

Journal of Public Policy Practitioners (JPPP)

Volume 1 Issue 2, Fall 2022


ISSN(P): 2959-2194, ISSN(E): 2959-2208

Homepage: <https://journals.umt.edu.pk/index.php/jppp>



Article QR



- Title:** National Internal Security Policy: An Assessment
- Author (s):** Sarfraz Khan Virk
- Affiliation (s):** Police Service of Pakistan
- DOI:** <https://doi.org/10.32350/jppp.12.03>
- History:** Received: September 29, 2022, Revised: November 08, 2022, Accepted: December 23, 2022, Published: December 30, 2022
- Citation:** Virk, S. K. (2022). National internal security policy: An assessment. *Journal of Public Policy Practitioners*, 1(2), 49–78. <https://doi.org/10.32350/jppp.12.03>
- Copyright:** © The Authors
- Licensing:**  This article is open access and is distributed under the terms of [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
- Conflict of Interest:** Author(s) declared no conflict of interest



UMT

A publication of
School of Governance and Society
University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan

National Internal Security Policy: An Assessment

Sarfraz Khan Virk*

Police Service of Pakistan

Abstract

For the last few years, Pakistan has faced many traditional and non-traditional security threats. Among them, the fatal threat is terrorism and extremism in the country, which has largely been connected with the Afghan war. After 9/11, terrorism and extremism got triggered in Pakistan, in which the country faced heavy consequences in terms of economy, loss of life, and destruction of infrastructure. This grave situation compelled the government to develop a comprehensive national security policy to address the growing threats. In 2014, the government enacted the first NISP 2014-2018. The focus was to initiate military operations in FATA areas to eliminate the terrorist's hold, which achieved some positive outcomes in the short run. In 2018, prior to the general elections, the previous government announced another NISP 2018-2023. The implementation of that newly announced security policy was handed over to the new government. It was observed that the policy could not achieve the desired outcomes, as there were certain loopholes in the formulation and implementation of these stages. In this regard, the focus of the current research is, to critically analyze the drawbacks of NISP for the period of 2018-2023.

Keywords: extremism, NAP, NACTA, NISP, security, terrorism

Introduction

Security studies or international security studies is one of the fundamental disciplines in the field of international relations and for decades it has largely been defined in the context of military security of the state from external aggression. The realist school of international relations defined the international political system as a competitive strategy. Therefore, the states consider it imperative to seek power for the security and defense of their sovereignty. This traditional concept of security defines threats in a subtle way and makes military power indispensable for the security purpose.

However, in the last few years the traditional concept of security as a state-centric approach has changed and proposed some alternate paradigms

* Corresponding Author: sarfrazvirk@gmail.com

to understand the concept in the broadest way. The paradigm of human security was introduced in 1994 by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which encompasses areas related to politics, economy, environment, health, and food. (United Nations Development Program, [1994](#)). The increasing process of globalization has blurred the traditional way of perceiving threats. Now, there are many sources of threats which demand diverse and multi-dimensional responses to secure human beings and society from external as well as from internal dangers.

Pakistan's geo-strategic location is another significant element, both as an asset and a security challenge. The volatile situation at the eastern and western borders, the changing global political environment, economic degradation, increasing militancy in society, and the wave of terrorism have made the security environment even more complex than the traditional threats of the security. These multi-dimensional challenges to the country necessitate a multi-dimensional approach to address all these security threat-related issues. At present Pakistan's security has been compromised from within and outside members of the state.

After 9/11, Pakistan had seen a surge in terrorism and lost thousands of lives and billions of dollars in the military operations conducted in various parts of the country. Moreover, the rising sectarianism and militancy in society was another challenge that must be addressed for the national and international policymakers. Although, the government took some measures to counter terrorism and a number of legislations, certain policies were enacted to counter the increasing terrorism. However, there is a dire need to formulate a comprehensive internal security policy that could provide guidelines and a roadmap to address all internal and external security challenges. The first National Internal Security Policy (NISP) was issued in 2014 but the incident at the Army Public School in December 2014 not only expedited its implementation procedure but also led it towards the adoption of a National Action Plan (NAP). The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was legislated to implement and monitor the state's policy. It delivered broad contours, guidelines, and recommendations to deal with the security crisis. Prior to the elections, the government unveiled another NISP 2018-2023 with a shift in its focus on taking soft measures to address the emerging challenges regarding terrorism and extremism. Soon after a new government resumed the political setup, which was responsible for the implementation of NISP 2018-2023. It was observed that the security

policy was deficient in its formulation, which led to its ineffective implementation. Recently, the government has adopted another NISP 2022-2026 to deal with the security crisis. The current study aims to critically analyze the all-inclusive nature of NISP 2018-2023 and the challenges it has faced during its implementation stage.

The current study is divided into sub-sections. The first section of the paper focuses on the internal and external security threats in Pakistan. The second section highlights the broad contours of the security policies of Pakistan with a particular focus on NISP 2018-2023. It also takes into account the role of the National Action Plan (NAP) and National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). The last section draws attention to the critical analysis of the formulation as well as the implementation procedure of NISP 2018-2023 and explains why this policy could not achieve the desired results. The last section of this paper includes a conclusion and some future recommendations.

Statement of Problem

For the past two decades, Pakistan has been in the midst of a terrorist and militancy storm. Extremism and violence have developed strong roots in the Pakistani society since the Afghan conflict, compounded by foreign dynamics in the region. Efforts by Pakistan's law and enforcement authorities have reduced the frequency of terrorist events and damaged militant infrastructure but peace remained a fragile element for the citizens. Pakistan is unable to achieve long-term peace and security due to a concentration only on the kinetic front and the failure to implement the National Internal Security Policy. The current paper aims at exploring the NISP 2018-23 plan and how it perceived the internal security threats and why the implementation mechanism failed, with a certain set of recommendations to tackle such issues in future. The key research questions are:

- 1- Has the NISP 2018-2023 incorporated the internal and external geostrategic dimensions of the security challenges?
- 2- What were the gaps in the formulation and implementation of NISP 2018-2023 in dealing with the challenges and security threats of the country?



