhan Al-Buthi explains that this term reflects mutual confrontation rather than unprovoked aggression, underscoring that the Prophet Muhammad did not seek to impose Islam through violence but upheld the rights of non-Muslims.<sup>46</sup>

In interpreting the word *an-nās* (الناس) in the Hadīth, scholars note that while it appears general, it often refers to specific groups in Arabic. In this context, *an-nās* refers specifically to polytheists engaged in hostilities against Muslims, rather than all polytheists.<sup>47</sup> This interpretation

<sup>40</sup>M. Quraish Shihab, *Islam As I Understand It: Diversity is Grace* (Bandung: Lentera Hati Group, 2018), 137.

<sup>41</sup>Imam Samudra, *I Fight Terrorists* (Solo: Jazera, 2004), 96.

<sup>42</sup>Muhammad bin Ismail Al-Bukhari, *Sahih Al-Bukhari*, Hadīth 24 (Damsyiq: Daar Ibn Al-Katsir, 2022).

<sup>43</sup>Nasir Abbas, "Terrorists Often Misinterpret Verses and Hadith," detiknews accessed on September 2021

<sup>44</sup>Ahmad Hasan Asyari, *Reformulation of Islamic Teachings, Jihad, Caliphate and Terrorism* (Bandung: Mizan, 2017), 428.

<sup>45</sup>Ahmad Warson Munawwir, *Al-Munawwir Arabic-Indonesian Dictionary* (Surabaya: Pustaka Progresif, 1997).

<sup>46</sup>Muhammad Said Ramadhan al-Buthi, *Al-Djihād Fī al-Islām: Kayfa Naḥamuhū? Wa-Kayfa Numārasuhū?* (Jihad in Islam: How Do We Understand It? And How Do We Practice It?), (Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1993).

<sup>47</sup>Muhammad bin Ya'qub Fairuz al-Abadi, *Al-Qamūs al-Muḥith VIII* (The Comprehensive Dictionary VIII ), (Beirut: Muassasah Ar-Risalah, 1426).

is reinforced by Qur'ānic.<sup>48</sup> Ibn Hajar and Ibn 'Arabi emphasize that the term is general in wording, it is specific in intent, thereby excluding People of the Book and non-combatants. The historical context of the Hadīth further supports this understanding, presenting it as a defensive directive aimed at protecting the Muslim community from aggression. Sūrah at-Taubah<sup>49</sup> complements this interpretation by addressing specific hostilities rather than issuing indiscriminate commands.<sup>50</sup> Ibnul Qayyim and Yusuf Al-Qaradawi emphasize the prohibition of harming women, children, and non-combatants, highlighting Islam's commitment to justice and ethical warfare. Their interpretations counter extremist misreadings by upholding the principles of human dignity and respect.

"The Messenger of Allah captured Tsumamah bin Utsal, a leader from Yamamah, and repeatedly offered him kindness. After three days of compassionate dialogue, Tsumamah embraced Islam, declaring, 'I bear witness that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger.' He later performed Umrah and pledged loyalty to the Prophet, ensuring wheat supplies from Yamamah required the Prophet's permission."<sup>51</sup>

During Abu Bakr's caliphate, wars erupted against groups that refused to pay *zakat*, rejected prophethood, and opposed the Muslim community. The situation in Medina after the death of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) was critical, and *zakat* was essential for public welfare.<sup>52</sup> False prophets such as al-Aswad al-'Unsi, Tulaihah al-Asadi, Musailimah al-Kadzdzab, and Sajjah bint al-Harith posed significant threats to the Islamic faith, including Malik bin Nuwairah of Banu Yarbu' withheld *zakat* from Abu Bakr. Despite Umar's initial opposition, citing a Hadīth that protects one's life and property upon reciting the *shahada*—Abu Bakr insisted that *shahada* must be accompanied by both prayer and *zakat*. He justified taking firm action to uphold Islamic principles and unity.<sup>53</sup>

Some jihadist groups misinterpret Hadīth on warfare against disbelievers, ignoring historical and contextual nuances. A proper understanding of these Hadīth necessitates considering their socio-political background to prevent misuse and uphold their true intent.<sup>54</sup>

### 3.9.Reinterpretation of the Hadīth, Jihad: Approach to Study of Hadīth

Hadīths on *jihad* are widely recorded in major Hadīth collections, including *Sahih Bukhari* (6 Hadīths), *Sahih Muslim* (6 Hadīths), *Sunan an-Nāsai* (23 Hadīths), and *Sunan Ibn Majah* (5 Hadīths). Other collections, such as *Sunan at-Tirmidhi*, *Sunan Daruqutni*, *Sunan al-Baihaqi*, and *Musnad Ahmad*, also contain multiple Hadīths on jihad, each offering insights into its principles and practice in Islam. One of the Hadīths on jihad that will be analyzed in this study explores the

<sup>48</sup>Al-Hajj, 22:27 and Ali Imran, 3:173.

