Etu Gboshe, Nneka Sophie Amalu*, and Ekeng Antigha Okon
Department of History and International Studies, University of Calabar, Nigeria
*Corresponding Author: [email protected]
This study appraises the application of the concentric circles theory in Nigeria's defence policy. It has been noted that Nigeria's defence policy manifests the concentric circles theory, ever since the country attained independence in 1960. The theory posits three circles. The first circle is about Nigeria and the defence of its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The second circle covers all states of the West African sub-region, while the third circle includes the whole of Africa. However, the theory is not without challenges as certain threats experienced by Nigeria have made the theory inadequate to provide an effective defence policy. The current study, therefore, reiterates the need for Nigeria to take decisive steps to remedy the challenges posed by the concentric circles theory. The aim is to formulate a more realistic and credible defence policy backed by a strong military industrial complex.
Keywords: concentric circles theory, defence, Nigeria, policy, security
Defence policy is an integral component of Nigeria's security, and "since gaining independence, Nigeria aims to maintain peace with its neighbors, security and defend its territorial integrity" (Bodunde & Balogun, 2019). The Concentric Circles Theory has been a prominent framework within Nigeria's defence policies. The ‘Concentric Circles Theory' was first proposed by Ernest W. Burgess in 1925 (Olufemi, 2014). He used the theory to describe how different social groups are situated in a metropolitan area. According to Shehu and Garba (2020), "concentric circles are circles that form within each other around a common point. It also means circles that share the same centre, axis or origin with one inside the other" (p.2). Since then, the word has been used to explain different issues in various fields. In Nigeria, the theory has been applied to both foreign and defence policies.
Ekoko (1990) had argued that the concentric circle policy is perhaps the most comprehensive, clear-cut and operationalizable Nigerian defence policy ever enunciated since 1960. The concentric circle policy was based on the method of delimitating and prioritizing the strategic boundaries of Nigeria's national defence (Jemirade, 2020). First introduced by Buhari when he was Head of State, and later continued by Babangida, it is in three circles. The first circle is about Nigeria and the defence of its territorial integrity and sovereignty, the second circle covers all states of West African sub-region, and the third circle includes the whole of Africa. Ekoko (1990) emphasizes that each circle integrates strategic-military, economic, and political dimensions. The concentric circles theory was proposed as a strategy designed to bring defence planning policy to operational level and to reflect priorities accordingly in terms of the weight that should be given to the various levels of interest (Vogt, 1981). The rationale behind the concentric circles is that Nigeria cannot guarantee African security without first guaranteeing the security of its own territorial borders. This hierarchical approach underscores the significance of guaranteeing internal security before extending efforts to the West African sub-region and the broader African continent. It is when security is guaranteed within; only then Nigeria can operate to prioritize African regional security.
In order to understand the concentric circles theory, a proper analysis of Nigeria's geographical location is necessary. The geographical location is one of the most important determinants of a country's defence policy. Nigeria is located in the West African sub-region. It is bounded in the north by Niger Republic with a boundary of 1800 kilometres; and with a boundary of about 1000 kilometres in the west by Benin Republic; in the Northeast with Chad Republic in the Lake Chad Area with a boundary of 75 kilometres; with Cameroon in the East with a boundary of 1,700 kilometres and nearly 700 kilometres (356,376 square miles). This landmass extends from the Gulf of Guinea in the South to the Sahel in the North. Apart from the landmass, it is rich in human and abundant natural resources. It is the most populated country in Africa with over 200 million people.
While emphasizing the importance of geographical location in formulating the defence policy, Harvey Starr and Benjamin Most (Akinyemi, 2013) state that "a border does not necessarily cause either conflictual or co-operative international interaction…the existence (or non-existence) of border impinges on the range of possible policy options, which are available to decision makers and biases them towards (and away from) interactions with others nations". They particularly argue that countries with common borders are more likely to interact frequently than the countries far from each other. Hence, geographical contiguity or proximity is an important factor in national defence. It is more like the territorial extension of the homeland. Inferring from the fact that Nigeria is the largest black nation in Africa, she is surrounded by comparatively weaker neighbours. The case of Nigeria seems to be in stark contrast with countries like Belgium and Luxemburg which are surrounded by large and powerful neighbours like Germany, France, Britain, and in order to avoid conflicts with their powerful neighbours, they opt for neutrality. Perhaps, the geographical location of Nigeria made Tafawa Balewa (Nigeria's first and only Prime minister) to view Nigeria's defence in concentric circles because of which he is deemed friendly for both West Africa and whole of the African continent.