Significance and Scope of Study

This paper aims to critically analyze the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2018-2023 of Pakistan on the parameters of its all-encompassing formulation strategy, and the practical measures taken for its successful implementation. In doing so, the study not only briefly reviewed the NISP 2014 and the implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP), and the role of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) but also briefly assessed the broad contours of the recently released security policy of 2022. Although it is suggested that the security policy 2018-2023 envisioned the inclusive handling of all the internal and external threats and the use of kinetic and non-kinetic measures, it does not qualify as a successful national security policy. Previously, no thorough analysis has been conducted in finding the gaps in the formulation and implementation processes of the NISP 2018. The paper also recommends various measures by looking at how the implementation procedure of this policy was conducted and with what results. The findings of this study can be made the basis for evaluating the comprehensive nature of the new NISP 2022-2026. However, for the purpose of focus, the research is limited to:

- a) Analyzing the broad contours and comprehensive nature of NISP 2018-2023,
- b) Gaps in the formulation and successful implementation of the policy forwarded by recommendations.

Review of the Literature

The concept of security is elusive and contested, and therefore open to different interpretations. However, in the simplest way, it is conceived as the absence of internal and external threats. In the field of international relations, it is conceived or identified in terms of national security. Arnold Wolfers has succinctly described it as “security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Wolfers, [1962](#)). The narrower concept of security that is related to military power or strategy is predominant in the realist perspective. This conception of security limits it to the conventional way of approaching threats and challenges of any state, and using military power as the only solution to address them.

During and after the Cold War attempts were made to broaden the concept of security outside the realm of the military and to include politics, society, environment and economics. Barry Buzan was the leading figure

and began with the intention of defining security from non-military concerns. In his book *People, States and Fear* (1983, 1991) he mentioned five factors that affect the security of human collectivities (Buzan, [1983](#)). Traditional security, which is military security interplays at the level of offensive and defensive capabilities, and the perceptions of threats from other states. The political security of a state is related to the smooth functioning of the state organs, stability of the political system, and the sustainability of the core ideologies of any state, which give legitimacy to the government system. Economic security is the functioning of the financial system, market and available resources that give sustainable levels of social welfare to the citizens and enhance the state's economic power. Societal security pertains to the preservation and the integrity of cultural, linguistic, religious and national identity of the people. Finally, environmental security is safeguarding the natural environment and maintenance the biosphere upon which the survival of all human enterprise depends (Buzan, [1983](#)). All these different aspects of security defined above are interrelated, give a comprehensive overview of security and also sets priorities in defining and tackling the threats and challenges. Apart from military security, the other aspects come under the domain of human security, a concept developed in 1994 by the United Nations Development Program. Human security unlike military security does not require conventional ways of taking action and adopting procedures. As human security encompasses various aspects, the policies adopted should also be comprehensive and robust.

Since its inception, Pakistan's security situation is tenuous and became more volatile after the 9/11 incident. On the eastern border, India is posing unprecedented threats. The western border with Afghanistan, which has always been porous, became a breeding ground for all the terrorist activities that the country has been facing for the last twenty years. Pakistan's internal political instability coupled with the changing external political environment posed the country with more risks on both national and international fronts. The intensification of military operations in Afghanistan by the NATO forces and the complexity of the nature of the War on Terrorism and the spread of terrorism, extremism and militancy inside Pakistan required the government to take strong actions to limit its spread. Rana had pointed out that there needed to build a strong narrative against extremism. There was no consensus in defining extremism and terrorism, which lead to the difficulty in their elimination from society



(Rana, [2010](#)). In 2014, after the incident at the Army Public School, the government released the first reactionary national security policy. National Action Plan was adopted to take coercive measures against the terrorists and NACTA was put into place to overlook the policies and actions. However, there were certain procedural impediments that the security policies had to face. Farooq pointed out some deficiencies in the formulation and implementation of the first national security policy. He said that a political consensus is required for the formulation as well as the successful implementation of any security policy, and the first security policy lacked the active interest and significant suggestions of the political parties (Farooq, [n.d.](#)). NISP 2018 shifted its focus on elucidating the drivers of extremism (socio-economic, political and spatial), and the sharp inequalities prevalent in the society. Some scholars have attempted to dissect and understand the inclusive nature of NISP 2018 and the impediments in the way of its implementation. Waseem and Mirza noted that NISP 2018 reflects a consistent approach to understand and devise the security policies in Pakistan (Mirza, [2018](#)). A senior official Ihsan Ghani pointed out that the security policies of Pakistan should be proactive and above any political scoring. However, he mentioned that NISP 2014 was a reactionary policy and NISP 2018 faced ownership problems by the new political setup (Ghani, [2018](#)). Fahad Nabeel highlighted an important impediment in the way of implementing national security policies. He mentioned that the recommendations listed in NISP 2018 “fall within the purview of provincial governments...therefore the government will need to formulate their own strategies to implement them” (Nabeel, [2018](#)). This is an important point highlighted which recommends that the onus of the successful implementation of the security policies lies in the strong governance system and the alignment of all the stakeholders from federal to provincial levels.

However, the current study has undertaken some broad conceptual underpinnings of the policy and deeply analyzed the loopholes in the formulation and implementation of NISP 2018. Therefore, it contributes significantly to the existing literature with some valuable recommendations at the end.

Methodology

As the paper undertakes the critical evaluation of the National Internal Security Policy 2018-2023, the methodology adopted for this research is mainly qualitative, descriptive and analytical. The data has been gathered

from both primary and secondary sources. The secondary data is based on the extensive use of books, articles, journals, government reports, and newspapers to uncover the complexity of the underlying issues related to the implementation of this security policy to achieve desired results. For gaining further insight into the intricacies of the issue, the opinion of the main stakeholders in the form of government officials, and policymakers have also been sought. The methodology is helpful in identifying the issues with the NISP 2018, and the bottlenecks it has faced during the implementation stage. It is also useful to understand that to what extent the gaps in the new policy of 2022 have been removed to make it more robust and comprehensive.

Organization of the Paper In the current study, Section I of the paper briefly discusses the overview of the security environment of Pakistan, dealing separately with the internal and external security threats. Section II of the paper discusses the broad contours of the NISP 2018-2023, while also briefly discussing the 2014 security policy in order to analyze to what extent the second security policy was comprehensive. It also brings into discussion the implementation of the National Action Plan and the procedural role played by NACTA. Section III critically evaluates the formulation procedure and implementation stage of NISP 2018. Moreover, the discussion will also draw some attention to streamlining the internal and external security necessities and the possible ways out as suggested in the recent security policy. It is then followed by some recommendations that are useful in critically analyzing the NISP 2022-2026.