<sup>49</sup>Al-Taubah, 9:5.

<sup>50</sup>Ibnu Hajar Al-'Asqalany, *Fath Al-Bārī* (The Opening of the Noble), (Beirut: Dār al-Ma'rifah, 1379).

<sup>51</sup>Muhammad bin Ismail al-Bukhari, *Shahih Al-Bukhari*, (The Book of Sahih Bukhari), Hadīth 4372, (Damsyiq: Daar Ibn Al-Katsir, 2002), 14.

<sup>52</sup>Buya Hamka, *Tafsir Al-Azhar*, Cet. 3 (Singapura: Pustaka Nasional Pte. Ltd, 1999); Nasaruddin Umar, *Deradicalising the Understanding of the Qur'an and Hadīth* (Jakarta: Elex Media Komputindo, 2014).

<sup>53</sup>Ali Zakariya Yahya bin Syarf al-Nawawi, *Syarah Shahih Muslim* (Syarah Saheeh Muslim), Vol. 1 (Kairo: Dar Al-Hadith, 1994).

<sup>54</sup>Alfanul Makky, *Critique of Radical Ideology: Deradicalisation of Extreme Religious Doctrines in an Effort to Strengthen Islam With A National Perspective* (Kediri: Lirboyo Press, 2018).

concept of *dejihadization* through a Hadīth-based approach. This Hadīth is narrated by Ibn Majah from Abu Hurairah, above:

عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ قَالَ قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أَمَرْتُ أَنْ أَقَاتِلَ النَّاسَ حَتَّى يَقُولُوا لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ فَإِذَا قَالُواهَا عَصَمُوا مِنِّي دِمَاءَهُمْ وَأَمْوَالَهُمْ إِلَّا بِحَقِّهَا وَجَسَائِهِمْ عَلَى اللَّهِ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ<sup>55</sup>

The significance of *sanadic* studies in Hadīth lies in verifying its authenticity. The Hadīth narrated by Abu Hurairah, a *thiqah*, (trustworthy) companion, demonstrates strong *sanadic* continuity through reliable narrators.<sup>56</sup>

Abu Hurairah transmitted his Hadīth to his student, Abi Salih, who was also *thiqah* and remained with him for 44 years before passing away in 101 AH. Subsequently, Al-A'masy, a *tsiqah* expert in *faraid* (inheritance law), transmitted from Abi Salih using the symbol 'an',<sup>57</sup> followed by Hafs Ibn Ghiyath who was confirmed *tsiqah* by Ibn Hajar and al-Nasa'i, indicating direct narration from Al-A'masy.<sup>58</sup> This Hadīth is classified as *sahih li dhātih* because its *sanad* is free from *shādh* (anomalies) or 'illah (defects), and its *matan* (text) aligns with the Qur'ān, Sunnah, and sound reasoning. The credibility of the narrators and the absence of textual discrepancies reinforce the authenticity of this Hadīth in both its *sanad* and *matan*.

The third step in assessing the Hadīth is to examine the circumstances surrounding its transmission, known as *Asbāb al-Wurūd al-Hadīth* (the causes of a Hadīth's descent). Understanding the historical and contextual background of a Hadīth is crucial in interpreting its intended meaning. Several events are linked to the emergence of the Hadīth *الناس اقاتل ان امرت*, particularly the directive given to the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) to confront hostile forces, specifically polytheists or non-Muslims engaged in aggression against Muslims. For example, in the book of al-Bayan as follows:

قَاتِلُهُمْ حَتَّى يَشْهَدُوا أَنْ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَأَنْ مُحَمَّدًا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ فَإِذَا فَعَلُوا ذَلِكَ فَقَدْ مَنَعُوا مِنْكَ دِمَاءَهُمْ وَأَمْوَالَهُمْ إِلَّا بِحَقِّهَا وَجَسَائِهِمْ عَلَى اللَّهِ عَزَّ وَجَلَّ

Translation: "Fight them until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah. If they do so, they have protected their blood and property from you, except for what is rightfully due (Islam) while their reckoning is with Allah."