The implementation of the concentric circles theory arose out of the threat perception of Nigeria. The first major attempt at the implementation of the theory was in 1962 when Nigeria entered into a security pact with Togo and Dahomey (Benin Republic).The treaty was specifically aimed at giving protection to the countries against Ghana. The murder of President Sylvanus Olympio of Togo in 1963 prevented the pact from coming into force. Details of the pact were yet to be finalized when Olympio was assassinated. This prompted the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, JajaWachuku, to hurriedly convene a meeting in Lagos to discuss possible intervention in Togo. The move only failed when Benin Republic rejected the idea. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria went ahead and declared that Nigeria's border was at Ghana – Togo boundary, and that attempt by any state to recognize the illegal regime will be interpreted as unfriendly act by Nigeria (Asobie, 2014).
At the continental level, the efforts made by Balewa to safeguard Nigeria's interest were to support for the formation of the O.A.U in Addis Ababa. Nigeria rejected the formation of African High Command proposed by Kwame Nkrumah to protect Africa from external threat and assisting Africa liberation movements to free their countries from foreign domination. The argument put up by Balewa against the establishment of African High Command was very much belated. Balewa argued that it is unnecessary since some African states had already been into bilateral agreements with some extra-continental powers for defence. Secondly, he argued that it will lead to substantial loss of sovereignty of individual states. Thirdly, the Nigerian Prime Military went ahead to proposed European – African Alliance.
After the Civil War in 1970, General Gowon proposed the formation of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African State) in 1975 in Lagos to ensure the management of regional affairs in favour of Nigeria's vital interests. Apparently, it was merely an economic organization, but it also had covert defence or security protocols. This arrangement consolidates the concentric circles theory that is meant to ensure the peace of West African sub-region and the African continent as a whole.
According to Celestine Bassey and Charles Dokubo (2011):
The ECOWAS region completes what has been termed the three concentric circles governing Nigeria's foreign and defence policies. There is no gain saying the fact that when certain events occur in the sub-region depending upon their intensity and magnitude, which are bound to affect Nigeria's politico – military and socio – economic environment, we should not standby as a helpless spectator. We believe that if the events are such that have the potentials to threaten the stability, peace and security of the sub-region of Nigeria is duty bound to react or respond in appropriate measures to ensure peace, tranquillity and harmony (p. 36).
The defence protocol named ECOWAS Defence Pact was signed by 13 of the 16 member states of ECOWAS in May 1981 in Freetown, Sierra Leone. It is a regional arrangement designed for the military to react for security and defence in the West African sub-region when the need arises. The protocol consists of the following salient points:
Any armed warning or hostility aimed against any member state shall amount to a threat against the whole community. The parties to the treaty agreed on the principle of mutual aid and assistance and to take measures in the following situations:
However, the provisions of the protocol lacked clarity since it could not identify who the real enemy is. Article 20 of the treaty enjoined member states who are involved in foreign military alliance to "end all foreign military bases within their national territory as soon as the country is in a position to meet their requirements in matters relating to defence" (Bassey & Dokubo, 2011).
At the African regional level, subsequent Nigerian leaders like Yakubu Gowon, Murtala Ramat Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo began to depart from the rejection of an African High command by Balewa to its actualization. To them the rejection of African High command was ill conceived since it was the only genuine option for tackling colonialism and white minority role in Africa. This led to the signing of a treaty on Defence by the OAU, thereby securing the African region. The establishment of Liberation Committee of the OAU was a bold move to end colonialism and apartheid in South Africa. In order to implement the concentric cycle policy, Nigeria had taken bold and concrete steps to ensure its full implementation. Notably, Nigeria has initiated and completed key projects like Onigbolo Cement Company (OCC) and the Save Sugar Factory in Benin Republic. She also holds a limited share in Mifergui-Nimba Iron Ore and Dabola Bauxite Minning projects in Guinea. The country is also a shareholder in Uranuim projects in Niger Republic. Furthermore, Nigeria established the South African Relief Fund in December 1976 which was jointly funded by the government, corporate organizations and individuals. This way, Nigeria was able to raise about five million dollars to support liberation struggle in South Africa, showcasing its commitment to regional and continental solidarity.