Overview of The Security Environment of Pakistan

Profiling Pakistan's Security Challenges

Pakistan's security situation, since its inception, has been embroiled with continuous internal and external conflicts, and its geostrategic location remained a liability than an asset because of the non-conceptualization of a comprehensive security policy that encompasses all security challenges. Pakistan remained at the center of all major regional or international politico-strategic conflicts or events throughout its history. The founding father of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, while emphasizing the prominent geo-strategic location of Pakistan and the possible future security challenges said: "Pakistan is the pivot of the world, placed on the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves"

(Syed, 2019). The nature of the regional and international political system is dynamic, and therefore, continuously evolving. This dynamic nature of the political environment poses serious security challenges to Pakistan's State and the security-related institutions. The understanding of the multiple security challenges is, therefore, imperative to devise a sound security strategy to address the existing and emerging issues. This section of the paper gives an overview of the security environment and challenges of Pakistan to evaluate the national security policies devised until now. It is also significant to evaluate the applicability of those policies, and the challenges they faced during the implementation phases. In order to comprehend and appropriately categorize the security challenges they can be divided into internal and external challenges. In doing so, these categories could also corroborate the traditional and non-traditional aspects of security.

External Security Challenges

Pakistan's external security challenges largely emanate from its eastern and western borders. On the eastern front is the state of India which has complicated the security situation since the partition. On the western border lies Afghanistan, which remained occupied by the external powers and destabilized the internal situation of Pakistan, especially during the last four decades. Moreover, the external political dynamics and the rivalry among the big powers also contribute to the security perception.

Pakistan and India had fought three major wars and multiple border clashes since partition. Pakistan's threat perception and military preparedness largely revolve around the relationship with India, as there are multiple unresolved disputes between both states. Kashmir, undoubtedly, is the main source of antagonism and the nuclear flash point between the two nuclear powers of South Asia. The dispute is in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) without any fruitful results. Recently, the Indian government revoked the special status of Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK), and since then there is a continuous tension between both states. On one hand, India blames Pakistan for sending terrorist groups to the Kashmir territory and supporting terrorists' organization in the region. On the other hand, India has been involved in sponsoring terrorism inside Pakistan using Afghanistan and Iran's territory. Both governments also initiated a series of dialogue processes to normalize relations and amicably resolve the issues, but the mutual distrust, India's adoption of fascist Hindutva policies, the

continuous blame game on Pakistan, and the global political environment halted the peace negotiation process. Indian government's fascist domestic policies, its attitude towards its minorities, and the hegemonic posture in the region are abruptly disturbing normalcy.

Pakistan's second major source of insecurity emanates from Afghanistan. For the last forty years, the country has been facing internal instability and continuous crisis because of foreign occupations. The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has always been porous, and a large number of the Pashtun population lives on both sides of the border. Moreover, the terrain is extremely rugged and mountainous to be monitored properly. Before the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets in December 1979, the relationship between both states never required an alarming proportion of security. Afterwards, the relationship have seen many vicissitudes, and the incident of 9/11 further exacerbated and complicated the already chaotic security situation. In the garb of war against terrorism, many intelligence agencies were involved in destabilizing Pakistan and supported terrorist organizations to spread terrorism, militancy and extremism inside Pakistan. Eventually, the state had to decide to send the military to the FATA areas of Pakistan from where most of the hideouts of these organizations were operating. After 2007, the wave of terrorism was not limited to the border areas, instead, it spread to every corner of Pakistan. There was no mechanism to control the cross-border movement of terrorists, and the incumbent governments of Karzai and Ghani were known to be extremely loyal to India. From the strategic point of view, Afghanistan's internal problems and military inferiority can never be a source of security threat, however, the possible fallout of this instability in the FATA areas of Pakistan cannot be overlooked by the Pakistani state. The withdrawal of the NATO forces from Afghanistan last year, and the construction of a fence at the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan helped curtail terrorism but still, there are certain sleeping cells of those terrorists organizations working along the border areas and inside Pakistan and pose a continuous challenge for the security organizations. Afghanistan's stability and prosperity are greatly in Pakistan's interest. It can unblock Pakistan's access to the Central Asian region.

Furthermore, in the last few years, Pakistan has also faced security challenges from the Iranian border. Although both countries are Muslim brotherly neighbours, Pakistan's continued unparalleled support to the US,

and capitulation to the US's pressure more often drew Iran closer to India. Recently, both countries are talking about strengthening their security issues, but the easy movement of terrorists from Iran into Pakistan still continuing that needs to be looked after.

Internal Security Challenges

As the nature of security issues has been continually evolving from traditional to non-traditional aspects, the states are embroiled in multiple domestic security crises. Sometimes, the root causes of these challenges are purely domestic, some of them are linked with external issues and some have a mixed nature. From that perspective, the internal security of any state occupies a pivotal position in any internal security policy. Like other modern states, Pakistan has been confronting multiple internal security threats. These domestic challenges pertain to political instability, governance issues, a sluggish economy, energy issues, sectarianism, militancy, terrorism and extremism.

For the purpose of evaluating the internal security policies of Pakistan, it is important to look at the internal challenges that the society at large has been facing. As it has been mentioned that there are diverse facets of internal security threats, they will be briefly elaborated on in the succeeding paragraphs.

For the past many years, the continuous economic downturn and the financial crisis compelled successive governments to turn towards the IMF for a bailout program to provide some breathing room to the shattered economy. No single government could formulate a comprehensive economic program to come out of this quagmire. Internally, the worsening law and order situation, rampant corruption, energy crisis, and increasing oil prices in the international market could not attract foreign direct investment. Externally, Pakistan had to manage a large influx of Afghan refugees, increased defense spending to conduct military operations to curb terrorism, and conditions imposed by the development banks. The governance situation is another big challenge. The weak governance structure is unable to manage the law and order situation, economic crisis, smooth running of the government apparatus, and formulation of result-oriented policies.