The previous Hadīth is contained in the narration of Imam Muslim, namely:

عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ أَنَّ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قَالَ يَوْمَ خَيْبَرَ لَأُعْطِيَنَّ هَذِهِ الرَّايَةَ رَجُلًا يُحِبُّ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ يَفْتَحُ اللَّهُ عَلَى يَدَيْهِ قَالَ غَزَى بَنِي الْخَطَّابِ مَا أَخْبَيْتُ الْإِمَارَةَ إِلَّا يَوْمَئِذٍ قَالَ فَتَسَاوَرَتْ لَهَا رِجَاءُ أَنْ أَدْعِيَ لَهَا قَالَ فَدَعَا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ عَلَى بَنِي أَبِي طَالِبٍ فَأَعْطَاهُ إِيَّاهَا وَقَالَ أَمْشِ وَلَا تَلْتَفِتْ حَتَّى يَفْتَحَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْكَ قَالَ فَسَارَ عَلَى شَيْبَا ثُمَّ وَقَفَ وَلَمْ يَلْتَفِتْ فَصَرَخَ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ عَلَيَّ مَاذَا أَقَاتِلُ النَّاسَ قَالَ قَاتِلُهُمْ حَتَّى يَشْهَدُوا أَنْ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَأَنْ مُحَمَّدًا رَسُولُ اللَّهِ فَإِذَا فَعَلُوا ذَلِكَ فَقَدْ مَنَعُوا مِنْكَ دِمَاءَهُمْ وَأَمْوَالَهُمْ إِلَّا بِحَقِّهَا وَجَسَائِهِمْ عَلَى اللَّهِ

Translation: Abu Hurairah said: Then Ali walked away and stopped without turning his back and called out: 'O Messenger of Allah, on what basis am I fighting people? The prophet replied: "Fight them until they testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger

<sup>55</sup>Abi 'Abdillah Muhammad bin Yazid al-Qazwaini, *Sunan Ibnu Majah* (Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 2008). hadith No. 2434

<sup>56</sup>Yusuf bin Abdurrahman Al-Mizzi, *Tahdīb Al-Kamal Fi Asma'Ar-Rijal* (The Refinement of Perfection in the Names of Men), (Beirut: Muassasah Ar-Risalah, 1980).

<sup>57</sup>M. Syuhudi Isma'il, *Methods of Hadīth Sanad Authenticity* (Jakarta: PT. Bulan Bintang, 1988).

<sup>58</sup>Al-Mizzi, *Tahdīb Al-Kamal Fi Asma'Ar-Rijal* (The Refinement of Perfection in the Names of Men).

of Allah. If they do so, they have protected their blood and property from you, except for what is rightfully due (in Islam), while their reckoning rests with Allah.”<sup>59</sup>

This statement provides an overview of the context of the Hadīth regarding jihad against non-Muslims, particularly during the Battle of Khaibar which took place in Muharram of the seventh year of AH. During that battle, Ali bin Abi Talib was appointed as the leader of the Muslim forces. Understanding this historical context is crucial, as radicals and extremists often overlook it, interpreting the Hadīth in a purely literal sense. The Battle of Khaybar was a strategic response to a potential external threat rather than an act of unprovoked aggression. Similarly, the Hadīth narrated by Imam Muslim from al-Miqdad bin al-Aswad and the Hadīth concerning the debate between Abu Bakr and Umar regarding those who refused to pay zakat must also be analyzed within their specific historical contexts (*asbāb al-wurūd*) to prevent misinterpretation.<sup>60</sup>

### 3.10. Found Out of the Background of the Terrorism Movement

Ali Imron emphasized the importance of understanding the background of terrorism, including the informal education and non-formal skills of the perpetrators. In Indonesia, this phenomenon is closely linked to the Indonesian Islamic State (NII) movement, initiated by Kartosuwiryo in 1949 with the aim of establishing an Islamic state. This movement was continued by Darul Islam (DI) and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) under the leadership of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, whose mission inspired acts of terror against non-Islamic groups.<sup>61</sup> One of the short-term objectives was *jihad* in the form of armed struggle against non-Muslims, especially those involved in conflict with Muslim communities in Indonesia.