For Nigeria's territory to be safeguarded, she initiated several services to foster amicable relations with neighbouring countries. The country initiated the formation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (CBC) in 1964 which was meant to enhance the security and environmental protection of the Lake Chad Region. The Joint Border Commission (JBC) established in 1983, aimed to undertake border demarcation among members in the area. Nigeria has been selling electricity to Niger Republic from its Kainji Dam since 1971. To stabilize the OAU, Nigeria launched the Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF) in 1976 with a capital of 50 million dollars to provide soft loans to African States under the management of African Development Bank (ADB). By 1987, the fund grew to 250 million dollars (Bukarambe, 1990).
Another effort undertaken by Nigeria to implement the concentric cycle policy had been in the area of peacekeeping. Nigeria first participated in peace keeping operation in Africa in 1960 during the civil war in Congo; this was through the UN resolution 143 of July 14, 1960. The United Nations Operation in the Congo was headed by Late Aguiyi Ironsi. This peace keeping mission lasted from 1960-1964. Nigeria also led the Beleague organisation of the African Union's (OAU) mission to Chad during the Chadian Civil War in 1981. Though, the Chadian expedition failed largely due to external influence, Nigeria was only invited as an observer to the peace settlement. She also participated in the peacekeeping operations in Somalia in 1991-1995. At the West African sub-region in line with ECOWAS Defence Pact, it has been observed that for the seven years of Liberian Conflict, Nigeria was able to provide hegemonic leadership in articulation and formulation of the goals of the economic community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia. Nigeria's involvement has been exceptionally significant to the success of ECOMOG. Nigeria's manpower and assistance in terms of logistics are instrumental to the success of the whole regional force. Their capacity to conduct coordinated air, inland, sea operations and even efficient counter-terrorist campaigns have been remarkable. This is why Bassey and Dokubo (2011) state that if we ever want to engage in P. K.O/ Peace keeping Operations using African troops, we should keep Nigeria's potential very much in mind. It is on this record that Nigeria had spent over 8 billion dollars to end the conflict and restore democratic government in Liberia.
Nigeria also intervened in Sierra Leone in 1996 when rebels of Johnny Paul Corona backed by Charles Taylor overran the country. Nigeria led other ECOWAS countries under ECOMOG to intervene in the conflict; unfortunately, the initial gains made by ECOMOG were gradually eroded because of NATO sanctions on Nigeria following the lawless execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni eight (8) in Port Harcourt. The NATO sanctions were so effective that it crippled the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone, prompting a UN intervention in 1998 under the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNMSIL) which ECOMOG Forces later served under their command. Nigeria also assisted in the restoration of peace in West African countries like Cote d'ivoire, Guinea Bissau and Burkina Faso. The country participated in peace operations in Darfur (Sudan), Tanzania, and South Africa, where it played a part in ending apartheid. Additionally, Nigeria contributed 1200 troops to African led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and 200 hundred police officers to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).The first set of Individual Police Officers (IPOs) in Africa deployed to Congo in 1960-64 was organized by Nigeria. The pioneer formed police unit was also deployed to Liberia in 2004. The peacekeeping commitment of Nigeria has led to the establishment of an independent training institution, Nigeria Army Peace Keeping (NAPKC) in 2009. "The NAPKC was established primarily to give Nigerian troops pre-deployment training on peace support operations. By 2015, the NAPKC had delivered over 230 courses and trained 53,000 peacekeepers" (Chigozie & Ituma, 2015). The centre conducts research and trainings that aid peace support operations nationwide. The centre also works together with the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) and Pacific Architecture Engineers (PAE) and other training institutes to boost Pre-deployment Training (PDT) for Nigerian units. These efforts have been undertaken by Nigeria to make her peace keeping efforts effective and ensuring the successful implementation of the concentric circles theory.