Terrorism is another phenomenon or a security challenge for the world. It is somewhat hybrid when it comes to its conventional and non-

conventional conception. Terrorism has both local and external causes. Since the start of the Afghan war, terrorism has been exported to Pakistan too. As there is no consensus developed on the definition of terrorism, different people connote different meaning of terrorism. It has political, religious, economic and societal roots. Since the war against terrorism, no country has suffered as much as Pakistan in terms of economic, material and collateral damage. The economic damage to Pakistan is more than \$126 billion and suffered more than 70,000 casualties including civilians and military personnel (Ahmed, [2021](#)). Another critical challenge is the rising militancy. We often use terrorism and militancy interchangeably. The issue of militancy in Pakistan is very old, but the Afghan war against the Soviets intensified it and it continued after the 9/11 incident. Many militant organizations in Pakistan came to the fore. The most prominent among them are Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and some of the militant wings of the political parties. These militant organizations are receiving a heavy amount of international funding from different countries to destabilize the country and further their interests. The BLA fighters are also present in Afghanistan. In the last few years when NATO was there in Afghanistan, the BLA's activities were on the rise. The sole purpose was to engage the Pakistan army on both fronts and export the insurgency in Pakistan. Extremism refers to the holding of some radical political and religious ideology that is beyond the mainstream norms of society. It is generally perceived that only religiously motivated people can have extremist ideas. In reality, there is a strong connection between extremism and liberalism as an ideology. In the past, madrassas and religious seminaries were considered perpetrators of extremism. Now, modern educational institutes are also producing extremist ideologies, and we have seen some horrible incidents of lynching and mob killings in the universities which are imparting modern education to the students. This implies that extremism is not restricted to religion only, but it is largely connected with modern ideas. Sectarianism is another societal threat that is dividing Pakistan on the basis of different religious sects, political views, and cultures. Sectarianism is more pronounced in Shia-Sunni divide in Pakistan and often internationally supported. Its roots can be traced back to the Iranian Revolution and its subsequent fallout on the Shia community in Pakistan, and later General Zia's pro-Sunni policies in Pakistan.



All the above-discussed internal and external security challenges have direct implications for the internal security policies adopted by the succeeding governments at various times. As the modern conception of security has evolved from conventional to non-conventional threats, therefore, it requires modern states to devise an all-inclusive set of internal security policies to address issues ranging from external military threats to the state to internal security challenges to its citizens.

National Internal Security Policies: A Historical Perspective

From 2002-2014, Pakistan's government has seen major upheavals and extreme turbulence. These insurgencies have challenged state capacity, the increased landscape of militancy, and jeopardized the role of security departments. It has also adversely affected the morale of society and caused serious challenges for the overall economies. Some of the factions of those forces who were operating against the foreign occupation of Afghanistan turned against Pakistan and incurred heavy losses to the state and common people. The government took a variety of security measures previously and during that time, but the intensity of terrorism and rising of other security threats indicated that they were not enough. Therefore, a comprehensive national security policy was indispensable to address the emerging challenges. The National Internal Security Policy 2014-2018 was the first step in this regard, which was announced in 2014. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was given the mandate as a supervising authority of that policy (National Counter Terrorism Authority [NCTA], [2021](#)). Although the consultations and implementation process of that policy were deliberated upon, the incident at Army Public School in December 2014 was a turning point for the state and the security institutions to come down hard on the terrorists through concerted national efforts. This led to the formulation of the National Action Plan (NAP). In the following sections, an overview of the national security policies has been given with a particular focus on the NISP 2018-2023.

National Internal Security Policy 2014-2018: An Overview

The first NISP was presented in 2014, which adopted a two-pronged strategy after detailing the causes of extremism and terrorism that wrought havoc in the country. The underlined central features of the NISP- 2014 security framework were; dialogue, isolation, and deterrence. *The dialogue* was to employ political means to resolve conflicts. The role of dialogue or

political negotiations was extended to both non-state as well as anti-state actors, however, it was made clear that negotiations will be carried out under the constitutional parameters. *Isolation* was considered to adopt strategies to isolate the terrorist organizations “socially, legally, economically, and politically”. Lastly, *deterrence* referred to enhance the capacity of the counter-terrorism departments to deal with traditional and non-traditional security threats.

To implement the above-mentioned elements, the policy considered establishing the soft and hard components to deal with various issues concerning the state. The Comprehensive Response Plan (CRP) was envisaged as the soft component of NISP as the realization of the fact that militancy and extremism cannot be exterminated by only employing hard or military means. For this objective, it was decided to gain the confidence and trust of the public and engage them at various levels to eradicate this menace from society. As the causes of extremism and militancy are political, religious, or economic deprivation, so multidimensional strategies were needed to be employed. It was also reflected that the government was cognizant of the material and the collateral damage that occurred during the military operations. The measures for reconstruction of the infrastructure demolished or destroyed were also part of the CRP. The hard component of NISP was termed as Composite Deterrence Plan (CDP). It included a range of measures; inter-coordination among the security-related departments and intelligence agencies, ensuring the safety of key installations, de-weaponization of society, controlling the misuse of social media and dissemination of hateful speeches and radical views, madrassa reforms, and regulation of national database. Moreover, new departments like the Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) under NACTA, Rapid Response Force (RRF), and Counter Terrorism Departments (CTD) in all four provinces, AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan were established. National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was mandated to supervise the entire process. National Action Plan (NAP) was fostered by NACTA to crack down on terrorism. In short, the policy emphasized, “to protect national interests of Pakistan and addressed critical security issues and concerns with an institutionalized response through the National Counter Terrorism Authority”.

It was widely acknowledged that NISP 2014 was the first exhaustive security framework presented by the civilian government; however, it was



not devoid of certain deficiencies and shortcomings. It became subject to strong scholarly criticism for its self-claimed all-inclusive assertions and ineffective implementation strategies. Khosa and others criticized the overstated role of external threats instead of internal causes or conditionalities of terrorism and extremism in the NISP 2014 (Khosa, 2014). Ullah et al. (2018) argued that the policy failed to contextualize violent extremism and terrorism in diverse conditions and the counter-response. Rana argued that the policy lacked defining extremism and terrorism in Pakistan's context and therefore deficient in providing counter-narrative (Rana, 2014).

National Action Plan (NAP)

National Action Plan was adopted in 2014 after the announcement of NISP 2014-2018 as a reaction policy of Army Public School incident in December 2014. NAP consists of twenty points for countering terrorism and extremism. The main points of NAP include; the lifting of a moratorium on the death penalty with regard to terrorists' cases, madrassa reforms, the establishment of special military trial courts, strengthening of NACTA, curbing the dissemination of hate speech choking financing of terrorist organizations, reforms of FATA and revamping the criminal justice system. Although some of the points of NAP were successfully implemented like special military courts were established, FATA was merged into KP province, madrassas were registered. However, in the case of other major reforms like transforming the criminal justice system, designing a mechanism to control the spread of hate speech on the mainstream and social media, and blocking the financing of terrorists' organizations, NAP was not fully effective. It is also considered that the promulgation of NAP overshadowed the implementation of NISP 2014.