Ali Imron revealed that he acquired his bomb-making skills at the Afghan Mujahideen Military Academy during the war against communism (1979-1991). Around 400 members from both DI and JI, including himself, received training there, while his younger brother, Ali Fauzi, studied at the Mindanao Military Academy.<sup>62</sup> The close ties between DI and JI leaders reinforced the doctrine of jihad as martyrdom, which needs to be reexamined through the lens of fiqh al-jihad. Enhancing public understanding of terrorist networks, ideologies, and doctrines is essential to support deradicalization efforts and prevent extremism.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>59</sup>Abu al-Husain Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj ibn Muslim al-Qusyairi *Sahih Muslim*, Juz 8, Hadīth No. 2460, (Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turas al-‘Arabi, t.th)

<sup>60</sup>Shafiyurrahman al-Mubarakfury, *Al-Rahiq al-Makhtūm: Sirah Nabawiyah*, Ed. Translated by Sujilah Ayu, (Jakarta: Qisth Press, 2016).

<sup>61</sup>Ali Imron, "Bali Bombing Engineered?" This is Ali Imron's Answer | Ngobrass Podcast,” DamailahRI, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ck5JQ2L0FQM&t=1s>; Ali Imron, “Eksklusif Ali Imron: Sebenarnya Saya Tidak Setuju Bom Bali (Part 1),” [Exclusive Ali Imron: Actually I Don't Agree with Bali Bombing], RKN Media, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U251AHg9uCh&t=1s>; Ali Imron, “Yang Ngebom Kelas Petasan Itu Teroris Lokal. Kami Alumni Afgan Bisa Bikin Bom Kimia & Nuklir (1),” [Those who bombed the firecracker class were local terrorists. We, Afghan Alumni, Can Make Chemical & Nuclear Bombs], Akbar Faizal Uncensored, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=55Vsasmr3yU>.

<sup>62</sup>Ali Fauzi, "The Ease of Making Bombs-Ali Fauzi-Podcast Cafe Tolerance," Humas BNPT, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YHenOvs9wHo&t=1s>.

<sup>63</sup>Ali Imron, "It Only Takes 2 Hours to Become a Terrorist-Rosi (4),” Kompas TV, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-lfs32AkpE&t=1s>; Imron, “Bom Bali Rekayasa? Ini Jawaban Ali Imron | Ngobrass Podcast” [Bali Bombing Fake? This is Ali Imron's Answer], | Ngobrass Podcast; Ali Imron, “Bom Bali Itu Jihad Yang Salah [Bali Bombings Are Wrong Jihad],” Afu Ft.

### 3.11.Revisiting the Fiqh of Jihad

In interviews with Kompas TV Ali Imron stated "It only takes 2 hours to become a terrorist" and Then in TV One News, he explain further "There are still many people fighting over (to become Martyrs)".<sup>64</sup> underscoring the persistent appeal of jihadist ideology. Ali Imron pointed out that young individuals are particularly vulnerable to radical doctrines, as they often seek alternative ideologies when struggling with life's uncertainties and societal complexities. His insights stress the urgency of countering extremist narratives through education, critical thinking, and socio-economic support systems.<sup>65</sup>

Imron highlights that jihadists groups justify acts of violent acts as *jihad fi sabilillah* based on a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and Hadīth. Groups like *Darul Islam* (DI) and *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI) have historically pursued the establishment of an Islamic state through violent means. However, as a former militant, Imron later realized that such actions contradict the true concept of jihad in Islam, which emphasizes ethical conduct, justice, and adherence to Qur'ānic principles. He advocates for a re-evaluation of jihad through a scientific and contextual approach to Hadīth to prevent misinterpretation and radicalization.