The view of Tafewa Balewa (Prime Minister, 1960 - 1966) was that Nigeria had no enemies and would not be confronted by any major security threats warranting the mobilization of troops (Ekoko, 1990). Balewa's viewpoint that the domestic environment was peaceful, and the overall African region was peaceful, arose from the notion that the primary threat to Nigeria came from the communist bloc. He stated "Nigeria will have a wonderful opportunity to speak for the continent of Africa, that Nigeria may fulfill her destiny as the leader of Africa". However, this view underwent a significant shift by the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war in 1967, and according to Vogt, the civil war acted as a watershed in the perception of Nigeria's national security. The war was long and bitter and had extensive international dimensions and ramifications and also led to a total re-evacuation of the size, capabilities and objectives of the Nigeria Defence establishment (Vogt, 1990). During the war, Britain refused to supply certain categories of arms, paid for by Nigeria, on the grounds that it will be used on innocent population. This ended the long-standing belief that Great Britain would assist Nigeria in times of national security threats. The consequences of British actions were grave as Nigeria began to mend fences with the communist bloc which readily supplied her arms. Moreso, some African countries such as, Togo, Cote d'ivoire, Gabon and Tanzania recognized the Republic of Biafra. This situation has shown the shortfalls of the policy. The actions of both Britain and the African countries that recognized Biafra showed that the concentric circles theory was not realistic. Nigeria realized that she could not base her national defence strategy on the assumption that other African state would automatically support her.
However, Nigeria developed a fundamental sense of insecurity as she is being surrounded by French speaking African neighbours. Nigeria is bounded to the East by Cameroon, Chad Republic in the North East, Niger Republic in the North, and Benin Republic in the West. It is believed that as a result of special affiliation of these countries to France, they could easily be used to undermine Nigeria's' sovereignty. This is because during the civil war, Cote d'ivoire was involved in the shipment of arms through Benin Republic to Biafra. As a result, Nigeria recognized the importance of garnering support from its neighbours for its survival and national defence.
Another threat that challenged the concentric circles policy was France. Apart from recognizing Biafra Republic during the civil war, France also delivered large quantity of arms and ammunition to the secessionist through Gabon and Cote d'ivoire. She did everything possible to ensure disintegration of Nigeria. During the formation of ECOWAS in 1975, France opposed its formation, insisting that the organization will be dominated by Nigeria. This made Senegal to propose the inclusion of the Democratic Republic of Congo in the organization, to counter the envisage dominance of Nigeria in the organization. This argument was very much obscure as Democratic Republic of Congo is far away from West Africa. Events that followed the formation of ECOWAS leave much to be desired. This is because France mobilized the Francophone speaking west African countries to form a separate organization called La Communauté économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest(CEAO), which was a Francophone west African regional organization as a counter to ECOWAS. While ECOWAS has a defence pact, the Francophone speaking West African organization also has a defence protocol called ANAD (Accord de Non-aggression et d' Assistance on Matiere de Defence) with a secretariat in Abidjan, Cote d'ivoire. These moves were largely aimed at weakening ECOWAS. More so, frequent French military interventions in Africa have tended to threaten the Pan –Africanist posture of Nigeria defence policy (the concentric circles theory).
France intervened in Cameroon in 1959 - 1964 in a counter Revolutionary war against Union of Peoples of Cameroon (UPC). She also intervened in Mauritania in 1961 by helping in the suppression of riots. She also, intervened and supported Leopold Senghor during the breakup of Mali federation. She intervened in the Congo in 1960, 1962 during suppression of riots. She intervened in Gabon in 1960, 1962 and 1964 in which France participated in the containment of riots and prevention of military overthrow against President Mba. France intervened in Chad Republic in 1960 – 1963; she intervened in Chad in 1968 – 1975 in a war against FROLINAT. She again intervened in Chad in 1981 to expel Libyan forces stationed in Chad to support the Transitional Government of National Union (GUNT) headed by Goukouni Weddeye, where France used most of her most sophisticated equipment. France intervened in Djibouti in 1976-1977 in Operation Lovada and Saphir against Somali irredentism. She intervened in Zaire 1977, 1978 in Shaba to suppress Shaba Rebellion (Boussaid, 2021). She intervened in Central African Republic in 1979 in operation code-named Operation Barracudawhich was the expression of France support for David Dacko against Emperor Bokassa. Again, she intervened in Chad in 1983 – 1984 during Chadian civil war in support of Hissen Habre.