Role of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA)

NACTA was given the prime authority to monitor all the implementation process, it is imperative to discuss the role of this body in ensuring all the policy measures mentioned in NISP 2014 and the agendas of NAP. A brief discussion is also important to know to what extent NACTA was successful and to know which reforms are required to improve its efficiency. This critical point is taken into consideration in the last section of this paper. This authority was established in 2008 under the mandate of the Ministry of Interior. However, the incident of Army Public

School and the promulgation of the National Action Plan (NAP) called for reviving the ordinance and role of NACTA, which was ratified in 2013 by the parliament with a key objective to “act as a coordinating body, synchronizing the efforts of all of the security, and law enforcement apparatus in the country in order to combat terrorism in a concerted manner” (Zahid, 2016). NACTA is also responsible to coordinate federal and provincial governments and intelligence agencies on the issue of counter-terrorism, oversee intelligence and data collection, analysis and dissemination of relevant information to the concerned authorities, and to collaborate with the national as well as international academia and think tanks who have expert knowledge on the security subjects. The prime purpose is to conduct sound research and craft policies on these novel issues. However, since its establishment, the department has been facing serious challenges to implement its mandate. The most concerning issue is the provision of financial and political support. Apart from that some administrative bottlenecks are restricting the roles and objectives of the authority. The authority is still lingering to be properly owned. In theory, the authority has been loaded with multiple gigantic tasks, but in reality, the resources allocated are meagre, and it is seriously constraining its important role of countering extremism and terrorism in the country and implementing national security policies.

National Internal Security Policy 2018-2023

As national security is a constantly evolving challenge, therefore, a national security policy should be dynamic and evolve with the emerging challenges. In June, just prior to the new political setup, the PML (N) government unveiled another national internal security policy. The new policy marked the achievements made in the previous era and pondered upon the implementation gaps, and the emerging security challenges with new proposals and recommendations to deal with them. The following sections will give an overview of the main elements of NISP 2018-2023 to establish the all-encompassing nature of this security policy as our main area of focus. In the third section, a detailed critical appraisal of the formulation and implementation gaps of this policy is given. It explains whether it was comprised of all the elements imperative to design a comprehensive security policy to deal with the internal and external issues related to security. It also incorporates loopholes in the implementation process.



For the first time, the NISP 2018 clearly recognized all the terrorist's organizations working for perpetrating terrorism inside the country. The security policy mentioned that "the top threats to Pakistan's national security are the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Islamic State's (IS) presence in Afghanistan and possible spillover in Pakistan, and return of militants from Syria and Iraq". Moreover, it was also interesting to note that the madrassas were not delineated as the only form of insinuating religious extremism, but the modern educational institutions were also brought under the ambit of the emerging trend of violent extremism in society. It can be said that NISP 2018 was more internally oriented with a focus on determining the domestic causes of all the ills and implementing mostly soft measures to root them out.

To achieve a sustainable peace for the state and society, the policy organized the structure into three main domains to implement the recommendations proposed in the policy

- *Administrative*: This domain is related to the capacity enhancement and coordination of all the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) including civilian and military. Due attention was given to the strategic planning among the LEAs according to the imminent challenges.
- *Ideational*: It functions at two levels of identifying and dealing with the issues related to the motivations and the communications network, which are used in these organizations to meet their agendas. At one level terrorist organizations operate and propagate certain ideas and narratives. At the second level, they rely on different communication tools to carry out their tasks. The objective is to gain sympathy and to influence the people for recruiting and obtaining funds for their operations. The counter-strategy that comes under the ideational domain is to challenge the underpinnings of the extremist narrative by producing a counter-narrative and changing the mindset that is prone to violent and extremist ideas. Moreover, by employing the tools of cyber-security, their presence on social media, and their recruiting and funding mechanism can also be dismantled.
- *Socio-economic*: As the nature of extremism and terrorism is not exclusively related to religious fanaticism, it has deeply rooted political and socio-economic causes, which cannot be resolved entirely through administrative and ideational actions. It needs to introduce and implement deeply structured socio-economic reforms to overcome

inequalities and bridge the gaps between haves and have-nots to bring harmony to society.

Furthermore, to achieve the above-outlined objectives, the policy adopted a multi-pronged strategy that includes 6Rs; Reorient, Reimagine, Reconcile, Redistribute, Recognize, and adoption of a Regional Approach. A brief description of each strategy is warranted to delineate the subject of its comprehensiveness to meet the goals.

- a) *Reorient*: It stresses the modernization of the security apparatus including the infrastructure and capacity building, but also redefines its people-centric approach. Therefore, to accomplish the reorientation task to improve the cooperation and coordination mechanism among the security-related departments, to ensure the gathering of critical information and developing a sharing mechanism to the relevant stakeholders, propose reforms of the legal system to prevent its abuse, establishment of the comprehensive National Terrorism database, which includes all the concerned departments, and curtailing the financial network of the terrorist's organizations.
- b) *Reimagine*: It states that the whole society needs to be reformed as a "tolerant, inclusive, and democratic polity to strengthen the shared vision for the nation". This requires a certain set of policies, which includes preparing the National narrative intertwined with the beliefs and values of the society, cultural and interfaith harmony, educational reforms, registration and regulation of madrassas, and media reforms.
- c) *Reconciliation*: It was adopted to reconcile or reintegrate the left-out elements to make them a part of the rehabilitation process. According to that, priority would be given to the worst affected regions. In this regard, the key areas identified were FATA, Karachi, Balochistan, and certain parts of KP. The reconciliation is not limited to the negotiations process only; it includes creating a conducive environment and necessary reconstruction and development in the hard-hit areas. It is imperative from the perspective of socio-economic depravity, so that individuals can re-orient and re-connect themselves with society.
- d) *Redistribute*: This strategy focused on the marginalized factions of society to provide social protection and social justice. The above-mentioned values of creating alternative narratives, rehabilitation programs, and socio-economic uplifting cannot sustain in isolation without real connectedness in material improvements of the social lives

of the people. The priority areas included the political, social and economic uplifting of marginalized groups such as minorities, women and youth to bring them into the mainstream. It also involved the initiation of development programs for the under-developed regions so the people cannot be exploited by outside forces.

- e) *Regional Approach*: Terrorism is a transnational phenomenon with both local and international causes. It includes developing a proper mechanism to collaborate with the international community to bring peace within and outside the country. It also stressed adopting negotiation mechanisms and promotion of a peaceful environment with neighbouring countries to establish durable peace. It focused on shifting from geopolitics to geo-economic strategies.
- f) *Recognize*: This strategy aims to enhance the capacity of educational institutions and think tanks to evaluate, and propose broad-based quality research in identifying the factors that may lead towards extreme viewpoints and perspectives. Moreover, the focus was given to establishing research centers and analysis wings to develop a deeper understanding of security challenges. The proposals and evidence-based research would be provided to the concerned authorities and necessary measures would be taken by the Ministry of Interior, Information ministry, and NACTA to improve policymaking.