### 3.12.Minimizing Inter-Religious Riots

Ali Imron, a former terrorist involved in the 2000 Christmas Eve church bombings, explained that jihadists often exploit inter-religious conflicts as a "*field of jihad*." Since the fall of the New Order, Indonesia has faced significant religious tensions, leading to conflicts in Ambon, Poso, Sampang, and the Tanjung Balai temple burnings. These tensions have provided extremist groups with recruitment opportunities and justifications for violence. Imron highlighted that many terrorist acts, such as the 2002 Bali Bombing, were motivated by revenge for past conflicts. In particular, the Bali attack was a response to U.S. military actions in Afghanistan after 9/11, targeting American tourists as symbols of Western influence.<sup>66</sup>

Ali Imron emphasized that strengthening religious harmony is a crucial deradicalization strategy in Indonesia, where inter-religious tensions and geopolitical factors often fuel terrorism. Despite the presence of around 400 Afghan terrorist alumni reside in the country, only a fraction have executed attacks, indicating some success in government and civilian efforts to curb extremism. However, the risk of resurgence remains if the underlying conditions persist. The state must regulate sensitive religious issues and address hate speech that fosters division.<sup>67</sup> Imron stressed the need for the state to regulate sensitive religious issues and curb hate speech that fosters division. He also highlighted the role of "*half-radical*" groups that undermine Pancasila, conspiracy theories driven by political actors, and the importance of educating the public about the exclusive involvement of Darul Islam (DI) and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) in these acts of terrorism.

### 3.13.Empowerment of Ex-Napiters

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Ali Imron & Ken Setiawan (2)," Akbar Faizal Uncensored, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Nzn7ZXH6do&t=2s>.

<sup>64</sup>Ali Imron, "Ali Imron: Many Still Scramble for Suicide Bombing Action List | tvOne," tvOneNews, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=80o5oVlvtcd>.

<sup>65</sup>Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Drama of Jihad: The Emergence of Salafi Youth in Indonesia," in *Being Young and Muslim : New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North*, ed. Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 49–62.

<sup>66</sup>Imron, "The one who bombed the firecracker class was a local terrorist. We Afgan Alumni Can Make Chemical & Nuclear Bombs (1)."

<sup>67</sup>Imron, "The Bali Bombing was the Wrong Jihad Afu Ft. Ali Imron & Ken Setiawan (2)."

Hasan, Peter Beyer, and Badrus Salih argue that involvement in extremism, jihadism, and terrorism is not solely due to misinterpretations of jihad texts but is also influenced by complex economic and political factors. Ali Fauzi, a former terrorist in Indonesia, supports this view, emphasizing that the roots of terrorism require multidimensional solutions. After his arrest, he founded the Lingkar Peace Foundation in Tenggulun Village, Lamongan, to rehabilitate ex-convicts through life skills training, economic empowerment, and worship trips.<sup>68</sup> Despite facing threats from former radical sympathisers, Ali Fauzi continues to strive for rehabilitation and dialogue for peace and reintegration.<sup>69</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

This study highlights the importance of understanding the roots of terrorism, including the informal education and skills of perpetrators. The misinterpretation of jihad as warfare often arises from doctrines accepted uncritically, making radicalization a swift process, particularly for individuals experiencing alienation or life uncertainty. Military training abroad enhances technical expertise in bomb-making and combat strategies, reinforcing extremist beliefs. Social conflicts and interreligious tensions are frequently exploited to justify acts of violence as jihad, driven by a misinterpretation of religious teachings. Countering extremism requires strengthening scientific approaches to religious studies, particularly through Hadīth analysis. Promoting social harmony is a key deradicalisation strategy, with the state playing a crucial role in regulating sensitive issues and addressing hate speech. Economic and political factors also contribute to terrorism, emphasizing the need for comprehensive solutions. Rehabilitation programs for former extremists have proven effective in preventing re-radicalization and facilitating social reintegration. A holistic approach that combines education, social stability, and policy interventions is essential for combating radicalism, fostering peace, and ensuring long-term security.

#### Conflict of Interest

The authors of the manuscript have no financial or non-financial conflict of interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript.

#### Data Availability Statement

The data associated with this study will be provided by the corresponding author upon request.

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<sup>68</sup>Fauzi, "The Ease of Making Bombs-Ali Fauzi-Podcast Kafe Tolerance,"; Ali Fauzi, "Ali Fauzi's Journey Back to NKRI to Serve the Country," Humas BNPT, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F89UoEbYzg8&t=2s>.

<sup>69</sup>Ali Fauzi, "The Da'wah War of Deradicalisation and Radicalisation: The Murder Threat Is Always There-BBC News Indonesia," BBC News Indonesia, 2020, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhW5B7r8Nf4>.

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