Apart from these interventions, France has entered into military pact or agreement with 23 African countries, namely: Algeria, Benin Republic, Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Gabon, Mali, Morocco, Mauritius, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Libya, Madagascar, Niger, Central African Republic, Seychelles, Chad, Rwanda, Senegal Togo, Tunisia and Zaire. The threat posed by France is real. It had been stated that "in terms of conflicts of interest, military capability and their policy of military encirclement of Nigeria pose a potentially dangerous threat to the survival of Nigeria. Indeed, France and her West African allies posed a first -degree threat to Nigeria". In recognition of the potency of the threat posed by France, Ali Mazuri "called on Nigeria to join the nuclear club in order to narrow the gap between its physical centrality and military marginality". Ali MazAli Mazuri had argued vigorously that, "only Nigeria can contain France". He therefore advocated the development of a "Black bomb" (Nweke, 1990).
Over the years, South Africa had consistently remained a threat to Nigeria in the African region. This dates back to the period of Nigeria civil war when South Africa used the Nigeria civil war to carry our propaganda throughout the world that Africa cannot govern them. Therefore, the Nigeria's civil war justifies their minority in South Africa. Following Nigeria's support for dismantling apartheid in South Africa, South Africa acquired a base in Equatorial Guinea in the Island of Bioko, an Island few kilometres off the shores of Nigeria. Nigeria's reaction and the condemnation at the O.A.U. level let South Africa to pull out of Equatorial Guinea. The lesson from the South African presence in the Island of Bioko shattered the concentric circles theory, challenging the belief that Nigeria's neighbours were inherently friendly. In other to prevent a reoccurrence of such incident, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea established Nigeria – Equatorial Guinea Commission.
Furthermore, the Nigeria – Chad Border incident of 1983 marked a challenge to concentric circles theory in which the Chadian forces invaded Nigeria territory on 18th April, 1983, in a well-planned armed rehearsed operation, three thousand Chadian soldiers under the command of the then Chadian Army chief-of-staff, Idriss Deby invaded and seized nineteen (19) Island in the Lake Chad axis in Borno State. Twenty-four hours later, six villages in Borno State were captured by Chadian forces. The government of Shehu Shagari ordered the Nigerian Army, 3rd Army Division under the command of General MohammaduBuhari to flush out the invaders. The Nigerian Army led a coordinated attack against the Chadian troops and expelled the invaders. The Nigerian Army drove the Chadian forces to a range of about 50 kilometres to Ndjamena before withdrawing from Chadian territory. Before the outbreak of hostiles between the two countries Nigeria had participated in the various peace keeping operations in Chad where it spent both human and material resources to restore stability to that country. The Chadian invasion of Nigeria in April, 1983 was a dent the effectiveness or reliability of the concentric circles theory's assumption of having friendly neighbours, highlighting the vulnerability of Nigeria to security threats from neighbouring countries (Bassey & Dokubo, 2011).
Furthermore, the incident involving the killing of Nigerians in 1981 by Cameroon Gendarmes further exposed the inadequacies/limitations of the concentric circles theory. In 1981 Cameroonian Gendarmes killed several Nigerian soldiers and civilians in the Bakassi Peninsula. Nigeria did not react violently; instead, she opted for diplomatic solution. The satiation was finally rectified by the Green Tree Agreement which implemented the World Court Judgment of 2002 between Nigeria and Cameroon be ceding the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon. Perhaps the greatest challenge to the concentric circles theory is the challenges arising from the domestic environment of Nigeria.
More so, the internal threat of Nigerians defence has further exposed the inadequacies of the concentric circles theory. The threats of secession from Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Boko Haram insurgency, the Niger Delta militancy, religious dichotomy, robbery, banditry, farmers and herdsmen conflict and other issues such as poverty, hunger and starvation have further rendered the concentric circles theory obsolete. The ethnic division within the country which has made the country less cohesive is very apparent. It is well known that it is the internal affairs that determine the external affairs of a country. No country can actualize a strong defence policy when it is internally weak.
The paper appraises the application of the concentric circle theory within the context of Nigeria's defence policy. The first circle is about Nigeria and the defence of its territorial integrity and sovereignty, the second circle covers all the states of West African sub-region, and the third circle includes the whole of Africa. Despite its theoretical appeal, certain challenges (as discussed above) have exposed the inadequacies of the policy. Therefore, Nigeria needs to take decisive steps to address the deficiencies in the concentric circles theory in order to formulate a more realistic and credible defence policy. This should include addressing the obstacles to internal security. Additionally, Nigeria should develop its military-industrial complex comparable to that of U.S.A, France, and other countries. A strong military-industrial complex is essential to ensuring Nigeria's national security and serving as a solid foundation for a credible defence policy.
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