The above discussion provides a detailed account of what NISP 2018 entails. It has been clear that this policy was a clear shift towards adopting soft measures to counter the growing militancy and extremism in society. The policy encountered many ambiguities in the formulation process and faced multiple challenges at the implementation stage. Despite the fact, that the policy neglected some of the key areas related to security, it was effective in terms of bringing reforms in the national curriculum, and madrasa reforms and took some measures to control the spreading of hate speech on social media platforms. Overall, the policy could not achieve long-term effective measures of countering terrorism and extremism. This leads the government to formulate a new comprehensive security policy NISP 2022-2026. A detailed critical analysis of the formulations, as well as implementation of NISP 2018-2023, is given in the next section. The following is a brief summary of the recently announced security policy.

National Security Policy 2022-2026

This new security policy was announced to the public on January 14, 2022. The policy has considered the gaps left in the previous policy and attempted to make it more comprehensive by including all the traditional and non-traditional security threats. What is new in this security policy? It has been mentioned in the draft of the policy that the priority would be given to the geo-economics but it does not intend to replace it with geopolitics. Moreover, the security of CPEC projects has been given importance as the mega-project of the country. For the first time, the threats in all five domains; air, land, sea, cyber, and space are included in the policy. The realization of hybrid warfare has also been given due importance to neutralizing threats in media. The implementation of this policy would be critical as it would take a whole-of-government approach and the implementation process would comprehend all-inclusive nature of this policy, its successes, and failures in the coming months.

National Internal Security Policy (2018-2023): A Critical Appraisal

After conceiving and keeping in mind the national security policy, all the internal and external security challenges are preparing its draft, the next crucial step is its implementation. NISP 2018 experienced some stark challenges not only in its formulation but also at the implementation stage for a variety of reasons. Although maximum consultation and input were solicited from different stakeholders during the formulation process, the policy was approved in the last cabinet meeting by the then-government before the elections. This meant that the new government would determine the fate of its proper implementation. With the kinetic measures taken against the terrorists and conducting successful military operations, the government has been able to recapture areas and reestablish its writ in those regions. However, repatriation of internally displaced people in their areas and creating employment opportunities for them is still an uphill task. So that these people cannot be exploited by external forces again. All these measures along with many others were part of NISP 2018. The on-ground reality shows that the internal and external trends of terrorism have not been completely subdued and the prevalence of extremist ideology still exists in society. The recent incident of a brutal and inhumane attack on a Sri Lankan citizen by an extremist mob endorses this observation. Such incidents pointed towards the radicalized ideologies persisting in our youth and may manifest themselves violently in the future. That means either the security



policies are not vibrant and comprehensive enough and do not endorse the ground realities or there are some serious loopholes for their implementation. The following discussion critically approaches the formulation and implementation of these loopholes, which exist in the policy of NISP 2018-2023.

Formulation Deficiencies of NISP 2018-2023

Although with the initiation and implementation of the last two national security policies, the ratio of terrorist attacks and overall violence has declined, Pakistan remained vulnerable to a variety of other domestic and international security threats. As compared to NISP 2014, which majorly focused on conducting military operations in different areas to eradicate extremism, NISP 2018 adopted a multi-pronged strategy according to the needs of the emerging security threats. The focus of NISP 2018 was on domestic affairs, in which over 120 experts including law enforcement officials, parliamentarians, and civil society representatives were involved in the formulation process. It identified inclusivity, democratic society and durable peace as core values that must be protected. However, the proposal was overly ambitious, lacking in-depth analysis and neglected certain key security areas. This section would deliberate upon the critical evaluation of NISP 2018 in its formulation phase, as it is very important for any security policy to be implemented successfully and needs to be conceived properly and appropriately at the first stage.

The 6R strategy of this policy is similar to the UK's 4Ps strategy (Prevent, Pursue, Protect, Prepare) to counter terrorism needed to be conceptually developed and backed by academic and empirical research. The required strategies have been elaborated but the implementation and conceptualization of these strategies was somehow ascertained, which would have long term consequences. For instance, it had been mentioned in the policy that military and intelligence-based operations have produced immediate results and established the writ of the government but no comprehensive plan was charted to make this writ of the state long-lasting. Moreover, heavily loaded concepts had been introduced in the policy with no further explanations regarding their implementation. One of the 6Rs includes reconciliation, which comprises rehabilitation, reintegration, and de-radicalization, which is a huge task that requires enormous resources. However, this process still require identification , a detailed breakdown, which was not taken seriously in the previous policy. Moreover, new

concepts were introduced, for instance, in the reorientation domain the modern concept of Alternative Dispute Resolution was presented without elucidating the concept further and how it would be relevant in Pakistan's context. Moreover, a new National Community Policing Plan development was envisioned without elaborating on its mandate and tasks and how it would conduct its role in reconciling counterterrorism policies. It seems that the policymakers completely neglected the fact that already established taskforce and departments lack appropriate funds allocations and human resource development to perform their duties. In this scenario, introducing new sectors would cause distraction for the implementation of new policies.

Furthermore, in the domain of the 'Regional Approach' it was mentioned that in order for durable and sustainable peace within the region, a mechanism would be developed for close cooperation with the neighboring countries. However, the policy was devoid of any explanation and implementation mechanism which would develop and engage countries like India, Afghanistan, and Iran. The policy only reinforced the previous agendas of pursuing good relationships with the neighboring countries, with the Muslim community all over the world, and engaging countries at regional forums like ECO, SAARC and SCO. Likewise, the policy also stressed reforming the judicial system and making amendments to certain problematic laws that prevent the speedy trial of terrorists. However, the reforms of police, judiciary, and other institutions were not a new realization. These agendas had come forth many times before but the application of such proposals had always been limited.

Another important neglected aspect of security was to deal with the information of war. The security policy was unable to explain any mechanism or even mentioning of the threat of hybrid war and to deal with it. There was no proper roadmap given in the policy to regulate mainstream media and to control social media accounts involved in disseminating hate speech and the narrative of the enemy.

Finally, after the commencement of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) new infrastructure development projects are underway, in which some of the projects are being implemented in the most volatile areas like Balochistan and KPK. Therefore, transportation security is imperative as a well-established threat that exists to CPEC-related projects. In NISP 2018, there was no reference to transport security and the capacity enhancement of the relevant departments to prevent any security breaches.

In the annexure, the implementation plan with short, medium, and long-term goals, the periodic assessment plan were specified with the mentioning of establishing coordination committees to oversee counterterrorism efforts. However, ambiguity existed that which body would oversight and supervise the tasks and how these bodies would reconcile and cooperate in the counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan. It is the core problem with Pakistan's legislative system that a number of committees are established without any proper coordination mechanism, which delays the implementation procedure.

The shortcomings of NISP 2018 aside, it was unveiled prior to the new political setup. Therefore, in practice, the policy could not achieve much success. The following section would deliberate on the implementation procedure of NISP 2018 and discuss the problems that hindered to materialize the devised objectives.

Implementation Impediments of NISP 2018-2023

The implementation hurdles are discussed as follows:

Lack of Political Ownership

As NISP 2018 was approved in the last cabinet meeting by the previous regime, and after elections a new government was setup, so the security policy faced ownership problems from the very start. Some political analysts also claim that the policy was formulated and adopted just prior to elections to gain political benefit than actually addressing the core security issues. Although the policy was approved in haste and the then government took the trouble of its long formulation process, its status was left in the hands of the coming government, which has an explicit political rivalry with the government that conceived it. The new government established its own set of policies to run state affairs; therefore, there had been little mention of NISP 2018 in government circles.

It seemed that the successive government outsourced the counterterrorism-related issues and efforts to the military establishment to deal with them. There had been a lot of criticism of the government from the media, think tanks, experts, and Senate and National Assembly members on the slow pace of security-related steps. Moreover, there was no clear demarcation of the concerned department's responsibilities and roles for intelligence sharing and conduct of operations. For instance, NACTA

was first placed under the direct command of the Prime Minister, then it was placed under the Ministry of Interior, and still, its status is ambiguous.

Weak Criminal Justice System

Effective laws and a strong justice system play a crucial role in any country's success to implement policies and to get the desired results. From time to time, Pakistani government has taken measures to introduce and reform criminal laws to counter the menace of terrorism. As the phenomenon of terrorism is not new, since 1975 sequential successive governments, both civilian and military have enacted a number of ordinances, Acts, and legislations to introduce counterterrorism laws to address the growing security threats. The counterterrorism laws were special in nature and enacted to fast-track the execution process considering the nature of the act of terror. These laws can be divided into two categories; some specific laws are enacted for the prosecution of those criminals who are involved in terrorist activities and the second type of laws are applied to those individuals who are involved in financing, sponsoring and planning terrorist activities and terrorist organizations. Some of these specialized laws are; the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the Suppression of Terrorist Activities Acts (1974 to 1997), The Anti-Terrorist Act 1997 and Amendments, Special Courts and Protection of Judges and Witnesses, Anti-money Laundering Act 2010, Counter Insurgency Regulation 2011, The Investigation of Fair Trial Act 2013, Anti- Terrorism Ordinance VIII of 2013, Protection of Pakistan Ordinance 2013, and Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (Amendment) 2014.

Apart from these laws, there is a number of proposals and attempts, which have been made to reform police, judiciary, and prosecution. However, these reforms were not effective enough to bring out desired results or improve the efficiency of the overall justice system. If the legislations and policies were implemented in their true sense, extremism, terrorism, and militancy would not have taken root in the society.

Administrative Impediments

Another challenge that the implementation of security policies face is administrative obstructions and deficiencies. The government has over-excessively created committees and institutions with overlapping agendas causing confusion and wasting the time and resources. NACTA is the central body that has been mandated to oversight the implementation of

internal security policies with coordination of other security departments. In 2019, National Intelligence Committee (NIC) was formed with the role of integrating civil and military intelligence setup. The committee was headed by the Secretary of Interior and includes the DG Intelligence Bureau (IB), DG Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), representatives of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Directorate of Military Operations, and heads of provincial police and counterterrorism departments (CTDs). Surprisingly, NACTA was not made a part of this committee as the coordination body. Moreover, a Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) is already functioning at NACTA for the same purpose. Establishing NIC was incomprehensible and irrelevant.

During the first five years of the establishment of NACTA, it only provided lip service to the measures taken to eradicate extremism and terrorism. During that time, a struggle was going on between the Prime Minister, the Interior Ministry, and the head of NACTA over the issue of its powers and role. In 2013, that issue was resolved and act was legally passed, which placed NACTA under the direct control of the Prime Minister. Later on, new arrangements were made and NACTA was placed under the Ministry of Interior through an administrative notification. Currently, NACTA is answerable to the Board of Governors (BoG) headed by the Prime Minister. Unfortunately, no Board of Governors meeting was called during the PML (N) government tenure. The current regime started with a positive note to strengthen NACTA, however, there is no clarity on the future role and objectives of this authority. These administrative deficiencies affected the professional and operational activities of NACTA as a focal national institution to counter extremism and terrorism. NACTA has been given the arduous task of monitoring and coordinating the state's counter-terrorism efforts, repatriation of internally displaced people, dialogue with militants where necessary, and rehabilitation of the environment devastated by terrorism. However, NACTA has been facing serious financial and human resource constraints to carry out all these tasks effectively.

Apart from these loopholes, NACTA has taken some effective measures. It has banned groups, proscribed 444 individuals, and frozen 5,551 bank accounts, according to the data of 2019. As a capacity-building organization of the law enforcement agencies, it has held 24 workshops across Pakistan, which looked into the madrassa reforms that were part of

NAP. NACTA has also mandated to conduct effective scholarly research on the issue of terrorism, extremism, and militancy. For this purpose, it has launched the Pakistan Journal of Terrorism Research, which is a biannual journal that provides analysis on these topics.

Conclusion

The security (internal and external) of the country and its citizens is the prime responsibility of any state. After 9/11, Pakistan was entangled in myriads of internal and external security challenges. Some of the security challenges were homegrown, while others have strong external links. Among them, terrorism and extremism were the most challenging, which they defied the writ of the government in some parts of the country and created havoc in the society. To address these issues, the government decided to formulate a comprehensive internal security policy. NISP 2014-18 was a first step in this regard to give a befitting response to the terrorists. The major focus of that policy was to take coercive measures, and many military operations were conducted to dismantle terrorists' organizations operating from the FATA areas. Later on, NISP 2018-2023 was unveiled prior to the elections. This policy considered some of the emerging challenges that the country had been facing and the neglected areas in the previous policy and shifted its focus on adopting soft measures to respond to these security issues. Recently, it has been claimed by government officials and many scholars that the policy is all-inclusive and comprehensive. However, the detailed scrutiny of the policy in the above sections concluded that there were many loopholes in the formulation and implementation phases of the policy. The document was heavy-loaded with new concepts and terminologies without necessary explanations. Certain key areas of security were not considered and no mechanism and roadmap had been given to implement those ideas. Many of the concepts were ambiguous which hampered the implementation stage.

As there was no political ownership of that policy and certain structural impediments, led towards adoption of another security policy recently. It had been mentioned that key reforms would be enacted to expedite the process of countering terrorism and extremism but no practical measures had been taken by the current government. Some progress had been made in the curriculum reforms and madrassa reforms but these reforms still lacks

effectiveness, as the provinces have their jurisdiction over such issues, and the governance system is not delivering the desired results.

For any security policy, to be implemented in its entirety requires other areas to be functional. The political and governance system needs to be reformed. Comprehensive economic and educational policies needed the necessary time and the right steps to be taken in the right direction for durable and sustained peaceful society.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are recommended as a way forward for the future researcher

1. The national security policy is an important draft that deliberates the important contours of the comprehensive security policy, which the government adopts to address the security challenges. Therefore, it is important that the draft should not only be comprehensive in nature but must be drafted in a way that it can be easily comprehended without any ambiguities and without the use of heavy, out-of-the-context concepts. It should clearly mention the existing and emerging challenges both internal and external, and provide a clear and efficient roadmap to address them. In order to make security policy successful and comprehensively workable, a specific procedure is adopted which entails, agenda setting, identification of all stakeholders, exhaustive consultation to seek input, and ownership of all relevant stakeholders for the smooth implementation of this process. This process needs to be adopted properly so that the implementation process can go without any impediments.
2. As the nature of security challenge continuously evolve around the concept, which entails a variety of issues, therefore, it is important that the comprehensive policy should include all the related challenges. It is understandable that some of the security threats are more pronounced as compared to others, which is why they require a priority focus. In Pakistani context, it has become extremely difficult to differentiate the challenges based on these categorizations. Every challenge and issue is interlinked with the current situation, which has blurred the internal/external demarcation of the security threats. The imminent challenge is indeed terrorism and extremism, which has a direct impact on the development-related projects in the country. Therefore, a

comprehensive security policy cannot neglect transportation security from its draft. The NISP 2022-2026 has incorporated this aspect, which was neglected in the previous security policies.

3. There are many administrative challenges faced by the successive security policies for their implementation stages. It has become a norm in Pakistan that a lot of administrative agencies and committees are created and formed without any clear objectives and mandates. Such steps create ambiguities in the way of implementation. Moreover, the main departments responsible for the implementation process face constraints in the way of financial as well as human resource aspects. For instance, NACTA is the supervising body for the implementation of NISP, but the department lacks a proper financial budget and it does not have proper human resources. Moreover, NACTA as a civilian body to monitor the implementation process and effective counterterrorism authority should be revitalized and strengthened. Its Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID) should be made functional, so it can play its role in the sharing of intelligence with the concerned departments more effectively.
4. Moreover, there is a dire need to reform the governance system of Pakistan. After the 18th amendment, security, law, order, and terrorism is provincial subjects, in which provinces are autonomous in pursuing their own policies. In provinces, different political parties are ruling, which have their own interests. This situation also creates challenges for the effective adoption and implementation of internal security policies.
5. Lastly, security policies must be followed and should not be affected by the change of the government. There should be continuity in their implementation. The policies can be devoid of inclusivity of all the threats. However, as a matter of fact, new challenges emerged that demand the improvement and reorganization of these policies. In that case, a proper mechanism should be adopted to evaluate and upgrade the security policies according to the needs. A cost-benefit analysis can be a good strategy in this regard. It can help to understand the emerging challenges and improve the security policy accordingly. Moreover, cooperation is necessarily required between political and military institutions to carry out the tasks more effectively.

References

- Ahmed, K. (2021, September 12). War on terror' has cost Pakistan more than \$150bn in losses since 9/11, officials say. *Arab News*. <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1927131/world>
- Buzan, B. (1983). *People, states and fear; The national security problem in international relation*. The University of North Carolina Press.
- Farooq, K. K. (n.d.). *The national internal security policy of Pakistan- An Assessment*.
- Ghani, I. (2018). Intelligence collaboration between law enforcement, military and national security agencies in Pakistan. *Pakistan Journal of Criminology*, 10(4), 135–149.
- Khosa, T. (2014, March 8). Roadmap to internal security. *Dawn*. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1091721>
- Mirza, J. A. (2018). NISP: A long way to go. *The News International*. <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/331167-nisp-a-long-way-to-go>
- Nabeel, F. (2018, January 2). National internal security policy 2018-2023 — a critical assessment. *The Daily Times*. <https://dailytimes.com.pk/276539/national-internal-security-policy-2018-2023-a-critical-assessment/>
- National Counter Terrorism Authority. (2021). (NCTA). *NCTA watch 2020–2021*. <https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/NACTA-WATCH-2020-21.pdf>
- Rana, M. A. (2010). Litterateurs' response to extremism in Pakistan. *Conflict and Peace Studies*, 3(1), 23–30.
- Rana, M. A. (2014). *Literature responses to extremism in Pakistan*. Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies.
- Syed, M. H. (2019, December 23). *The vision of the founding father: what the Quaid foresaw in 1948*. Youlin Magazine. http://www.youlinmagazine.com/story/vision-of-the-founding-father-quaid-i-azam-muhammad-ali-jinnah/NzM0/?fb_comment_id=1207832865931107_4023251794389186

Ullah, I. Rehman, A. U., Ali, S., & Yasmin, A. (2018). National internal security policy: An analysis of prospects and challenges for Pakistan. *Journal of Applied Environment and Biological Sciences*, 8(2),178–183.

United Nations Development Program. (1994). *Human development report 1994*. Oxford University Press.
<https://www.undp.org/publications/human-development-report-1994>

Wolfers, A. (1962). *Discord and collaboration: Essays on international politics*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Zahid, F. (2016, July 19). *Counterterrorism policy measures: A critical analysis of Pakistan's national action plan*. The Mackenzie Institute.
<https://mackenzieinstitute.com/2016/07/counter-terrorism-policy-measures-a-critical-analysis-of-pakistans-national-action-plan/>